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A METHODOLOGY FOR PROBLEM-FORMULATION
ABSTRACT
The process of operational research is traditionally described 
by a list of sub-processes, starting with a description, definition 
or formulation of the problem. Explicit methodology for this 
formulation is sparse. Earlier research on the nature of conflict 
and its resolution produced a diagrammatic notation, which seemed 
capable of extension and use as a problem-formulation 'language'.
This thesis examines a wide range of methodology, directly or 
peripherally related to problem-formulation. It then argues the case 
for carrying out research to develop the diagrammatic notation as a 
medium for communication between an operational researcher and his 
clients, in order to establish in detail what their 'problem' is and 
perhaps to monitor the process of resolving it.
The notation, and rules for its use, are developed and described 
in detail, and then used to help decide how the problem formulation 
process itself is to be managed. The difficulty of 'proving' a 
methodology is examined and the principles and purpose of experiment 
in this context is discussed. A suitable groiip of people with a 
shared problem was approached, and agreed to an experimental consultancy. 
The methodology was thereby tested 'successfully', in the sense 
defined in the thesis.
The consultancy is in abeyance, but a start has been made with 
the use of the methodology in a study in support of a hospital accident 
and emergency department; it is also to be used in a study of decision­
making in higher military commands. Further applied research will 
also be needed to find out how best it can be used to enhance the 
early stages of systems practice (Checkland) , the analysis of options 
(Radford; Howard) and hypergame analysis (Bennett).
- ' Present evidence suggests that the procedures and practice 
described in this thesis are consistent with and complementary to 
these and other methodologies.
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CHAPTER 1
TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY FOR PROBLEM-FORMULATION 
Introduction
This is a statement of the ideas behind a research programme.
It will argue, in the first place, that the problems with which 
operational research helps are not satisfactorily posed in general; 
and, indeed, that the problems stated and analysed are often not 
sufficiently relevant to the decisions that those who own the problems 
have to make.
Secondly, it will examine what methods are used, or are being 
proposed for use, in carrying out the problem-formulation stage of 
the total decision-procèss. It will be accepted that this stage 
is not necessarily the starting point of a linear process, although 
it is a key-area of an iterative process. In particular, it will 
consider what constraints there may be, at present, in applying 
existing methods to the decision-process in large (e.g. governmental) 
organisations.
Finally, it will consider the proposed direction of research; 
viiy it is seen as relevant to the development of a problem-formulation 
methodology; why it should provide a sound basis for negotiation 
between operational researchers and their clients; and why it should 
be complementary to and not an alternative to other methods which 
in part or in whole have similar purposes.
The Philosophy and Methodology of Operational Research
Ackoff's principles
Not everyone sees the aims and procedures of operational research 
in the same light, a comment that can be taken as an understatement of 
the current state of operational research and one that demands a 
statement of my personal philosophy. This is based on long experience 
as an operational researcher, as a manager of operational research, 
and as a researcher into techniques and methodology. It is also 
influenced in a major way by the ideas and experience of others.
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Some of this experience and influence will be outlined later in this 
paper. The immediate statements summarise, in broad terms, my current 
beliefs.
In essence, they are in very close agreement with those recently 
stated or restated by Ackoff; a paper which I presented to a one-day 
conference arranged by the OR Society in December 1979 to debate Ackoff's 
views, and which is at appendix A, states why I am in agreement with 
him. This agreement has developed over a period of ten years through 
personal exchanges and study of his books and papers, in relation to 
my own research and to my former advisory role, as Head of Research of 
the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment, Ministry of Defence.
In a paper written as a basis for discussion of OR in Defence (Third 
International Discussion Conference on Operational Research), I summarise 
the difficulties facing OR in doing relevant supporting work on major 
problems (appendix B).
For the present purposes, the principles which Ackoff expounds 
and follows start with his perception of the problems of major concern 
to decision-makers as 'messes', sets of interlinked and interactive 
problems. He sees the need for taking into consideration a very wide 
environment, which may include many organisations, many purposeful 
systems, with complex and often inadequately explicit aims and goals 
and with similarly ill-defined values which govern the behaviour of 
each individual who affects the total system behaviour. This alone 
raises enormous difficulties. I have commented on some of these 
elsewhere (Bowen, 1975a and 1979) - see also note 1.
Central to his concept of planning, for which the operational 
research and decision-making are required, is the idea of ideals, 
outcomes that can never be obtained but can be pursued and approached 
without limit. This idea not only comes into the initial statement 
of purpose, but into clarification of what is meant by objectivity and 
into the process of idealised design. Constraints on the eventual 
resolution of the 'mess' through the planning and implementation pro­
cesses are introduced only as a conscious practical limitation on present 
progress towards the ideal.
The total involvement of those who plan and those who are planned 
for is another ideal. It affects operational research in the sense that
12
analysis should not be attempting to solve problems for people, but 
facilitating their efforts to resolve their difficulties for 
themselves. Additionally, it calls for operational research commitment 
to the total problem and not to some conveniently chosen part of the 
problem which appears to be amenable to some standard analytical 
treatment.
This is far from being a full treatment of the logic which Ackoff 
has developed over many years of teaching and practicing OR (which he 
calls Social Systems Science). Even the references given in appendix A 
are only a part of the whole story. Nevertheless, it is perhaps 
sufficient to make a few simple points which are very relevant to the 
purpose of my research.
a. Because of the nature of messes, it is very difficult for 
anyone to state clearly a problem for resolution, and it is 
impossible in principle to solve a mess. Every change made
to a system can only be looked at as a step towards the elusive 
ideal.
b. Because of the interaction, in a mess, of many systems which 
contain many people, a host of variables which will be difficult 
or inpossible to quantify have to be considered.
c. Because standard OR procedures can model certain sub-systems 
(primarily mechanistic ones or ones that are so treated) , 
there is no prior reason to believe that the analysis of 
these models will provide a decision-maker with information 
that he will perceive as relevant to his choice.
d. Only when the total problem (mess) is sufficiently clear to 
those who own it (see note 2) can they and their s\ç>porting 
analysts specify what further data and data-precessing they
may need in order to move towards a better framework for choice. 
It may be that no detailed analysis, other than that of 
clarifying the issues and their relationships is then needed, 
in some cases at least.
e. The perceived nature of the mess and acceptable courses of 
action to reduce its discrepancy with the ideal, may change in 
major ways as inquiry proceeds and as time passes. Even 
statements of the ideal to be pursued may change.
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f. Any statement of the stages of a decision-process must
recognise that a procedure that is followed in linear fashion 
must be weak, in that it should be an adaptive process: 
in Ackoff's philosophy the planning process should be ideal- 
seeking which requires a capability for self-monitoring 
and self-adaption. In particular, the stages of problem- 
formulation and implementation must be linked: it is of 
little value to have a proposed 'solution' which is found 
to be unworkable in practice.
Decision methodology
Ackoff's principles are demanding and conprise a framework of 
methodology for the whole OR process. Nevertheless, except in brief 
accounts, guidance as to how to operate within this framework is not 
available. To assimilate Ackoff's philosophy is hard; to work within 
it requires a discipline and style similar to his own. It also requires 
clients who are willing to participate in the ways his approach demands, 
and it has to be remembered that it aims to offer such sipport that 
is required to enable people to resolve their own problems. Ackoff 
has the advantage that he is free to refuse to work for those who 
want him to behave in ways other than those which he believes to 
be desirable.
What else then is on offer, that can help operational researchers 
who, even though they may accept his principles as a sort of ideal, 
find themselves at this moment forced to accept severe constraints 
inposed by the situation in which they work? I am thinking of those 
in groips within large organisations, and consultants who work for such 
organisations under normal economic constraints which do not allow 
them to pick and choose their clients. Particularly, in the area of 
problem-formulation, what structured procedures and techniques are there?
There is not much in the OR literature that gives a coherent 
picture of a methodology or methodologies for ope rati on eil researchers 
to follow. This should not be taken to inply that they do not exist.
There are many very good operational researchers and operational 
research teams who have done excellent work on conplex and intractable 
problems. Few have attenpted to give coherent accounts of the personal 
rules and procedures that have guided them. A recent paper (Tobin et
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al, 1979) is one exception: interestingly it is linked with the debate 
that followed Ackoff's controversial statements (Ackoff 1979a and 
1979b), Two other papers (Mitchell, 1980; Tomlinson, 1980) provide more 
general statements of methodological belief based on long personal 
experience. There are many reasons why more such papers are not written: 
time ; the reluctance of some employers to have organisational problems 
aired; and the difficulty of making explicit processes which have 
developed through experience (for example, how to manage people) 
in a way that could help others to follow.
Only one book exists that explicitly covers the total OR process 
(White, 1975a). This I have studied closely, and I have strongly 
recommended it (Bowen 1976 and 1977a). However, as the author admits, 
it is limited. It contains some guidance on the factors that must 
be taken into account in the problem-formulation stage, but, it says 
little about the linked stage of implementation, the process of communi­
cation, the nature of the decision-making system and the conflicts 
within it, and, generally, it avoids behavioural issues. Its strength 
lies in the treatment of modelling and analysis, which are the convention­
al expertise areas of operational research. It illuminates the range 
of secondary decisions which the analyst has to take in assisting with 
the primary decision, but, in the problem-formulation stage, these 
are decisions which are necesscury to translate the problem into a 
manageable shape for analysis. In my 1977 review, I said "... the 
reader is awakened to the fact that finding the problem is a major 
study area, lacking at present any clear methodology."
There are few good accounts of what OR is done in large organisations, 
how the tasks are negotiated, and how the place of OR in the organisation 
helps or hinders the analytic and communication processes. It is 
inport ant for the problem-formulation stage that a partnership between 
OR and management should exist; it is also important that management 
should see its role in the wider environment of its organisation, and, 
indeed be prepared to evolve this organisation accordingly. Without 
such organisational characteristics, OR as Ackoff would have it will 
operate under severe constraints. Two organisations have produced 
literature which indicates that these aspects of decision methodology 
are not universally ignored: there are undoubtedly others (see, for 
example. Tobin et al, 1979) although I have not seen explicit
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documentation. The Swedish National Defence Institute (FOA) has 
described the central role of OR in policy formulation and planning 
at the highest level and traced the development of its activities 
prior to and after the crucial decision in 1973 to give OR this wider 
responsibility (Jennergren et al, 1977). The treatment of the subject 
in a series of essays on different aspects, is well-worth reading 
(Bowen, 1978a). More recently, the National Coal Board has produced 
a document which, although it concentrates more on the work carried 
out, gives a similarly encouraging message of success through 
co-operative endeavour (Operational Research Executive, 1979).
The latest argument for a new approach to methodology comes from 
Rosenhead (1980a and 1980b). This urges a move away from rational 
comprehensive planning and from incrementalism, both of which are 
seen to fail in turbulent environments, the first because it posits 
too rigid a policy, the second because the continuity in the nature 
of the problem which it requires is rarely forthcoming. Rosenhead 
proposes a methodology based on robustness analysis which he believes 
will provide for flexible planning and practical application. It is 
too early to judge the full merit of his claims, but it is inevitable 
that the problem-formulation and inplementation aspects of the total 
decision or planning process will require very careful and explicit 
attention.
There are, of course, numerous case histories in the literature. 
Almost without exception, these ignore how the problem came to be seen, 
to what part of the overall problem the analysis was relevant, and 
what success there was in implementation. There are a few recent 
gleams of light in the prevailing darkness. Stain ton (1979) has 
deliberately rewritten an earlier case-history (Stainton, 1977) to 
throw some light on the way in which management and analysts operated 
together to improve the operations of a steel firm in cutting bars 
of rolled steel. Williams (1979) , in a paper that won the first 
PROSPECT award, discusses a productive planning problem enç>hasising 
the involvement between the OR team and the client shipbuilding 
organisation. Although, as yet, there is not enough material of this 
sort to offer more that "the beginning of a rationale for problem- 
formulation" (Bowen, 1980a) , more of the same is badly needed.
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There is, then, evidence of need for something to be added to 
the written methodology of OR, and, in particular for something to 
guide the phase in which analyst and client jointly wrestle with the 
task of deciding what it is that is worrying them and what they have 
got to take into account in any changes that may be made to the 
system they control. The next few sections examine what research 
is already underway that shows promise of offering something towards 
this goal.
Some Current Research Studies
Radford's approach to complex decision problems
In dealing in general terms with policy problems and the decision 
processes related to them, Radford (1977) introduces the Analysis of 
Options. This approach is based on the study of metagames; the problem 
to be analysed is viewed as a game situation and the procedure in 
essence seeks a stable resolution through reviewing the metagames 
derived from the game situation and the metaequilibria of the metagames. 
Radford is concerned with the perception of the participants of their 
own possible strategies and the possible responses of others, the 
perceptions of others' perceptions and so on. I have no doubts about 
the value of his work as an orderly, descriptive, explicit form of 
representation of the conflicts that militate against a simple preference 
decision. It can provide insights into the needs for more data and 
more communication and the nature of these needs. It can provide more 
coherence for the judgement of alternatives, and for negotiating and 
bargaining procedures, once the broad decision has been taken to regard 
the problem in a particular way,
Radford refers to limited information leading to those involved 
having "... a sense of incompleteness in their understanding of their 
problem" (page 4) and regards "the gathering of information and 
preliminary appraisal of the problem" as the first step (page 1) .
He also says (page 2) that "In many ways formulating such a problem 
and resolving it are one and the same thing." Again, on pages 36 
to 38, when he discusses in more detail the first steps, namely inform­
ation gathering, it is as if the problem is taken as known; indeed, 
if this is not so, what is guiding the information gathering? In all
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this discussion, I would prefer the word "data" rather than "inform­
ation"; the latter word, to me, contains the assumption that the data 
is in fact relevant for the purposes of inquiry and for the related 
secondary, or the eventual primary, decision.
In his chapter 5, Radford looks at the communication, negotiation 
and bargaining between participants. There is no mention of prior 
procedures which might have helped towards an avoidance of the more 
malevolent and non-co-operative relationships that may exist. He does, 
of course, deal with the full spectrum of possible co-operative 
and non-co-operative stances, but, as with the "problem", there is 
a situation which is deemed to exist and be, more or less, understood.
All this does not seem untypical of real situations. Whenever 
we come to recognise a problem's existence, we take our perception 
of that problem at that moment, and we take the situation, as it is, 
to be the environment in which the problem exists. There must be 
a starting point and to some extent it must be arbitrary. Nevertheless, 
there is some choice and it would be nice to make that choice before 
positions become too entrenched.
In his chapter 6, Radford does draw attention to the way the problem 
develops in time, and his statement of the information gathering stage 
is now somewhat different since it is part of a continuous development 
of understanding leading towards a resolution. But "the problem" 
seems still to be prejudged. In the accompanying illustrative case- 
history to expand the facilities of the Toronto International Airport, 
which gives a fine descriptive analysis using the analysis of options, 
the final decision, forced by events, was 'Do nothing'. As in the case
of the Third London Airport, the anguished process might at least
have been alleviated if a much wider framework for the original problem- 
formulation had been accepted.
It is this aspect of the total decision-process that is a problem 
in its own right. It may be that the Analysis of Options can in fact 
be used on this meta-problem. But even if it can, some earlier work 
needs to be done to start from a very wide environment of a set of
linked, or possibly linked, problems, as Radford accepts (pages 155-158);
there will be a need for another sort of negotiation, between analyst
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and client, to decide on the choice of problem within this environment.
It seems that Radford's procedure will allow the problem to change 
in degree and, particularly, for the strategic complexity of the 
problem to be differently perceived. It will not allow it to change 
in type, until at the end of a long and perhaps bitter struggle something 
like a 'Do nothing' policy is achieved, despite the fact that the need 
for some sort of change may still be required.
In my experience of defence problems, there are many worrying 
features that occur. Linked problems are certainly not always 
analysed together. When there is a search for a weapon system to 
fulfil a certain task, one will be chosen, although later events 
and negotiations may force a cancellation for reasons which might 
have been considered even if not predicted. Studies to prepare for 
possible future military actions, and spend resources accordingly, 
take precedence over studies that seek a spending on facilities that 
should reduce the probability of such future actions being called 
for (Bowen and Harris, 1978) . Grainger (1980) , in a private communi­
cation, has drawn attention yet again to the interesting fact that, 
no matter how the world changes, the UK defence vote remains obstinately 
divided, like Gaul, into three more or less equal parts: he too is 
concerned that analysis carried out seems insecurely linked to decisions.
My conclusion is that Radford offers a most helpful means of 
improving the later processes of problem reformulation and implementation 
but does not provide a sufficient methodology to ensure that the ball 
is started rolling in the right direction. It may also be that he 
offers techniques of communication and debate that can be integrated 
with new approaches to their benefit. In a later book (Radford, 1980) , 
he does add more description of how the problem is formulated, but 
my general inpression of a gap here is unchanged.
Bennett's theory of hypeygames
The work that was seminal in producing Radford's ideas (Ackoff et 
al 1968; Emshoff and Ackoff, 1970; Howard 1970, 1971, 1975) has been 
developed in a different, but probably conplementary, fashion at the 
University of Sussex. Neither of these approaches have yet had time 
to produce published applications, other than illustrative post-hoc
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analyses. Nevertheless, hypergâmes also merit study with regard to 
their relevance to the problem-formulation process.
In brief, I believe that they have the potential to extend and 
inprove Radford's concepts of analysis of conflict situations: they 
did in fact stem from a conflict research programme (see Bowen and 
Harris, 1978) which used game-theoretic and gaming approaches.
The underlying idea of hyper games is that the several participants 
in a conflict are playing different games. They will not necessarily 
have correct perceptions of the strategy sets being considered by 
others, nor similar perceptions of the preferences of outcomes.
Hyper game theory examines the stable and unstable solutions of the 
linked games - the hyper game. Details of the analysis of hypergames 
are given by Bennett (1977) , Huxham et al (1978) , Bennett and Dan do 
(1979), Giesen and Bennett (1979), Bennett (1980), Bennett et al (1980), 
and Bennett (198ob).
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this series of very 
interesting and stimulating papers is the increasing caution that is 
expressed. Even in post-hoc analyses the uncertainty as to whether 
the analyst has the full problem or the full context of the problem 
becomes more explicit. Huxham's work on the shipping crisis is referred 
to by Bennett (1980b) as ^a case in which the great 'width* of a 
problem precluded any great 'depth' of analysis with the available 
resources." It is also stressed that there should be no attempt to 
produce a single model that is claimed to be a complete picture of
what is happening. As with Radford, a process for disentangling some
of the complexity of reality is being sought.
Once again, there seems to be a need for an earlier stage of
problem exploration, before a hypergame (or an analysis of options)
technique is used (see Bowen, 1981a). Perhaps however the logical
framework, the language, of hypergames may be valuable, as may the 
language of the analysis of options in the earliest stage of problem- 
formulation that can be systematically carried out.
It will be clear by now that the whole problem of looking at 
messes is bedevilled by never-ending adaptive loops and by a bewildering
procession of infinite regresses; we go round and round; there is no
clear starting point and no clear end; every problem contains many
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secondary problems and is enclosed by many meta-problems. The eventual 
choice of how far to probe will be a decision about how to tackle at 
least the first metastage.
Work at the University of Bath
In the long run, a problem-formulation which is satisfactory 
has to be one that is acceptable to those who own the problem (see 
note 2). If those involved participate to the utmost, the whole 
process is necessarily eased. In particular, values do not have to 
be measured artificially or imputed (see Bowen 1979 and 1981b) .
Behavioural studies seem to be increasingly moving towards techniques 
in which interactive modelling enables the participants to control 
and understand their own decision or judgemental behaviour and such 
measures of their own subjectivity that are used (by them) in analytical 
support (Kaplan and Schwartz, 1975 and 1977) . I have studied such work 
not because, for the present purposes, I wished to use the models 
being developed but because I needed to know what processes of later 
an^ysis were available to which any framework of problem-formulation 
should relate. I have referred elsewhere (Bowen 1981b, 1980b, 1980c) 
to particular interest in the work by Hammond and by Kaplan on Subject­
ive Judgment Theory and Information Integration respectively, although 
I cannot yet be sure what their impact might be on the research I 
carry out.
Eden and his colleagues at the University of Bath have gone a 
stage further (Eden, Jones & Sims, 1979 and 1982). They are engaged 
on what I see as major research on, and application of, a very special 
problem-formulation technique. Their inspiration comes not from the 
ideas in OR and management science but from the areas of the social 
sciences, notably that of clinical psychology. Their concern is not 
so much with the 'solving' of problems but rather with helping their 
clients to understand, in their own language, the relationships and 
influences of the mental constructs from which they perceive their 
problem to be built (see note 3). They use a directed graph-theoretic 
technique, backed by an interactive computer program which enables 
people to enter into a dialogue with their own ideas and those of 
collaborating others. Their process ends when their clients no longer 
need their professional siç>port in the inquiry that the clients themselves
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make. The problem of values is eased because these are subjectively 
included, and questioned, by those who own them. The problem of language 
(or jargon) is set aside since the study is carried out in the language, 
or sub-language, that is natural to the individual. It is an impressive 
process, researched by using co-re se cir che r clients and 'proved' in 
practical success with other clients. Why should I wish to seek further?
There are two main reasons. The first is that the process used 
in getting things going is one which I describe as counselling. It 
has many of the features which, in other fields of counselling, limit 
the numbers of those who can successfully engage in the task: it is
not a question of knowing rules, studying them and having a serious 
intent to do well, but it is a question of having a suitable personality 
and an ability to both emphasise and at the same time remain detached 
from the analysis development. The qualities that provide a good 
operational researcher with a sufficient neutrality so that his own 
values are not unwittingly imposed upon the problem studied, may not 
be enough for the carrying out of Eden's methodology.
The second reason is the commitment required from the client and
the time he has to devote to make this commitment fruitful. Since
it is, generally, a client groip rather than a single person, this 
difficulty is magnified. From experience, I cannot, in general, 
see the clients in large organisations having, yet, the confidence 
in the ability of their analysts to be willing to get the process 
of inquiry underway. There may be antipathies to the central role 
of the computer, however interactive and responsive this may be, but 
this is not seen as too serious an issue.
I believe that as a step between existing (or non-existing!) 
practice in problem-formulation, and the development of an environment 
in which Eden's work can be widely used, there is a need for a less-
ambitious, more prescriptive methodology with a flexible but impersonal
language. It should, however, be consistent with, and not preclusive 
of, any methods of potentially general application which are closer 
to the ideal; cognitive mapping as used by the University of Bath 
team is certainly close to my ideal.
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Hildebrandt's view of implementation
Hildebrandt uses the word implementation in a special sense.
In a discussion of the analyst's role (Hildebrandt, 1980), he describes 
it as
"the actual use of OR output by managers, a use that 
influences their decision processes"
In a paper that won a prize at the 1979 Norwegian OR Conference, he 
deals specifically with implementation so defined (Hildebrandt, 1980b) . 
He does not, however, stress the importance of problem-formulation, 
perhaps because he did not find it to be of special concern to the 
OR community whose writings he discusses.
Nevertheless, in a summary of one analysis of the problem of OR 
implementation (Ginsberg, 1975) , Hildebrandt quotes "mismatch between 
problem and solution" as the first in a list of major difficulties 
that Ginsberg perceived. Not only this, but all the other difficulties 
listed, stem in part from the inadequacy of problem formulation, e.g.
"failure to handle the manager/analyst interface adequately" 
is inevitable if a problem is inadequately formulated and 
the model building is not based on the concepts of problem 
which the manager has;
"poor criteria for problem selection and solution evalution" 
is a result of the preceding failure; and
"environmental factors which affect the ease or difficulty 
of implementation" also seriously affects implementation as 
I have used the word - a change to a system as a result 
of decision stemming from analysis - and I have already 
drawn attention to this at the end of my comments on Ackoff's 
principles.
Implementation must, in both senses, be a factor in problem- 
formulation. In particular, environmental systems which might introduce 
constraints on potential actions must be seen as part of the problem, 
as of course must any internal behaviour which operates against possible 
changes.
Hildebrandt does not examine how Eden's work might serve to 
overcome the problem of getting OR accepted, or getting the OR process 
properly used. This was, I think, because at the time his paper
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was prepared, the most relevant descriptions of that work (e.g.
Eden, Jones and Sims, 1979) had only just been published: certainly 
Hildebrandt is well aware of Eden's research.
Per Agrell, of the National Defence Research Institute, Sweden, 
in a private communication, draws attention to the fact that implement­
ation may be used of many aspects and phases of the total decision 
process, and that, therefore, the concept of "implementation" has 
to be defined, implicitly or explicitly, in the separate contexts
in which it may be used. I comment on this again in chapter 5.
Systems thinking
Within systems thinking (Emery, 1969), there is a gread deal that
I view as essentially a part of operational research. In addition to
Ackoff's work (appendix A) I would stress the relevance of cybernetic 
modelling (Beer, 1972 and 1975) and of systems developments by Checkland 
(1972, 1977, 1980, 1981). These researchers deal with the total 
process of "problem-solving" from their own special stanc^oint.
Neither, however, provide the language that I seek for problem- 
formulation. If I feel more comfortable with Checkland's methodology 
than with Beer's, it is because the former provides a more coherent 
view of "process", the time-varying elements of the overall system 
studied, as opposed to "structure", which, by conparisen, changes only 
very slowly.
In his stress on "root definitions", which establish the essence 
of systems relevant to the "problem", Checkland addresses an issue 
of central importance. His approach is a verbal one. My "language" 
will have to be capable of coping with the necessary root definitions 
and be instrumental in helping to obtain them. In statements on 
problem-formulation itself, Checkland (1977) sees the essence of his 
new systems analysis as lying in the debate that it generates about 
ill-structured problems.
It is towards a systemic procedure for conducting this debate 
that my own work is directed. I shall return to a more thorough 
discussion of Checkland, 1981, after I have described my own methodology 
and its application in practice. I shall also then comment on the 
claims made for a System E^amics approach to problem-formulation.
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Conway's study of the OR process
Before moving on to discuss my own earlier research and why I 
believe it can lead to a useful methodology for problem-formulation 
I want to make a few comments on a broad research study (Conway, 1979) , 
the aim of which is examine the actual process by which problems 
for investigation by OR are generated, understood, structured and 
solved, culminating in implementation of recommendations,
Conway started this work in 1976 and it is still in progress.
It contains an invaluable analysis of the many different (but similar) 
models of the OR process that have been offered, and considers what 
aspects, seen in actual processes, are missing from what, generically, 
is seen as the classical model. (The variants are not seen by Conway 
to have essential differences). Among other aspects, he finds identifi­
cation of the nature of the problem as perceived by individuals in 
the management structure to be missing, and also the importance of 
the co-existence of several interacting projects.
In his search for a suitable language for discussing the dynamic 
model of the OR process that he has developed, he has discussed 
several language approaches that are in the literature (Boothroyd, 1978? 
White, 1975a; Ackoff and Emery, 1972; and ray own work based on conflict 
which I discuss in the next section). In all cases, he sees the concepts 
limited to a single independent project, and has sought his language 
elsewhere.
This is important because I shall need either to show that this 
limitation is not true of my own ' language' or I must develop it to 
remove such limitation. Conway's comments were based on the then 
limited documentation of my ideas, but they are not made lightly and 
I cannot ignore them. I shall comment on the close similarities 
between my approach and that of Boothroyd's concept in the next chapter.
The Conflict Approach
The key works which have recurred in the foregoing are 'conflict', 
'language' and 'perception'. In the earliest published work on the 
research studies into conflict (Bowen and Smith, 1976), which I 
initiated in work for the Ministry of Defence, it was made clear
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that misunderstandings of language and different perceptions of 
situations and actions were fundamental and had to be overcome if 
conflict was to be avoided or resolved. In this paper, a new logical 
diagrammatic notation (largely developed by David Smith) was introduced. 
With minor changes, it is the language which I propose to develop 
and use for the study of problem-formulation. It is systems-oriented 
and set-theoretic in priciple. Basically any system is a set containing 
sub-sets (or sub-systems) and is contained by some set which can be 
defined as its environment (in some sense), Sets which are separated 
within a common enclosing set represent systems which are likely to be 
in conflict: there may be a third set in the same environment which
is capable, potentially, of controlling any conflict, but this is not 
always the case (even in organisations that normally ccane under 
some central control),
The full detail of the notation will be given in the following 
chapters. For the present purposes, three quotations from the original 
paper are important,
"Anyone who is advising on a problem has to choose suitable 
methods by which he defines, interprets and models the problem 
and provides information in a suitable form for ultimate decision 
and implementation, Ihe fact that there is a problem, means 
that there is conflict,,," (page 165)
"The models which have been described are useful, not only for 
the purposes of problem-definition, but also for structuring 
and enquiring into the interaction both between the analyst 
(in his subsequent advisory role) and the decision-maker, and 
between the decision-maker, when advised, and those whom his 
decision affects." (page 165)
",,,it would be valuable, even to those experienced as advisors, 
to have some type of logic to apply directly and systematically 
to any new problem ,,, to work out afresh for each problem, 
in its own language, a procedure which may already be known is 
a wasteful and an inefficient way of doing business," (page 166) 
The first two show that even in 1972, the idea of a problem-formulation 
use of the notation, introduced to help understand the way in which 
conflicts arose and developed, was foreseen. The third, in the light
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of much more knowledge, particularly influenced by Eden, showed an 
enthusiasm that was fash, although as I have stated above, perhaps the 
language can help in the current modified aim of getting part of the 
way.
Since then, only a few documented uses of the notation have 
been published, although I have used it informally in my own work and 
in advisory work, particularly that which involved intervention in 
conflicts at a managerial level. In a paper for a Conference on 
Systems and Informatics (Bowen, 1975b) the basic diagrammatic notation 
was described very simply: the interaction notation (arrows connecting 
boxes or sets, or systems) was shown to be optional and only necessary 
to emphasise what seemed, to the analyst or for the purposes of communi­
cation, to be more important : the rules of the notation defined inter­
actions between contained and containing sets. The use of various 
notations for emphasis of particular interactions was also introduced, 
although I have since abandoned these. There is also in this paper 
an important discussion of the way in which the passing of time makes 
for difficulties in stating the problem in the context of its ultimate 
implementation: this may prove to have links with Rosenhead's method­
ology.
Before the conference took place, the notation had already been 
used to examine the OR process itself, and the interaction between 
analyst and decision-maker in particular; the paper was in fact presented 
somewhat differently. The new ideas were included in a later paper 
(Bowen, 1975c) and were further extended and presented at an OR 
Society one-day conference (Bowen, 1977b), Because these last two 
are not published in very accessible form, the second one is reproduced 
at appendix C, It is this work (which discussed the case of a single 
OR problem) that motivated the critical comment by Conway referred 
to above. The earlier work (Bowen 1975b) does, however, indicate, 
albeit very briefly, something of the nature of interlocking problems.
Additionally, and perhaps very inç>ortantly because of the relevance 
of the game-theoretic ideas of Radford and Bennett, the notation has 
been used to illustrate and develop concepts of conflict games (Bowen, 
1978b), This, largely the work of Janet Harris, also introduced new 
'arrows' into the notation to specify purposeful interactions and pure
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communication links (purposeful and otherwise). Finally, there were 
notes (primarily by Janet Harris, with contributions by David Smith 
and myself) which were not even in an informal document. These dealt 
specifically with a search for the implications of the different 
perceptions of systems in conflict, and also made some, very tentative, 
suggestions for dealing with the time dimension. They will be referred 
to again in the next chapter.
As a basis for a language to describe and develop problems,
the notation has the advantage of logical simplicity and visual neatness
and compactness. It enables both physical and conceptual systems to
be described in the same sort of way (the former may be seen as defined 
sets, the latter as fuzzy sets). It can compress a lot of data into a 
small space, it provides a diagram to guide thought and communication, 
and particularly to offer, partially, a common language for the latter.
It avoids, to a large degree, the snaking connecting lines of typical 
system diagrams. It imposes a discipline by forcing attention to 
systems which contain and systems which are contained: this includes
systems which properly belong within an individual, being his concepts.
It does not accept overlapping systems : either systems must be broken 
down and give new sub-systems labels or systems must be drawn as at a 
particular time or stage to identify changing states or shifting roles.
It has the potential to interface with other methodologies. This 
is very important both because of the adaptive nature of the OR process 
and because it may not be easy without a linking methodology, to 
ensure the carrying through of the logic of methods which only deal with 
part of the total decision process. It seems desirable also to concentrate 
attention on the broader aspects of problem-formulation, and not to 
try to deal with detail that may be better studied by other methods.
It will, therefore, be necessary to keep the level of description at 
a low and balanced level until a clear need arises to introduce complexity: 
further, it will be necessary to check the extent to which the notation 
can deal with the underlying concepts of the other methodologies discussed.
Like any other language (see Eden, Jones and Sims, 1979 and 1982), 
it must be accepted and understood by analysts and clients. It must
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therefore be natural, or if a specialised sub-language, it must be 
simple. There may be difficulties with those who prefer words to 
diagrams; fortunately, those working in large organisations are 
becoming more and more familiar with graphic methods, particularly 
computer flow charts, and this will aid any new learning process.
The Research P^ rogranpne
To conflate my account of why I have stayed with this conflict- 
based idea, I should revert to the statement made at the end of the 
section on hypergames. The infinite regresses and the endless adaptive- 
loop processes that I refer to have always been accepted, indeed a 
natural feature, of my research on conflict. My early collaborator,
David Smith, and I saw clearly that we ought to be able to use our 
own process of modelling to monitor our own processes of inquiry into 
conflict: in work, that unfortunately cannot be quoted, David Smith 
did just that, albeit in a loose subjective fashion. Accordingly,
I should, if the methods to be developed are to be sound, be able 
to model the problem of problem-formulation. It is an idea which is 
also possible in the University of Bath work; Eden and his colleagues 
do indeed use their own mapping techniques to study their research 
processes. In the same way, a good OR methodology that enables the 
modelling stage to be carried out in a reasonable formal way should 
provide a methodology for the choice of models. (Bowen 1975d and 1976),
How far I can get towards my ideal is debatable, but, in principle, 
the method proposed has the important potential of being self-reflecting. 
That is a desirable criterion.
My own experience in using the notation in professional discussions, 
and in seminars for University and Civil Service College teaching is 
encouraging. It has been readily accepted, has stimulated ideas, and 
has helped to co-ordinate discussion by identifying more clearly the 
relationships between the concepts being used. The diagram of appendix C 
has been invaluable in drawing attention to the difficulties that face 
any operational researcher.
The research programme, as at appendix D, was prepared before this 
chapter was written. Despite a great deal of further reading and 
discussion of available methodologies covering the OR process, nothing
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arose which made me wish to change direction. The research that followed 
was to put a belief into more formal terms; to develop the ideas 
that had been useful to roe into ones that could be generally useful; 
and to demonstrate this in practice. In short, it was to show that, 
in Ackoff's phtase, I had "an idea whose time has come".
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Motes on Chapter 1
1, There is work going on in France (Moscarola, 1980) on the process 
(not the moment of time) of decision, which relates directly to 
and is in broad agreement with issues discussed in Bowen (1979).
I cannot yet judge the relevance of this research to my main 
theme of problem-formulation, since the questions raised about 
values and beliefs have been primarily oriented towards other parts 
of the total decision-process.
2. On the notion of ownership of a problem. Professor W.R. Buckland 
commented that, while he was not sure what meaning I intended,
he was sure that it would be confusing to a manager who, generally, 
would describe his situation as one of responsibility for, and not 
ownership of, a problem. Two points arise.
a. I find it a useful notion, but I must define it for my purposes,
and I must not use it in communication with clients unless
they come to 'own' my concept as I intend it.
b. In my language, an individual owns a problem if he accepts
it, as defined in words, as recognisably the problem perceived 
by him (i.e. it is part of his world-picture) ; and if, also, 
he is concerned with, and in some part responsible for, its 
resolution. A group which does not have (or own) a common 
perception of a problem will have difficulties in the joint 
attenç»t to resolve 'it'.
I would also note, in the context of Buckland's comment, that 
'decision-maker' is a term which worries people, since there are 
usually several involved in a decision, while the prime function 
of "the man at the top" is his taking of responsibility. Elsewhere 
(Bowen, 1979), I refer to Shubik's advocacy of "responsibility- 
taker".
'OvTning a concept' is a phrase that I have borrowed from 
Eden and from Ackoff: it was not previously in my vocabulary
but I now own it. Eden is concerned (Eden, Jones and Sims, 1979) 
that the problem studied by an adviser is so expressed that it is 
recognised by the client as 'his problem' - he owns to having 
that problem (see pages 148-151 of the reference) . Ackoff has 
a particularly nice thought on ownership (Ackoff, 1974, preface.
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page viii)
"I do not claim authorship of any of the ideas presented.
I am sure others have had each of the ideas I treat as 
my own. No idea can mobilize a large number of individuals 
into action unless most of them can treat it as their own.
My hope, therefore, is that in this work I articulate what 
many others have thought and desire to claim as their own"
3. Dr. Sue Jones, of the University of Bath, in a private communication, 
referred to
"... the need to pay attention to the problem definition 
before any attempt to find solutions - assuming that [these 
solutions] can be found [and that] the process of problem 
definition itself does not result in a dissolving of the 
problem".
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONFLICT NOTATION
Introduction
In the early 70s, with a colleague, David G. Smith, I initiated 
a research study on conflict. The initial intention was application 
to military problems. I was conscious that, in modelling situations 
for defence studies, it was customary to assume that war had started 
and that two sides were ’lined up' in a particular way. The unstated 
and unanswered question was how affairs had developed towards this 
undesirable state and in what ways would this development affect the 
initial conditions for combat. It was the precursors to war that 
were of interest to me: it seemed that the deployment of resources
of all kinds to aid a move away from war should be an important issue 
for defence, yet, in OR studies, nothing had yet been done to analyse 
such deployment.
It soon became clear that descriptive models of the process of 
conflict were required; also, that such models should help to 
identify critical points, particularly the crisis point when a move 
from ’peace’ to war became an accepted, because necessary, policy.
As our study advanced, it appeared likely that, if basic elements of 
the process could be identified, these should be relevant to conflicts 
of all types, and provide a basis for concepts which might be useful 
for understanding conflict situations. It was also recognised that 
conflict could be benevolent, and as such was an essential element of 
progress. What we wished to study was malevolent conflict, or a 
loss of control of conflict that could, if it remained benevolent, 
be useful. When conflict led, or might lead, to the acceptance 
of non-preferred policies and actions which, at an earlier stage, 
would not have been deemed acceptable at all, we wished to know what 
facilities (including means towards understanding) could be improved 
or added to so as to reduce the future likelihood of such degeneration 
of a situation (note 1).
The results of our work were presented at a social sciences 
seminar at Edinburgh University in 1972, and reported in due course
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in the proceedings of that seminar (Bowen and Smith, 1976). In 
repeating here, for convenience, the essence of the notation and models 
developed, I have made changes in order to bring the material into 
line with my current practice. This includes tentative rules or 
conventions for the use of the original and extended notations.
The Conflict Models
Model of interaction
Figure la shows a model of interaction in its most simple and 
basic form. X and Y are two purposeful systems which interact 
in a common environment. This environment of the X-Y interaction 
will be defined as a system which may have sub-systems, other than 
X and Y, which are of particular relevance to the interaction.
The total environment contains everything. Arrows are shown which 
imply changes that system and sub-system produce in one another; 
it is not essential to show these since such changes can be understood, 
by definition, to take place. With separated sets, X and Y 
for example, changes that they produce in one another are, in fact, 
made through changes to and by some common environment, although 
the changes are more commonly perceived as direct. For example, 
if an individual X speaks to another individual Y, X's voice 
modifies the intervening space by producing sound waves in it and 
Y receives these. Even if X hits Y, there is, physically a 
process of transfer of energy that requires the environment to be 
there. In more complex situations, X and Y will interact through 
their observations of how the other affects other sub-systems of the 
common environment, although again they may perceive a "direct" 
mutual involvement.. If it is necessary to emphasise such a relation­
ship, this is done by a double line (not arrowed). It is between 
such separated systems that conflict may occur at some level of 
intensity, desired or undesired.
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System YSystem X
Observing System
Environment of X -  V Interaction
Total Environment
Figure la. A model of Interaction (neutral observer)
*Ackoff defines environment in a way that excludes the system whose 
environment it is. This leads to difficulties in notation and, 
generally, in language. In my notation, my own environment would 
include myself.
The double lines therefore indicate potential conflict, although 
there is normally conflict, benevolent or otherwise, between two such 
interacting purposeful systems. Indeed, the way in which a diagram 
is drawn itself indicates where conflicts are perceived to be possible. 
Any diagram is someone's perception, perhaps a perception of another's 
perception. Someone else may wish to change the placings of systems 
in the diagram, or to add systems, in order to draw attention to other 
conflicts or direct influences, which are seen to be descriptive of 
the matter under consideration.
I illustrate this by considering the observing system (figure la), 
which I have depicted as observing the X-Y interaction from outside the 
environment which primarily affects the interaction. Although, 
through the total environment, the observing system must, in however 
small a way, affect the X-Y interaction, it is not here percieved 
as doing so in an obtrusive way. Consequently, no direct interaction 
is shown between the observing system and the X-Y interaction.
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Importantly, this implies no conflict.
However, if the observer were within the X-Y interaction 
environment, there would be potential conflict with both X and Y 
(figure lb).
System X System Y
Observing System
Environment of X - Y  Interaction
Total Environment
Figure lb. An Interfering Observer (arrows implied)
Such an observer would be far from neutral and would himself be 
an important part of what he was trying to observe. Such non-neutrality 
is clearly an undesirable state, never totally avoidable. Indeed, 
it is often a feature of an observer-cum-consultant*s problem that 
has to be accepted and allowed for. I shall return to this important 
theme in the next chapter.
The final comment that can be made about figures la and lb is 
that the changes brought about by interactions may be affected by 
errors of omission, commission and delay. There will be a need, in 
some cases, to draw attention to the distortion of what is intended by 
purposeful action: this will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Model of an adaptive system
Figure 2a shows how a purposeful system (X) adapts. Essentially, 
X has a means for obtaining data, for storing them, for processing 
them into information for decision, and for giving effect to decisions.
Data on 
X -  System
Data on 
Y -  System
Other data
X -  Receptors
(Memory: Picture) 
X-Representation
X -  Brain
System X
1
Acting on
X -  System
Others
X - Effectors
(Decision Process) 
X -  Director
Figure 2a Model of an Adaptive System
The receptors are shewn as handling data from different parts 
of the environment, including, importiantly, system X itself.
All data may feed into the X-Representation, which is sampled in a 
purposeful manner by the X-Director (the decision-making function). 
Appropriate orders then go to the X-Effectors. One "set" of effectors 
are responsible for changes to X itself; these changes come back 
to the X-Representation via the receptors which deal with the system 
itself. This closes a loop between X-Representation and X-Director
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(together, the X-Brain) and provides tlie consciousness and internal 
adaptive behaviour of X. The other effectors provide for external
adaptive behaviour in the same way.
Alternative processes could be assumed and shown. For example, 
'automatic' processes could link receptors and effectors 'directly'; 
the rules for decision could be shown as a sub-system of X-Director, 
as could rules for sampling from the X-Representation. In another
context, the whole or part of the process could be seen as taking
place, by definition, without explicit diagrammatic description 
(in particular, receptors and effectors will always be assumed to 
exist within any sub-system that accepts and acts upon data). It 
is neither desirable nor possible to show everything, and only what 
is essential for the purposes for which a diagram is being used will 
be shown. The fact that there are other features being assumed must, 
of course, be clearly understood.
There is a logical sequence in which an adaptive process works, 
subject always to errors and delays. The influences on X must be 
received by the receptors and the actions of X must be put into 
effect by the effectors. In such a case, we must show the influence 
arrows to and from X and (exceptionally) influence arrows directly 
frcm receptors to brain and brain to effectors. Later, I shall 
introduce other conventions of this sort which can be added to the 
minimum notation rules illustrated by figure lb.
The scheme in figure 2a is also drawn as if for an individual, 
but it can equally illustrate the working of an organisation. In 
such a case, the X-Director and X-Representation will be purposeful 
systems of people and machines with someone in control. There is 
no intention to lump together the distinct mental frameworks or brains 
of all people in the organisation, although documents or understandings 
may exist that imply an intended common frame-work for operation.
There are certain to be some conflicts C^ .I have data; why aren't 
you using it?", or "I can't make a decision with what you are giving 
me"). Such struggles also go on within individuals (who, as will 
be discussed later, have to carry out many roles), and we can speak 
of internal conflicts. Similar remarks to these on Director and
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Representation also apply to the interaction between Brain and 
Receptors or Effectors. In such cases, we may wish to indicate 
conflict by double lines, or to indicate, as in figure 2, a relatively 
orderly and harmonious working by using influence arrows.
To summarise, it will not always be necessary to show all the 
sub-systems of X which makes it adaptive, nor is it possible, 
except in a particular case, to say whether influence arrows, conflict 
double lines, some mixture or nothing, is appropriate to the diagram. 
The selection is a matter for the judgement of whoever is producing 
a diagram, and it must reflect his purpose.
Indeed, there is a complexity in choosing notation which was 
hidden in figures 1, but, nevertheless, it is often possible for 
such simple diagrams to suffice. Since the environment influences 
the systems it contains, and vice-versa, there must be means by which 
this influence is received and transmitted (receptors and effectors 
of some sort). Figure 2a can therefore be simplified into figure 2b, 
as has already been implied.
Data
Decision
Process
X -  Brain
System X
Figure 2b. The Adaptive System Simplified
What has happened is that the receptors and effectors have been subsumed 
into the influence arrows (not shown) that would indicate the influence 
of X on X-Brain, and vice-versa (a similar approach could be made 
to representing the interaction between X and its environment).
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Only for more detailed statements will diagrams like figure 2a be 
required.
Model of the decision-process
The decision-process of system X, albeit over time with consequent 
continual influences from within and outside system X, take place 
within X-Brain. Figure 3 shows the basic subsets which form ideas, 
operate on them and lead to action, in relation to a presumed interaction 
(conflict) with system Y.
X -  Aim
X -  Policy
Presumed 
Y -  Policy
Rationalisation 
of Y-behaviour
Policy -  pair 
Assessment
(Prejudice)
X-lmpression
X -  Representation
Director
X -  Brain
Figure 3. Model of the Decision-Process
*The arrows that link subsets of separated sets operate strictly as 
in figure la; here they are shown, for emphasis, as direct links 
(a similar emphasis was used in figure 2a, but not mentioned there),
X has an aim which he perceives to be potentially adversely 
influenced by Y's behaviour. He has a number of policies which he
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could follow to meet his aim, one at least of which he hopes will be 
satisfactory. If none are satisfactory, he may be prepared to adjust 
his aim and seek new matching policies. If he knew Y's policy for 
action, he could make a suitable assessment. However, in general, 
he can only acquire a presumption about this policy after rational­
ising Y's behaviour: in this process, his prior stored and processed
knowledge of Y is all-important. Dependent on past history and on 
the nature of the current interaction, his impression of Y might be 
far from benevolent and far from accurate: he may well impute to
Y reasons for behaviour which are untrue. Part of his picture is 
his impression of Y labelled prejudice: this word is not used
here in its emotive connotation but in its precise sense, acknowledging 
that pre-judgement invariably enters into the assessments of the purpose 
of others. Without close empathy and/or co-operation, X is likely 
to make a poor estimate of Y-policy and, consequently, choose an 
unsatisfactory policy (if he can find one at all).
The sub-sets shown in figure 3 are fuzzy in the technical sense - 
it might be more correct to say fuzzier than those dealt with previously. 
They are mental constructs, although, in some cases, they may be 
made explicit outside the mind of an individual, and then used as 
information by other purposeful systems. As shown in figure 3, they 
are implicit concepts within the X-Brain. For an organisation, they 
represent more complex combinations of ideas, with more explicit 
representation, however inadequate this may be. Nevertheless, the 
ideas still exist and are developed separately, and inevitably different­
ly, within the minds of individuals comprising the organisation's 'brain', 
The complexity of group decision-making is apparent: there will be
conflicts between individuals with some sort of joint responsibility 
for decisions, due to different individual perceptions of the situation 
faced. However, what is being attempted is still something like 
figure 3.
There is no clear sequence in which these sub-sets operate in 
the decision-process. What goes on is continuously fed back to the 
representation and influenced by the changes that take place there.
Figure 3 contains what I believe to be the more important sub-sets 
for the present general discussion. The particular influence of
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'prejudice' has already been stressed.
More complex structures can be created. Sub-sets can be included 
to emphasise such concepts as values and beliefs. Various logical 
processes and sub-sets of data available can be included. It is 
worth noting that one way in which this can be done is by using 
graph-theoretic approaches similar to those of Eden and his colleagues, 
as discussed in chapter 1. There may, indeed, be many approaches to 
deal with particular complexities for particular problems; it is not 
yet possible to generalise any approach, and it may well be dangerous, 
theoretically, to do so.
Additions to the Notation
Uses of the notation
The notation has been used, since 1972, for a number of purposes 
rather different from those for which it was originally devised.
It had, however, always been realised that it should be relevant for 
describing important aspects of many situations for which conflict 
and crisis management were not generally perceived as central features.
The original paper offered tentative views on this. In particular, 
it seemed relevant to any attempt to plan and control the OR process 
itself; some work on this has already been mentioned (appendix C, and 
chapter 1).
Individuals and their roles
In this examination of the OR process, I used an idea introduced 
by Janet Harris in work on games (I shall return to her other notational 
additions below). This was the sinple device of using a circle, 
rather than a rectangular box, to represent an individual (the most 
basic purposeful system): in particular, the circle is placed in the 
top left-hand corner of a box to represent an individual within a 
system who is the controller of that system. In this role, the individual 
is, potentially, a resolver of conflicts. In figure 4a, sub-systems 
Y and Z controlled by B and C respectively may be in conflict.
If their immediate environment, system X, is controlled by A, his 
task includes keeping B and C in order.
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Figure 4a. Individuals in Control of Systems•
A is successful in preventing serious conflict between systems Y and Z.
Even in the wider context of large organisations, there may be, by 
agreement, some purposeful system in their common environment which 
plays a similar role (e.g. the United Nations, however limited its 
powers, in world affairs; or a joint union-management committee in an 
industrial organisation).
Difficulties arise when an individual operates in control of a 
subsystem (or subsystems) of the system which he also, nominally, 
controls. Such an individual plays conflicting roles, and it may be 
impossible for him to mediate satisfactorily in a conflict to which 
he is an active contributor. To indicate multiple roles, the individual 
is shown in hatched circles : at any moment in time, he attempts to 
play one role but this must be affected by the knowledge and ideas 
(prejudice) he has from his other role (figure 4b).
-©
Figure 4b Individuals in Control of Systems
A is unable to control a conflict to which he is a party (note 2)
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In annex C, role-playing is discussed in relation to the hoped- 
for neutrality of an analyst. Since one of his roles, in regular 
discussion with his clients, is as part of the decision-making 
system, he cannot in his neutral-analyst role be wholly disinterested.
A similar situation would occur if a parent was enployer of one of 
his children in a business : roles of parent and employer are not
compatible in practice. Even worse would be a situation in which a 
child employed a parent.
If the roles which an individual plays outside the organisation 
(system) of immediate concern are perceived as relevant to his behaviour 
as part of the organisation for a given problem, the systems in which 
he plays these secondary roles must be included in the environment of 
the organisation when formulating that problem . It is in this context 
that it will be necessary to take account of Boothroyd's 'action 
programme* concept (note 3). I believe, however, that this can be 
treated as part of the wider concept of conflict rather than as the 
central feature of 'articulate intervention'.
Purposefulness and communication
In her work on conflict games (Bowen, 1978), Janet Harris introduced 
additional arrows into the notation. The need for these arose in 
emphasising communication and purposeful action. In addition, she 
found it necessary to indicate that what happens may not be what was 
intended. As mentioned earlier, distortions due to errors of various 
kinds, and due to delays, will arise. When the likelihood of such 
distortion is recognised, and is seen as important to the description of a 
problem (or some part of a problem), this should obviously be emphasised.
Figure 5 shows the arrows used. A solid triangular arrow denotes 
purposeful action: it should start from a circle (an individual) -
whether there might be merit in allowing such an arrow to start 
from a more general purposeful system still has to be examined; it 
may not be important to stress the individual responsible for the
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Purposeful
Action
Communication
Distortion
Figure 5. Purposefulness, Communication and Distortion Arrows
action and yet important to label the purposeful nature of the action.
Some purposeful action may be primarily communication, but 
communication can also come from systems which are not themselves 
purposeful. Communication is always to an individual, and the empty 
triangular arrow, stressing communication, should end on a circle 
(again it may be that communication although actually received by people 
within a system, is more appropriately shown with the arrow ending 
on a rectangle). Automatic transfer of data, from machine to machine, 
is not itself purposeful nor is it communication: purpose (from an
individual) may control what data is passed and extracted from a machine 
store, and so may lead to communication for an individual, but black 
boxes are just black boxes.
For both types of arrow, distortion is shown by rounded arrow 
bases.
The simple arrows («-^ ) , as well as those of figure 5, were used 
in the work on conflict games to emphasise any important influences 
between systems and subsystems. In particular, they were used* to indicate 
a direct influence between subsystems of separated systems ; they are 
so used in the diagram of figure 3. All other arrows may be used in 
such ways, subject to the rules for their initial and terminal points.
*This had not been general practice before, although David Smith had 
found it useful in some of his conflict studies.
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Communication is sometimes the intention underlying physical 
action (e.g. destruction of some physical object may be a means of passing 
a message which has no direct connection with the act of destruction). 
Communication from one person to another is generally purposeful.
It is not intended to develop special notation for such cases. In 
general, the context in which a diagram is being used should obviate 
such need. Also, the description required and the sets actually defined 
should be enough to determine when and where communication and purposeful 
arrows are required.
Conversely, if a diagram seems to need some special additional 
notation, it may be because appropriate sets and subsets have not yet 
been introduced or satisfactorily related. It is important that the 
'language' remain as simple as possible and not develop piecemeal into 
sub-languages, since this would reduce the effectiveness of the method­
ology developed. This will be further discussed in chapter 3 on Theory 
and Methodology. In particular, I would not at present wish to press 
the ideas on intensity of interaction which were suggested in an earlier 
paper (Bowen, 1975b).
Non-Overlapping Sets
In set-theoretic terms, the sets (systems) that will be acceptable 
will be those whose intersection is either the null set or that set which 
is contained by the other. In diagrammatic terms, sets will not 
"overlap", i.e. A A  B = jjS or A or B. This restriction is imposed in 
order to maintain a clear and orderly notation: although overlaps will
in principle occur and have to be dealt with, this may be done in a 
number of ways.
For example, consider the resources (R) of a system (X) which 
have to be allocated in part or in whole to a number of subsystems 
^^l'^2'^3^. The most direct way of showing this might be (if the 
restriction were removed) as illustrated in figure 6a.
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Xi X2
Xs
Figure 6a. Sharing Resources
The total demand for resources might of course be more than was 
available, a fairly common occurrence. Conflicts arise between
and X has a problem of supply and allocation. This can 
be more usefully demonstrated as in figure 6b.
R 3X 3
Figure 6b. Conflict over Allocation of Inadequate Resources
Here the X sub-systems are seen in conflict. R^jR^fR^ are either 
the resources planned to be allocated (R^ + R^ + the demands
(R^  + Rg + Rg > R). Expanding this, we could enclose R in a subsystem 
which was the supply subsystem (S) and X's job (more precisely the
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job of the controller of X - the individual circles are not shown 
here) would then become that of the resolver of conflicts between 
S and X^fXgfX^. To examine the problem, we would start to look at 
ordering, manufacture and so on, eventually expanding beyond X 
itself. Even at a single level, we might well begin to identify 
organisational or policy limitations. As with people (see 
earlier remarks on roles) hatched lines can be used as in 
figure 6b to indicate that, over time, subsystems change roles 
(or simply change) and become part of other systems. Indeed, the 
example of roles is a case of overlapping sets if the rule of 
'non-overlaps' is not imposed. I am a member of the sets {RHC 
academic staff}, {RHC students} and {RHC staff cricket club} as 
well as of a large number of sets, professional and social, outside 
RHC: fortunately, few of the problems I encounter are due to conflicts 
of roles, and I am almost always in a clearly defined role at any 
moment of time. To monitor my own life, it would certainly not be 
very useful to me to picture it through diagrams with overlapping sets.
Simple cases of overlap may be overcome by relabelling the 
intersection and removing parts of the original sets. More complex 
cases of overlap may best be dealt with by separate diagrsims for the 
different aspects of systems interaction that need description and 
analysis. It is fairly evident in any case that a single diagram 
would soon become too complex to take in: each diagram should be
related to the purpose of drawing it, although the relationships 
between diagrams and their mutual consistency must be given attention 
(note 4).
In particular, different people's perceptions will need different 
diagrams, even though they may be describing the same 'reality'.
Such diagrams are in effect 'dimensional slices' of whatever 'reality' 
is. I do not find the concept of reality very useful, except in so 
far as it may be a measure of the convergence, or possibly some kind 
of summation, of individual perceptions (for my present purposes at 
least), I stress again, that all diagrams in this chapter are my 
perceptions of illustrative situations that I hope will help the reader 
to understand my outlook, and perhaps formulate objections and differences 
(note 5).
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This problem of perceptions is introduced here because confusion 
about perceptions often leads to a concept of overlapping systems 
because they are being looked at from two different points of view.
The process of seeking appropriate ways to avoid overlaps in the 
diagrammatic representations will often shed light on the concepts 
being used and will aid understanding. It may be, for instance, that, 
in attempting to cover a period of time over which a system is changing, 
overlaps will occur which have to be removed by describing time-slices 
separately. It may however be possible, when the structure of a 
problem changes only slowly, that time passing will bring new systems 
(concepts) into the description: in such cases, there is a possibility 
that successive environmental systems can be defined as time-sets.
A simple example is given in appendix E which summarises unpublished 
notes of 1975 (mainly work by Janet Harris) on the interactions and 
perceptions of analyst and decision-maker in the total OR process.
Perceptions
There are other comments on perceptions which seem useful as a 
tail-piece to this chapter on notation. One of the intentions of my 
study is to develop diagrams which can provide explicit bases for 
communication, inquiry and shared understanding. Although I am 
primarily addressing the broad problem-formulation stage of the OR 
process, it is necessarily a part of this to consider what later 
analysis may be needed, and be feasible, as the analyst and decision­
maker jointly move towards practicable implementation of relevant change, 
They may need to go through some of the thinking which appendix E 
examines from different perceptual stand points.
Another importance of perception lies in its relevance to conflict. 
Conflicts that are perceived by an individual may not be 'real' in the 
sense that they result from misunderstanding or lack of information; 
nevertheless they are real for the progress of events. A may see 
himself in conflict with B, but B may see no conflict. B's responses 
to A's actions may then be as difficult for A to appreciate, as are 
A's actions for B. I offer three examples to illustrate the ways in 
which problems arise and can, in principle be resolved (note that 
'problens' and 'conflict' are near-synonyms).
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Example 1
Individual A requires some work done on a faulty installation 
carried out by system X. He identifies D(X) as the relevant actor 
and forwards his complaint. He receives a formal notification that 
his complaint has been noted and will be attended to. Nothing happens. 
However, D(X) is totally unaware of the problem; his management 
system provides the formal temporising replies and, unknown to 
him, there is a pile-up in the system. A's best hope was to see 
D(X), but as implied above this never came about (I usually put this 
in the context of a particular nationalised undertaking, since the 
story is partly a true one) . Figures 7a and 7b show the actual and 
desirable situations. In a., A is in conflict with M(X), D(X)'s 
management system (M(X) is aware of A's frustration but is too 
tied down by rules to act usefully, and does not really perceive conflict 
since A is too polite to attack junior staff). In b., which is the 
desired solution, A breaks through the M(X) barrier and is able to 
resolve his conflict with D(X) directly, c. is an alternative form 
of b. which shows A in two roles, formal and informal, in relation 
to the typical business hierarchy: this also contains an implied time
dimension.
a. 0
M(X) contains people (juniors) other than D(X). 
the A-M(X) conflict.
It is they who create
b. 0=0
c.
P(X)
t
\
M(X)
A, in M(X), becomes, in effect, part of the management system for a 
period of time.
Figure 7. Conflict with a Bureaucracy.
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Example 2
This second example is not put in diagrammatic form because it 
is a simple story and the diagrams needed are rather space-consuming 
for my present purpose. It concerns a military force (X) in 
readiness to move but situated diplomatically, well away from the 
potential enemy (Y) border, Y is not contemplating aggression, 
but carries out manoevres close to the border as a normal sort of 
contingency-plan exercise, X knows that Y does this sort of thing, 
but this is a new area for exercises and Y has failed to announce 
publicly what he is doing, X-intelligence reports an aggressive move 
and X takes up forward positions in accordance with his contingency 
plans, Y-intelligence reports this and Y is instructed to abandon the 
exercise and take up a defensive stance against the presumed X-aggression. 
The two defensive stances degenerate into open war. Preconceptions 
of the underlying attitudes of each party are seen, in this example, 
to affect disastrously the interpretation of the data received. Lack 
of awareness of the potential effects of prejudice, lack of a procedure 
for examining carefully all possibilities, and lack of direct communi­
cation Eire important aspects of this sort of development of conflict.
In an analysis of the most recent Egypt-Israel war, an even more 
bizarre example is quoted (Shlaim, 1976), The Israelis had firm 
intelligence of impending attack but disregarded it: they had already
decided that Egypt could not succeed in an attack, that Egypt knew 
this, and therefore Egypt would not attack. Changes in organisation 
and in monitoring of intelligence are necessary to avoid such mispercep­
tions ,
Example 3
This must be regarded as hypothetical, although it arose from the 
study and rationalisation of obscure communication between conflicting 
groups, which appeared to do nothing to reduce conflict and much 
to enhance it.
Three trade unions together formed a joint negotiating team (JNT) 
to sort out difficulties with the Board of a nationalised undertaking. 
Unfortunately, there were two very distinct perceptions of the negotiating 
system.
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The three union representative groups saw themselves, at the 
negotiating table, as independent negotiators albeit with some 
external discussion and procedural agreement as a JNT, prior to meetings 
with the Board. They also saw the Board as representatives of 
Government (figure 8a).
Main Negotiation Subsidiary Negotiation
TUI TU2 TU3
Government (Board)
Negotiation System
Figure 8a. Perception of the Trade Unions
The Board, particularly its Chairman, saw itself faced by an organised 
entity, the JNT. It also saw that the negotiation would be directly 
influenced by the expressed and presumed policies of Government.
They had necessarily negotiated earlier with Government to see what 
constraints they could avoid and what they still might have to face 
(figure 8b).
Main Negotiation Subsidiary Negotiation
Board
Negotiation System
Board
Figure 8b. Perception of the Board
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The result of these different perceptions came out clearly in 
confusion over pronouns I When the Board Chairman said "we" he 
meant the Board, but the unions read "we" as the Government. When 
the Board chairman said "you", he addressed the JNT, but got conflicting 
responses from the union representatives. When a union representative 
said "we" he meant his union, not all three (JNT) as the Board thought. 
When he said "you" he meant the Government and was duly surprised 
when already overt policy was denied by the Board, who were not trying 
to support, or even were actively trying to subvert. Government policy 
that they saw as harmful.
I believe that a few explicit diagrams, available to all, 
might have made a world of difference! (note 6)
Final Comment
In all problems, conflicts that exist or that might be generated 
are important aspects which are all too often disregarded until 
implementation of decision is seen to be inpossible or to result 
in consequences undesired and unforeseen. Identifying these conflicts 
is part of the problem -formulation process; perceptions of potential 
conflicts and the nature of these conflicts are essential aspects of 
a full appreciation of problems and their possible resolution.* I 
do not of course imply that formulating the problem solves it, although 
the ideal is to move in this direction: even though we may include
options for implementation within the problem statement, later processes 
of analysis may change the list of options and, indeed, the whole nature 
of the perceived problem.
The conflict notation is seen to have potential to describe and 
clarify many of the difficult concepts that lie within the idea of 
problem-formulation. It provides a possible language to make complexity 
explicit in a simple manner and on a relatively small area of paper 
(a characteristic of any good diagrammatic illustration) : it provides
a discipline which forces certain inquiries that should be relevant
* Appendix F describes one use made some years ago of the notation. 
It is based on work carried out by D.G. Smith and J.I. Harris and 
includes an interesting set-theoretic treatment by the latter (not 
previously published).
53
and fruitful? and, being based on notions of conflict, it centres 
itself on aspects of problem which, if absent, imply that no problem 
exists. It is consistent with Ackoff's philosophy in being holistic 
and being concerned with all systems that may in some way contribute 
to the existence or the resolution of the problem.
The next chapter will discuss some of the philosophical issues that 
surround the concept of simplicity and examine the notation as a 
means for describing the problem that faces me in producing and 
'selling' the methodology sought.
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Notes on Chapter 2
1. Dr, Sue Jones of Bath University raises an interesting point which, 
in effect, asks whether it is always desirable to move away from 
conflict (e.g. war) when the alternative might be perceived as 
worse (e.g. a long period of suffering for oppressed people while
a slow and not necessarily successful negotiation process goes 
on) . Would such a war be "malevolent conflict" in my sense of 
the term? This is a very complex subject and my brief statement 
here must necessarily be only an indication of how I would treat 
it.
It may be, in such a case as is indicated above, that war 
is not a totally unacceptable policy, whereas letting the status 
quo go on for much longer is unacceptable. There are no constraints 
on what people or groups of people may select as policy orderings 
and preferences at any stage. However, even if such a serious 
move into conflict is made wittingly, it would be recognised that 
the process leading to the situation prevailing had not been success­
fully controlled at some earlier stage. One aspect of the original 
conflict research was to study precursors to conflict and seek 
ways of avoiding such situations occurring again (see my phrase, 
"future likelihood").
Conflict is potentially useful, in this context, as an indicator, 
at an early stage, that policies and actions may be leading inexorab­
ly, unless there are facilities (including willingness) that can 
change attitudes to possible ccxnpromise or co-operative futures, to 
a conflict that would be described as malevolent. There would be no 
policy for the party perceiving malevolent conflict that could 
resolve it "peacefully" and sensibly; although a "successful" 
war might eventually result in resolving conflict, one would prefer 
there to have been satisfactory alternatives.
2. Figures 4a and 4b do not imply that, in the former, a can easily 
remain neutral towards the conflict between the X and Y 
systems. Control is always limited; only mutual acceptance 
implies a lack of conflict. Some discussion of mediation in 
conflicts will be found in chapter 3 that add to the single models 
offered herel
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Professor M.R.C, McDowell interpreted figure 4b in a manner 
which I did not intend, seeing the role shift as movement (of A) 
from one set to another. Accordingly, he suggested that a directed 
dotted line should be introduced between the two hatched-line 
circles, to indicate a role shift for some purpose, e.g. communication 
or, more specifically, conflict resolution. It was, however, 
not my intention to inç)ly that A physically moved into Y 
to deal with conflict nor that his presence in Y was a special 
cause of it. The point being made is that A's necessary 
concern with X, in which he is superordinate to C in Z, 
would not allow A to play the role of a missing ^  without 
risk of conflict, in this role, with C. If such conflict occurred,
A, as a direct party to the conflict, would have great difficulty 
in playing his primary role as conflict-resolver.
Nevertheless, the idea of a notation to imply, when appropriate, 
some ordered sequence of role-playing may be useful. I do not, 
at present intend to add such a notation, since diagrams are more 
likely to be representing near-simultaneous playing of multiple 
roles and frequent switching between them. Work on actual problems 
should indicate whether, how, and when, the sort of added 
notation proposed might be of value (see however the brief 
comment on a hospital study, chapter 6, where the patient moves 
from subsystem to subsystem)•
3. In correspondence with Hylton Boothroyd, I offered an "Ackoffian" 
definition of his concept of "action progreimme".
"An action programme is the totality of states, actions and 
concepts of a purposeful system over a period of time, the 
purposeful system being a set of individuals (maybe only 
one) and facilities they control, not necessarily in concert, 
for a broadly defined purpose."
He was reluctant to accept this since to him "purposeful system" 
sounded like a solid slice of space and/or time, and he saw within 
my definition a concept of "common purpose" that is not a prime 
characteristic of what can be identified as "programmes". He 
offered a tentative definition as follows;
"An action programme is any set of past, present and future 
actions that an observer both chooses to regard and chooses to 
regard as a whole, together with the known, unknown and inplicit
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cognitions of the actors" (my underlinings).
I commented on the phrases underlined.
a. I aim to deal with past, present and future actions in 
terms of existing data and prejudices; what is or is 
seen to be; and what is intended by self and others, 
the latter imposing constraints on acceptable policies.
I am conscious of all the possible actions as basic to 
the existence of and resolution of problems, and regard 
implementation as a vital aspect of problem-formulation.
b. "chooses to regard" is important. Every system diagram 
will be the choice of its owner; it may represent his 
perception of the "diagram" of another. A diagram does
not necessarily represent a fact and it will put together
systems, of all kinds, in an idiosyncratic way.
c. "chooses to regard as a whole" is important to my problem- 
definition process, which following Ackoff is to be 
holistic, as close to the ideal as possible.
d. The "cognitions of the actors" are precisely what I 
hope to make explicit, or at least less vague, through 
my diagrammatic structuring.
On this basis, I regard our processes as closely similar; although
there is still much room for debate, I prefer to wait to see
whether application of my ideas will, in practice, encompass the 
concepts that Boothroyd provides. Certainly, I do not think of a 
purposeful system as other than changing (evolving) in time and 
space, and, with the emphasis I place on misperceptions and 
misunderstandings and the barriers of language, I do not recognise 
"common purpose" as other than an ideal, even though such a concept 
may be perceived. My treatment of roles is an important part of 
my recognition of "action programmes".
I am aware that not everyone will prefer my insistence on non­
overlapping sets. If, in the process of disentangling overlapping 
sets, ideas become clarified, this should lead to acceptance of 
my "rules" for the purpose of a common language for problem- 
formulation. There is nothing to prevent people using their 
individual 'languages' for their own purposes. If the process is
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not found useful, I shall obviously have to make changes, but 
these must be done in the context of the whole process that I 
outline.
It is implicit in this chapter and in appendix E that conflict 
is a perception of an individual. As stressed in a diagram by 
double lines it is the perception of whoever owns the diagram.
It does not follow that conflict is perceived by either or both 
parties to an interaction, even though it is perceived by a third 
party. Nor does it follow that if A perceives himself to be 
in conflict with B then the reverse is true. It is also important 
to stress that conflicts between large systems are perceptions 
of some individual (s).
I have tried to avoid the need for an explicit definition of 
conflict because, paradoxically, it seems always to provoke a 
lot of argument. Broadly speaking my perception of the concept 
is covered by the statement;
"Conflict between X and Y is perceived to exist if 
X's (or Y's) actions are seen as inhibiting Y's (or X's) 
courses of action now or in the future; the perceiver may 
be any individual - the one who draws the diagram - including 
X and Y."
I have kept the diagrams of figures 7 and 8 as simple as possible 
for the purposes of illustration. It has been pointed out that 
a use of the arrow notations of figure 5 might have improved their 
message. I accept that this might be so. However, as may be 
seen in appendix E, and will again become apparent in chapter 3, 
the use of the arrows involve certain complexities in the diagrams 
(particularly the inclusion of individuals, to or from whom some 
of the arrows must go) that I decided to avoid here. In a 
practical application, as will be seen, the added complexity 
becomes inevitable and acceptable.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY, THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Introduction
The purpose of this research into problem-formulation is to 
provide a coherent and usable methodology. The use of whatever is 
produced will necessarily be pragmatic and in no way prescriptive.
There will be no theory as to how problems are or should be formulated.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of methodology development which 
necessarily parallel those of theory. In particular, it must be 
shown that the methodology can be used and is useful, other than by 
stating the purely subjective view of the author that it is useful 
to him. Also it must be shown that there are sane rules of procedure 
that are generally applicable and that the pragmatism does not go 
so far as to make each application a special case, despite the 
fact that there are bound to be some special feature and limitations 
with each problem.
This implies a number of things. Firstly, the notation or language 
for the formulation of problems must be kept simple, in seme sense; 
it will be undesirable to extend it to cope with special difficulties 
without ensuring that such extension is compatible with comparable 
difficulties that might arise elsewhere. Secondly, it will be necessary 
to be able to identify ways in which the methodology, at any stage of 
its development, is producing indications which are wrong, inadequate 
or misleading, and to be able to hypothesise changes which will redress 
the errors of the earlier work. Thirdly, in order to be useful, the 
methodology must be acceptable to those to whom it is offered, and this 
problem of communication should be capable of being addressed by the 
approaches proposed for problems in general.
All these issues will be discussed provisionally in this chapter.
It is possible to make a few brief initial remarks before going more 
deeply into principles. The issue of simplicity was intuitively 
accepted in the earlier work on conflict. The mode of thinking about 
conflict as a generic process was also tested subjectively, on a
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range of conflict situations, military, political, social, religious 
and personal. Any changes that seemed worthwhile were retested in 
contexts the same as or similar to those already used to ensure that 
the language was not becoming specialised. This not only sorted out 
errors, but it ensured simplicity by limiting statements to those which 
seemed to be generalisable across contexts; at the same time, it provided 
a means of getting deeper into each problem by the new light which 
was thrown on it by the transfer of ideas from apparently very different 
problem areas. Simplicity and testing seemed to go hand in hand.
The use of the methodology to explore its own relevance to the 
many problems inherent in problem formulation was touched on in 
chapter 1. It is not possible without experimenting with a problem 
owned by a client or a client group to say whether the methodology 
can be used to monitor and aid the acceptance of the methodology.
It is possible however, to attempt to use it, as it so far exists, 
to explore the problem that I have of considering how to present it 
and how to conduct, or how to lay down some principles of conducting, 
experiments to establish that a workable methodology has been created.
There will necessarily be difficulties in establishing criteria 
other than the subjective ones of acceptability. It will be enough if 
I can achieve the confidence to say "it works" and to have independent 
support for this.
Some Comments on Theory
My philosophy concerning theory and the methodology underlying 
theoretical development seems to be close to that of Karl Popper.
I do not imply that my views have been developed independently, 
although on reading Popper (1977) for the first time, I found my 
ideas were coherent within his framework which did not seem a surprising 
one, although in its totality it was an impressive and powerful statement. 
What seems to have occurred is that, indirectly through conmunication 
with Ackoff, Boothroyd and others, many of Popper's ideas had .become 
incorporated in my own thinking. I now find that Popper makes precise, 
or at least logically argued, what I thought I had thought but had 
never expressed explicitly.
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Theory, as Popper regards it, must be falsifiable. It must 
consist of strictly universal statements (such as "all ravens are 
black") as opposed to strictly existential statements (such as 
"not all ravens are black") : the latter can be verifed in principle,
by finding a white raven for exanple, but cannot be falsified, while 
the former can by the same process be falsified in principle but never 
verified. Theory must divide the class of all possible basic statements 
into two non-empty sub-classes, those with which it is inconsistent - 
the potential falsifiers - and those which it permits. It will be 
falsified if a reproducible effect is discovered which refutes it.
Basic statements have the form of singular existential statements 
which result from observation of a specific event, or which are testable 
by observation of appropriate events. Some permitted basic statements 
may be false.
It is necessary to be clear what potential falsifiers there are.
The easier it is, in principle, to destroy a theory, the more satisfactory 
will the theory be; provided that many falsifying hypotheses have 
been tested and found wanting, confidence in the theory will be high.
If basic statements contradict a theory it should not be abandoned 
unless they can be held to corroborate a falsifying hypothesis 
(reproduceability - see the above paragraph - is of importance here).
Popper accepts that, in the search for scientific knowledge, there 
must be methodological rules. These can only become accepted by custom 
and by the satisfaction of those who use them. One such rule of particular 
inportance here is that if a theory (a system of statements ) is 
threatened, one should not try to save it by any kind of conventional 
strategem; that is by adding auxiliary hypotheses to deal with the 
particular threat. Not only will the universal statements on which 
the theory was based be weakened, but the degree of falsifiability 
will generally be diminished. Only if this latter is not true will 
the theory perhaps be 'saved'; for example, by limiting the class of 
objects or the class of circumstances to which the theory applies. 
Falsifiability and the universality of the theory will often only be 
affected by the more constrained, but still general, universe to which 
it applies.
It would also make theory less ' simple ' were it to be surrounded
61
by conditional disclaimers for specific singular statements of many 
kinds. It would become increasingly difficult to identify falsifying 
hypotheses, and increasingly likely that self-inconsistency would 
arise without being observed. Nevertheless, certain disclaimers are 
always necessary to make clear what the theory applies to;
"... a theory is not just a set of hypotheses, verified or 
unverified. A theory has to be more than this, and it has to 
be used. Indeed a theory should include a specification of its 
uses." (White, 1975b)
It is the last sentence to which I draw particular attention.
Such a specification of uses, which might be the form of disclaimer I 
refer to, is, of course, part of the process of identifying the two 
sub-classes into which theory divides the class of basic statements.
The other part of the above quotation that is important is that 
theory, to be theory, has to be used. Many so called 'applications' 
of theory can be seen to be statements of potential application. It 
is evident that, if a theory contains statements of application, 
it can be falsified if application fails in appropriate tests. It 
would be methodologically unsound if such potentially falsifying tests 
were not attempted, although the status of theory could, protem, 
still be properly claimed (that is if it were clearly intended to carry 
out the tests).
Popper discusses the preference that should be given to those 
theories which can be most severely tested, a statement that he derives 
from a methodological decision to seek always universal laws and casual 
explanation for events which can be described. He gives an example 
of four possible natural laws.
o All orbits of heavenly bodies are circles,
o All orbits of planets are circles,
o All orbits of heavenly bodies are ellipses,
o All orbits of planets are ellipses.
Of these, the first has the highest degree of universality and precision; 
if it is true, so are the others. It is more easily falsified than 
the others ; one should not go to theories of lower universality or 
precision unless tests make it necessary to abandon the preferred ones.
In this way, one starts with the hope of being able to make sinple
62
statements and only introduces conditions and qualifications when this 
is inevitable.
Methodology
Although I am not trying to develop theory as such, I am seeking 
a process through which knowledge can be 'improved', however subjectively 
this improvement may be assessed. It is therefore worth examining 
what the above aspects of theory have to offer to methodology development.
In what sense, for example, might the methodology proposed in 
earlier chapters be said to be falsifiable? This depends on the 
statements which can be made about it which have the form of, and can 
be interpreted as, strictly universal statements. There are some 
intuitive tests that I have used in the development so far. For 
example, inferences and insights will come from the diagrammatic 
structures which were not in my mind, or at least never explicitly 
formulated, before (see, for example, the discussion of the diagrams 
in appendix C and in appendix E) ; unless this happens, the methodology 
fails. That it will not necessarily happen with some individual client 
is not particularly important, but the methodology would be deemed 
by me to have failed if such an outcome could not be obtained with 
a co-operating client or with a sufficient number of clients in a 
true consultancy activity.
Also, what can be said about a problem in words must be capable 
of encapsulation in diagrams so that words can be used in less explicit 
and precise ways once the diagrams are there to direct and formalise 
discussion. Thus, if the meanings of diagrams remain primary causes 
of argument, rather than enlightening the confusion created by earlier 
verbal statements, the methodology will be discredited.
My theory, if I have one, is that people in general will be helped 
by the methodology and will wish to use it - not all people (human 
nature being what it is I) but some people and by "some" I must necessarily 
mean a considerable number. Clearly, if I cannot help myself, I 
fail (subjectively, I have already passed that test) ; going a stage 
further, I fail if I cannot help a co-operating client. In the latter 
case, it may not be the methodology per se but the way of introducing
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or teaching it that is at fault. It is proper perhaps to remove this 
distinction by including the way of introducing the process in the 
methodology, that is to say that the methodology must eventually 
include a statement of the procedure for the application of the 
methodology.
It may seem that I can, after a certain number of successful 
experiments or client applications, claim that the methodology is 
proven. In a sense, yes; at the least, it would be very encouraging. 
However, the important feature of any testing should be potential 
falsifiability. As I proceed, failure with a new client, or a different 
type of client, should point to methodological aspects that need 
reappraisal. One problem with OR methodology in general has always 
been that, as problems become more difficult, the profession keeps 
running out of relevant techniques. Theories are eventually replaced; 
methodologies must be continaully reassessed and reinvigorated.
Within the ideas of the conflict notation, there may be another 
important, unstated "theory": that the process of interaction and 
conflict as defined is universally applicable. This implies that the 
concept of problem can be built up by using no more than the basic 
'bricks' of interaction between systems and of certain enç>hases 
which are indicated by the notational arrows and by what systems and 
subsystems are or are not included.
If this view is taken, then the methodology is capable of
falsification along the lines indicated by Popper. More importantly, 
a theory of this sort is both simple and of a high degree of precision 
and universality, and it is consequently capable of more severe testing. 
Were it to be hedged with 'ifs' and 'buts', it would introduce the 
very semantic problems, in deciding whether it were applicable or not, 
that the diagrammatic language seeks to avoid.
From this brief argument, I draw a number of tentative conclusions
to guide the move into experimentation and application.
o No auxiliary notations should be added for any specific 
problem without testing the relevance and consistency of 
these in othef (as different as possible) situations.
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o If there is ev2-dent lack of success the source should be 
sought in the fundamental systems and conflict concepts 
and in the rules of the methodology, rather than in the detail 
of the notation used.
o The extent to which the logic and structure of the problem 
can be outlined, rather than the extent to which the totality 
of a problem can be expressed should be taken as a criterion 
of satisfaction.
o The methodology must work for me, including enlightening 
my perception of others' problems, and it must work for me 
in helping to provide, and later develop, a methodology 
of practical application.
The rest of this chapter will look at two important aspects already 
touched on: firstly, the use of the notation to define and illuminate
the task of devising a satisfactory methodology, and, secondly, the 
type of experimental procedure that can be followed to test and develop 
the methodology.
The Problem of a Language for Structuring Problems
My problem is to develop and 'sell' a language for structuring 
problems. I use the word 'problem' rather than Ackoff's word 'mess' 
for simplicity and because this is the language a would-be client 
will most likely prefer: the process of study will soon make it
apparent whether the problems are indeed complexes of problems. I 
must do two things at the outset: explain my notation and give some
rationale to encourage a client to use it (initially, the second of 
these may be made easy by taking a willing and co-operative client, 
although the co-operation must not be allowed to degenerate into a 
supportive conformity). It might be helpful to use the notation to 
describe what it is that the methodology is intended to do.
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Consider figure 9, which is by no means the first such diagram 
that I have tried on myself.
Explicit Rules for Notation
Client
System
fConsiitanti
c
Explicit 
Formulations of 
Problem by
Explicit 
Formulation of 
Problem by
Those 
using C's 
Notation
Individuals Consultant
p
Figure 9 The Problem of Structuring a Problem
There is a problem which is 'observed' and formulated by a number of 
individuals who jointly own the problem (client system X of which 
A is a particular individual). P' is the set of explicit representations 
produced by X and by a consultant C. These representations 
(problem-formulations) change both in time and in nature as will be 
discussed in a moment.
The clients and consultant may or may not include some picture 
of themselves in P'. As I would generally draw a perceived problem P, 
they would be part of this problem (see the diagram of the OR process 
in appendix C) ; however, they are present in a rather different way 
during the problem-formulation stage. Indeed they are part of P* 
which includes P' (which could be drawn as part of P), and P* is the 
problem of how to set about establishing what P is. Their role in 
P* is not the same as their role in P, once a satisfactory P /
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representing P, has been established.
In P* what process does C follow? He formulates the problem 
for himself using his notation. This is an imperfect and incomplete 
representation but he may pass it to X as a starting point for 
discussion. It seems likely that there is conflict between C and X 
at least in the early stages, and how and at what rate communication 
proceeds is a matter for judgment in each situation. Certainly the 
representations passed initially will be misunderstood, and communications 
and purposeful actions will suffer distortion. As the communication 
process goes on, the consultant will continue to feed back the 
descriptions he receives, translated into the notation, with amendments, 
additions and questions.
I will assume that the process does not founder and that eventually 
the clients will begin a serious use of the consultant's language.
Why should this occur? I believe that this will occur because of 
obvious and interesting differences in the separately perceived pictures, 
and because of the questions raised by the consultant (especially by 
his inclusion of systems that are not at that stage perceived by the 
clients as relevant to the problem).
I have stressed in figure 9 that the diagrams are purposefully 
constructed. The purpose is not immediately, nor necessarily, made 
explicit. This seems important. A learning process is to go on and 
(ideally) no one should be attempting to provide prescriptive statements 
(although in part they will do sol). Naturally, as time passes communication 
is expected to become more complete and error-free as a mutual understanding 
is created.
The consultant would, in principle, be better off if he could 
preserve a sort of neutrality, so that his clients are, and see themselves 
as, in control of the problem-formulation - their problem defined in 
their way - and also in control of the resolution of any disagreements 
between themselves. If the consultant is seen as 'interfering' or 
'taking over', he will risk rejection* He needs to minimise the chance 
of conflict becoming malevolent between him and his clients.
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Any reluctance çf individual clients in opening their concepts 
to each other, w d  to the consultant, is undoubtedly a problem which 
.may prevent the overall problem from being fully formulated, it 
implies conflicts, which may be hidden, but which are part of the problem 
until they are resolved, I think one has to accept this, remain aware 
of it, but be prepared to fail if co-operation is at too low a level.
Also the consultant must be prepared to interfere and to translate 
to the best of his ability, i.e. he must sometimes consciously depart 
markedly from the ideal neutral stance.
Conflict Resolution
To consider what nuetrality involves, I cannot do better than 
refer to the Third Party Consultation process which Burton (1969) 
and others have used. In particular, there is an excellent account 
by Fisher (1972) of various methods of this type proposed for the 
study and resolution of conflict. Figures 10 and 11 encapsulate the 
sort of "controlled communication" seen as essential to the conflict- 
resolver's role. At appendix G, these figures are compared with 
Fisher's summary of the common features of the methods he describes.
Figure 10 is the basic interaction model (see figure la, chapter 2) , 
and shows a conflict between two systems X* and Y*. the cfcserving
Environment of X*-Y*C onflict
Observing
System
Total Environment
Figure 10 The X* - Y* Conflict
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system Z* offers a third-party consultancy to help resolve the 
conflict. In figure 11, X and y are individuals, perhaps leaders 
of a small team, chosen as negotiators for X* and Y*. Aided 
by a team of consultants from Z*, led by Z, they communicate with each 
other. The aid is in the form of neutral models about conflict and 
related to the particular problems that Z perceives them to be 
troubled with.
X-lmpression 
of 2 
and Z-models
Y-lmpression 
of Z 
and Z-models
Explicit Y-Representation 
of X * - Y *  Conflict
Explicit X-Representation 
of X *-Y *C o n flic t
Y*-negotiating SystemX -negotiating System
Z-Models of Conflict Processes
Z-Metarepresentation of X -Y^Conflict
Z*-consultancy System
Neutral Environment
Figure 11 The Third-Party Consultation
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There will be, frcan time to time, additional direct communications, 
outside the primary form of the consultancy, for information and 
advice. These would generally be shared communications as in figure 12
Three-party
Discussion
System
Figure 12 Direct Communication
Ultimately, as confidence in each other's intentions increases, it is 
intended that there will be co-operative sessions of direct communication 
between X and Y with Z as observer (figure 13) .
Explicit
X-representation 
of X * -Y *c o n flic t
X*-negotiating System
Explicit
Y-representation 
of X # -Y *  conflict
V ^-negotiating System
Negotiation Environment
Two Party Discussion System ©
Figure 13 Moving towards Conflict-Resolution
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In figures 11, 12 and 13, the 'boxes' can in several cases be regarded 
as rocxns. In figures 13, there may be separate phases where the 
Negotiating Systems operate separately or together in face to face 
communication. There may also be an iterative process in going 
from figure 11 to figure 13, The principle is that as communication 
starts to flow so conflict yields to co-operation.
That the process works, I have to take largely on trust since 
confidentiality has prevented the publication of case studies. However,
I have never doubted its applicability since it is an extension and 
a formalisation of typical counselling work; for the same reason, I 
was always confident that Eden's research would succeed.
Referring again to figure 11, Z's models of the process of 
conflict could well include figure 11 itself since this relates to the 
purpose and process of conflict-resolution consultancy. There may 
be an initial perception by X and Y of conflict with Z, his 
processes and his models, and it is important to resolve this so that 
Z is accepted. Even then, this acceptance may need to be reinforced, 
even re-established during the consultancy process. In doing this 
rapidly and unequivocally, the permanent display of and constant reference 
to diagrams such as figure 11 could be more effective than words.
Burton cind his colleagues have concentrated in their work on 
preserving acceptability through neutrality; they have found, in 
some cases, that it can even be helpful to know very little at first 
about the detail of the conflict so that they do not have prejudices, 
except of course about what they learnt frcan their clients.
Going back now to the preceding section, concerned with my problem 
of a language for structuring problems and how to employ it, I am 
very conscious of the attraction of the Burton process (and also the 
Eden process) because of the close attention to a neutral stance.
However, as I have already indicated (chapter 1), such processes make 
great demands of, and require great commitment by, the clients.
Provided that the process used maintains an awareness of and a conscious 
analysis of conflicts (note 1) between analyst and clients, I believe 
that it is wise to be able to compromise between neutrality and
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esqpediency (both in terms of a busy decision-maker's time and of a 
familiar way of working - the diagrammatic language alone will be 
a large enough hurdle).
It will therefore be necessary to have figure 9 as a constant 
reminder of the conflict that potentially (and initially inevitably) 
arises due to the imperfect neutrality of the consultant's stance and 
of the imprecision of the interpretation of communication. In principle, 
the communication should become increasingly meaningful to all parties 
as the problem-formulation process goes on.
The First Experiment
Having argued that there is a process of interaction with clients 
which can be suitably described and illuminated through the notation 
with particular emphasis on the problems of conflicts that may arise,
I now want to examine what sort of initial experiment would be suitable 
to examine the applicability of the methodology so far outlined.
There are a few principles, which I will list and discuss, which 
will aid my choice (or, because I have in fact already been through 
the arguments before writing this, explain how I intend to choose).
o The problem should be a real one in process of study by those 
who have perceived it as a prdDlem.
o The owners of the problem should be amenable to a systems 
approach to problems.
o They should be known to me and I to them and a mutual respect 
should exist.
o Their problem should be broadly understood by me, but I
should not be personally committed to a particular style or 
type of resolution of their difficulties.
o They should know, or quickly be able to get to know, the 
nature and principles of my methodology.
o They should be critical, seeking to use the methodology 
but unwilling to accept it unless it was seen to go deeply 
into their problem and to steadily enhance their perceptions of
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how they might best formulate it.
The first of these principles I take as self-evident. The next four 
are principles which ease many of the difficulties of communication 
and conflict for a first experiment, it is not an adequate confirmation 
of the methodology if all goes well, but it will clearly be necessary 
to make drastic changes if the reverse is the case. It might be 
argued that falsification would be achieved more quickly (if the 
methodology is misconceived) with a tougher test, but there are many 
practical aspects of the methodology that still have to be learnt and 
developed (how to increase the detail of problem representation; 
how to recognise whether one has gone as far as possible; how to actually 
carry out the stage-by-stage arguments about different problem—  
perceptions; and so on). In other words, I have to resolve my problem 
(figure 9) in the process of resolving that of others.
The last of the six principles stated is of particular importance, 
and it raises the question of how to maintain the clients' concern 
that the methodology should be critically tested. It is made of more 
consequence by the fact that several of the other principles implicitly 
introduce risks that polite and supportive responses might replace 
the required harsher tests of critical assessment.
The co-operating clients would be more suitable therefore, if 
they had a vested interest in there being such a methodology as 
I intend, and if they also had a requirement for its having a general 
(rather than a specific, own-problem oriented) validity. Such clients 
might be of several types. They might be people who are aware of 
past difficulties in being confident that they had the right problem; 
they might be conscious that internal or external conflicts implied 
that their problems had been far from mutually agreed; they might 
recognise that their problems had been of many different types, 
but that some systematic process of formulating them would be of 
value (i.e. they would see the value of generalised and therefore 
more repeatable and controllable approaches).
The strongest motivation for critical appraisal that I can think 
of would be that the lack of a suitable problem-formulation methodology 
was in fact a part of their problem. This lack is a problem that, as
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a practicing operational researcher, I have been concerned about for 
some time, and that is why I have set about the research task of resolv­
ing it. But what sort of operational researchers might be suitable 
clients? Most 'good* practitioners (see chapter 1) seem to have 
methodologies of some sort, not necessarily unsound or seriously 
lacking but not explicit, and therefore very difficult to impart to 
others except through a long apprenticeship.
Teachers of operational research (OR) do in fact teach something 
about problem-formulation in this way. But what they can teach is 
limited. Indeed, the methodology of OR as a whole is accepted to be 
very difficult to teach usefully, except through experience (on- 
the-job-teaching) . An inquiry into this problem, instigated by the 
NATO Science Committee was carried out by an Advanced Research 
Institute (Bayreiktar, B.A. et al (eds.), 1979) and it has been variously 
debated since. Teachers are without doubt very keen to increase the 
range of explicit theory and methodology of OR that can be taught.
My preferred clients would therefore be a teaching group who 
wish to increase the generality and methodology content of their 
education in and for OR. Such a group would be one of which I was 
not a direct part but with which I had a reasonably close relationship. 
The next three chapters deal with the experiments, subsequent consider?- 
ations of methodology, and conclusions (note 2).
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Notes on Chapter 3
1. My use of 'conflict' may create adverse reactions in the minds 
of clients who would see it as connoting a critical attitude
to their organisational behaviour; like 'prejudice' and 'mispercep­
tion' f it could lead to a lack of tirust, a feeling that they 
were 'on trial'. (Dr. J. Kidd, Aston University). I am conscious 
of this risk and am prepared to use other language if necessary.
2. This and the two preceding chapters complete the first and part
of the second stage of the research study as outlined in appendix D. 
The time scale was met: just over a year was spent in producing 
this material. It includes a number of ideas (not originally 
related to problem-formulation) which existed in informal, 
unpublished notes by myself and former research colleagues. What 
was not originally mine has been acknowledged; in its present 
form, it is mine (in Ackoff's sense) and no responsibility 
attaches to others for any shortcomings or errors in its presentation. 
Similar remarks apply to comments made by several colleagues 
on earlier drafts which I have included as notes on the chapters.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ASTON EXPERIMENT
Introduction
On December 3, 1980, after a period of discussion with Dr. Raul 
Expejo of the Management Centre, University of Aston, I forwarded the 
following statement for consideration by the teaching staff of the 
Management Centre's Operational Research and Systems Analysis Group.
"RESEARCH IN PROBLEM FORMULATION
I have devised, from earlier work on conflict resolution, a 
systems-based diagrammatic notation to assist in the description 
of and communication about problems. I wish to test the applicability 
of this in practice. Following discussions with Raul Espejo, I 
wish, in particular, to become an analyst/consultant (unpaid) to 
the client group composed of those involved in the OR/SA teaching 
at the University of Aston.
The problem that I perceive, at this moment, is the problem of 
"developing and maintaining an integrated MSc OR/SA course 
in the Management Centre of the University of Aston. "
This is, of course, a totally inadequate statement to give a basis 
for action.
With those who are willing to become my clients, I propose to 
act as follows, to a time-scale governed by the time you can afford.
1. Early in January, 1981, I shall send copies of a short paper 
outlining the notation, and the rules for its use. Raul has 
more detailed papers.
2. I shall also send a very rough diagrammatic indication of how 
I perceive the problem.
3. You are requested to respond, using the notation and/or any 
other 'language' (basically English!) giving your own individual 
or joint perceptions - preferably individual because this will 
produce richer detail of problems within 'the problem'.
4. I shall respond with queries, new diagrams, etc., to each one
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of you. I shall not, without permission, refer your views to 
others.
5. When I have 'sufficient pictures', I shall request a joint 
meeting at Aston to discuss implications of the findings to date.
At this stage, your individual views will need to be expressed 
by you, with me in the role of an incompletely neutral mediator.
If you are willing to exchange and study explicit views produced 
independently, before such a meeting, so much the better.
6. The process iterates but with close group participation. At 
some stage we shall, I hope, be using a common notation modified 
as necessary from the initial one: the 'problem' should be 
'better defined*.
Be critical. If we succeed you will have something of value for 
planning and teaching. If not, I must return to the drawing board."
On December 12, the statement was considered at a departmental 
meeting and on December 16, Dr. Espejo wrote to tell me that "(it) 
was indeed well received", that "all members of the group are keen 
with the idea", and that he expected that I would "receive all the 
necessary support".
In anticipation of a favourable reply, I had already drafted 
the paper on notation and rules. It was a 12-page summary of the 
essential elements of this larger document. It had a second role 
as an invited paper for the 1981 International Federation of OR 
Societies' Conference in Hamburg, and was published in the Proceedings 
of that Conference (Bowen, 1981c). It does have minor additions, 
such as a comment on the transfer of aim to policy to aim, and so on, 
down a hierarchy, and a reference to work on communication distortion 
(Laing, 1980) but these will not be enlarged on here. The dual purpose 
of this document did not involve any compromise since the message 
for the Aston Management Centre was always intended to be fairly general 
and not overly-prescriptive, a document for information and discussion.
The First Phase 
Procedure
On January 26, 1981, I sent to all eleven memvers of the University 
of Aston's OR/SA teaching group the rules of the notation and six
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diagrams. The data on which these diagrams were constructed were 
taken from a formal document prepated as a statement to the Science 
Research Council's Mathematics Committee, frcsn notes that I had 
made during discussions, primarily with Dr. Espejo, and from informal 
internal documents.
I asked that I be informed of where individuals differed from 
or did not understand my treatment of the as yet incompletely defined 
problem. I suggested that they might wish to indicate to me their 
personal problems within the overall course development programme or 
how they saw such problems arising in the future.
I stressed that 'conflict' was not intended as a pejorative word.
I noted that there would be many constraints imposed by individual 
styles, beliefs, needs and so on, and these could develop into more 
difficult situations unless conflicts could be controlled or phased 
out.
It was intended that individuals responded to me in their own 
way and in their own time. At that stage they had current teaching 
and examinations to cope with as well as planning towards a very 
different course and its integrated teaching.
The initial diagrams (note 1)
These are provided, together with those that followed, in a 
pocket inside the back cover of this thesis (attachment 1). The 
'rules and notation' (Bowen, 1981 c) and a second published paper 
(Bowen, 1983) which is a short version of this chapter are also there - 
attachments 2 and 3. Diagrams 1 to 6 show the picture that I had 
so far gleaned.
Diagram 1 showed the management system; and its main environment: 
individuals were named but this detail has been omitted here.
Diagram 2 was a very incomplete picture of the proposed course 
and I commented also that it was clearly subject to conflicts and 
constraints.
Diagram 3 showed conmunication and purpose and drew attention 
to primary potential conflicts (as currently perceived by them).
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Diagram 4 showed resource allocation and associated conflicts.
I drew their attention to the inadequacy of this diagram and said 
that their views were particularly required.
Diagram 5 dealt with personal aims, policies and values. I 
noted that it would be useful, eventually, to have explicit aims, 
policies, and so on, for each individual.
Diagram 6 dealt with the monitoring of the programme. Its 
relation to the other diagrams are indicated, as shown, by the footnotes
The responses
Because of my own involvement in other work, namely studies of 
the use of analysis of options and hyper games in the examination of 
problems and their resolution (Bowen 1981 a), and because of my clients' 
pressure of work, there was a lull in our interactions. Since my 
hopes of written responses were clearly not going to materialise,
I arranged for a series of one-hour interviews at the University.
Two members of staff were away, including one of the senior lecturers 
who was to be on sabbatical leave for a year, and I was also unable 
to see the Acting Head of Department.
The eight interviews took place in May, and my analysis of these 
was forwarded to the Acting Head of Department in June. Diagrams 1,
3, 5 and 6 (first revise in each case) show the changes made to 
diagrams 1, 3, 5 and 6. The following paragraphs summarise these 
changes.
The management system (diagram 1, first revise)
The senior lecturers were not perceived by themselves or others 
as a management group. Policy was determined by departmental staff 
meetings and might be implemented, as appropriate, by any member of 
staff particularly by those with named roles (e.g. course organisers; 
admissions tutor). Apart from the Head of the Management Centre, 
and the Dean, both of whom, it was said, should be concerned with 
ORSA relations with external organisations, the Director of Post- 
Graduate Studies was seen as the focal point, both for publicity 
and administration. A minor change was the disappearance of a link
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with the Mechanical Engineering Department which was not seen as of 
any importance, despite a specific reference to it in the original 
SRC document. Other changes reflected staff movements.
Communication and purpose (diagram 3, first revise)
The main changes reflect changes already made to diagram 1. 
Communication between the Acting Head of Department and the main 
Course Organiser is now stressed; there is a somewhat strange and 
dual hierarchical relationship between them which will be referred 
to again in discussing other aspects of the problem. Another important 
feature is the Admission Tutor's need to have good contact with 
potential students prior to their joining.
Aims, policies and values (diagram 5, first revise)
No further comment is necessary for this revision of diagram 5, 
except to point out that the Course Organiser becomes potentially 
the arbiter between individuals with regard to their personal aims 
and policies. This puts a responsibility on him which is outside 
the natural administrative hierarchy, and his formal and informal 
relationship and communication with the Acting Head of Department 
is critical.
Monitoring and co-ordination (diagram 6, first revise)
Changes made here are major ones. Here the Acting Head of 
Department (AHD) is seen in his natural role requiring, in particular, 
information from the Course Organiser, who is at the hub of day to 
day course development activity, so that he (AHD) can check whether 
t±ie course's purpose for which he is responsible is being reasonably 
met.
Discussions with the Acting Head of Department
The letter which accompanied these diagrams, spelt out many of 
their implications in detail. In particular, it suggested
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a. the need for a description of the course with regard to
(i) the relationships between its parts; and 
(ii) the relationship of these parts to an explicit 
and detailed statement of the ideal aimed at, 
implying a major development of diagram 2-
b. the development of a programme for monitoring the teaching 
programme with particular enphasis on individual roles and 
values, in^lying further extension of diagram 6, first revise 
and the other diagrams which extend its understanding; and
c. in due course, when the new teaching programme was underway,
a proper development of diagram 4 to deal with the sub-problem 
of resources stemming from shortages of time for staff to do 
what, professionally, they needed to do.
In July, I met the Acting Head of Department to obtain his reactions 
to what had emerged. It was agreed that he would provide a more 
detailed statement of his intentions for the course, including the 
minimum concepts necessary in the teaching to make students aware of 
the nature and practice of ORSA. He would also try to give me a 
fuller description of the intended teaching programme based on the 
draft syllabus planned to come into operation in October, 1981.
His general reactions were remarkably similar to those expressed 
by those who participated in an exercise at Royal Holloway College 
(Bowen, 1981a) to examine their problem of the cuts in University 
finances. Namely, he found nothing "new" in what my diagrams said 
(not surprising, since they merely reflected what he and his staff 
told me) , but he did feel stimulated into action; in particular, 
he agreed that explicit systemic models must be available for monitoring 
and co-ordination (indeed he started to develop ideas based on diagram 6 
revised, although we had insufficient time to develop these together).
The Second Phase
In August 1981, I received the papers dealing with the aims and 
objectives of the course (due to start in October). The first 
paper gave the learning objectives (L.O.) in a provisional form, and 
this is included with the diagrams - attachment 4. It was intended to
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use it as a pilot evaluation device, getting students to respond, at 
the end of each term, to questions about how they felt the objectives 
had been met for them. The second paper was "a crude attenç>t at 
an overall map relating a set of named skills or knowledge topics 
to the course modules" and I was asked if I could design something 
more complete without the diagram's disappearing "under a spider's 
web of interconnections".
At a meeting (for another purpose) on September 3, I provided a 
questionnaire for students based on the L.O. (this questionnaire is 
not given here, since it was in the event never used in a systematic 
manner) and also obtained some reactions to a first draft of a diagram 
linking the L.O. with the course modules as described in the syllabus.
On September 7, I forwarded an improved diagram (diagram 2, first 
revise) . I took the syllabus document to represent the best information 
I had on the "desired programme" (see diagram 6 first revise) while 
the L.O. similarly represented the "explicit espoused values". I 
drew attention to the fact that I was aware from the September 3 
meeting that the syllabus as then perceived by individuals was clearly 
not what had been written nor was there agreement on exactly what 
it was. I also raised the following points.
1. The questionnaire, based on the L.O., could provide a 
direct communication route from students to the Course 
organiser and the Acting Head of Department, with statements 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with learning progress.
If this was done an appropriate link should be added to 
diagram 6, first revise.
2. I suggested that the teaching staff should examine the L.O. 
periodically to enable them to comment systematically on 
what teaching they have intended or been unable to include, 
and on what they perceived others to be providing.
3. I saw diagram 2, first revise, as part of the control and 
monitoring facilities, for use as the course proceeded.
I stated that it should be redrawn as necessary by those 
teaching the various parts of the course.
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In the new diagram 2, the arrowed links between 'boxes' implied 
that the teaching in one box should enhance the learning related 
to the L.O. numbers in the box to which the arrow went, I stressed 
that there were bound to be some conflicts of opinion between staff 
on these, and of course, that my perception was merely a starting 
point for discussion and debate.
Once the course started, and many of the issues implicit in all 
the diagrams became real problems, the pressures on the teaching 
staff became such that they had no time in the first term to think 
about precisely what they were doing - all their energies went on 
the doing! If I had been an in-house adviser (and I realise, in 
retrospect, that I had always thought about my methodology as a tool 
for such an adviser), it would perhaps have been possible to work 
with individuals in their 'spare moments', as well as to observe 
directly what was going on. However, such actions were not practical.
It was not until late February, 1982, that I was able to meet 
with the Acting Head of Department (and others) to be briefed broadly 
on what had transpired and to plan the next interaction. The following 
questionnaire was prepared, it being made clear that any confidences 
would be respected if things had to be said which could not be fed 
back to the group as a whole.
QUESTIONS
1. Do the Learning Objectives (L.O.) represent adequately your 
perception of what the Group aims to teach and should be teaching? 
In particular,
a. are any of the objectives clearly wrong?
b. are there objectives which you would like to have added?
c. are any of the objectives too idealistic?
2. Which of the c±>jectives, in part of whole, will be broadly 
met by the courses you teach?
3. Which other courses (which others teach) do you see as important 
to the same objectives as these in 2?
4. Have you any comments (further to the above), on any of the
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courses, that imply discrepancies between intentions (as 
presented by the learning objectives) and likely results?
[For example, there may be personal attitudes to material 
that individuals wish to teach; limitations on what individuals 
are able to teach; and constraints such as time, facilities, 
student attitudes and abilities; and so on.]
5. Have you any disagreements with my statement (figure 2, first 
revise) other than those implied by your answers above.
I received responses from the Acting Head of Department, the 
Course Organiser and the five main teachers, during visits which 
took place in April 1982.
Sorting out what I leamt was a complicated and time-consuming 
task. Diagram 2, second revise, was forwarded in August 1982 with 
a wealth of ccmnnent (see note 1) ; nothing was added by me to what 
was told me except in the form of separate questions and observations 
for the next interaction, and nothing was omitted except by generalising 
some statements to preserve confidentiality. The following summarised 
what was done.
1. I listed the stated views on the CQEŒ teaching, both those 
of satisfaction and those of criticism and self-criticism.
2. I listed general comments on the L.O. and then comments 
on each L.O. in turn. (These provided a rationale for 
my new interpretation of the placing of numbers in the 
second revise of diagram 2.)
3. I gave an account of views on the integration of teaching 
across the course.
4. I noted that there were no basic disagreements with the 
first revise of diagram 2 as a format for infoirmation although 
there were many modifications required. One teacher had
had difficulty in understanding what was implied, but this 
seemed largely due to the inherent complexity of the course. 
Another saw such diagrams as essential steps in the understand­
ing of what was going on. The Acting Head of Department 
referred to the structuring as "a stimulus to our thinking".
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5. I provided notes on their comments which implied the need
for second revisions of diagrams 1 and 5.
My suggestions for the next stage were as follows (actions by them)
a. to discuss rewriting the syllabus to be more like what
is taught (note 2);
b. to discuss rewriting the L.O. so as to make them more 
easily understood (free of jargon and woolly phrases) 
and acceptable as reflections of what is taught;
c. to discuss whether diagram 2 now represented present 
reality and how it should be changed by modifications 
as above;
d. to examine resources of time and people, related also 
to needs outside the MSc course;
e. to consider student reactions to the course and other 
opinions (for exanple, those summarised by me); and
f. to look at my comments on diagram 5, first revise, 
which I saw as important to both the course development 
function and the monitoring and control function.
This last was concerned with differences of opinion on the relationship 
between the Course Organiser and the Acting Head of Department.
It was suggested that the latter was not a main channel of communication 
with the former, and that the diagram did not reflect the informal 
structure of planning and implementation. Diagram 5, first revise 
is concerned with the personal attitudes of teachers and links with 
diagram 3, first revise; course development is covered by the latest 
diagrams 1 and 2.
I pointed out that there were pressures on teachers. I accepted 
that, normally, negotiation between the Course Organiser and individual 
teachers would be informal and amicable. However, should there be 
a clash, the Acting Head of Department should be situated so that he 
can be the resolver of conflict. I believed that I had faithfully 
reflected his view; if not there might also be a need to reconsider 
"Monitoring and Co-ordination" where he is seen clearly as superordinate,
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The Third Phase
The next phase of out interaction turned out to be very much 
related to the last of the issues just discussed, although the others 
entered into the particular situation which arose. Important differences 
of opinion about the direction in which the course was progressing 
and the way in which other university pressures and duties has affected 
the intended open communications had led to management difficulties.
In retrospect, I observed that the earlier analyses had foreseen 
this possibility, but insufficient emphasis had been placed on organisa­
tion to prevent or minimise it.
For reasons of confidentiality, no detail can be given relating 
to the discussions that took place in October, 1982. My analysis of 
the situation, through discussions with the eight people primarily 
involved was forwarded on November 8, 1982. I later wrote a summary 
of the whole experiment, (Bowen 1983, an offprint of which is included 
with the diagrams) , which went through an editing and approval 
process with my clients. I do not therefore wish to include more 
about the third phase here, but I draw attention to the section of the 
published paper that deals with the use of the notation for representing 
the actual process of communication within the group.
Despite the fact that I would have liked to continue this study, 
it seemed likely that I had got what I needed from the experiment.
In February, 1983, I wrote to the Acting Head of Department:-
"... While 'the problem' looks very different now than it was 
a year ago, experience has made it better known. It is suggested 
that I have said what people already 'knew': it was always my 
hope to make explicit what you all 'knew'. I shall never know 
whether my interventions helped this knowing ... It was never 
my intention to propose solutions, merely help identify problems 
as perceived, as part of the process of my finding out how my 
methodology would help me in doing this. I would like to look 
at some of the specific questions now arising if you and others 
wish me to, but I would first want to know what areas of your 
problems need clarification ..."
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Conclusions
The findings and conclusions of the experiment are given in 
the published paper (Bowen 1983) . Again, because of my responsibilities 
to my clients, I do not want to add to or change the words that they 
found acceptable. More general conclusions, covering the whole study, 
are in Chapter 6,
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Notes on Chapter 4
1 . It is not possible to make the d i a g r am s fully self-explanatory
in this thesis. In diagram 1, for example, there are organisations 
shown whose relevance and purpose were fully interpretable by the 
client-group. In particular, diagrams 2 (first and second revise) 
cannot be understood in detail without an intimate knowledge of 
the ORSA course; the important features of these diagrams are 
their inherent complexity, the interlinking of 'separate' subject 
areas and the differences between them. It is necessary to realise 
that I was presenting what I understood my clients to be saying 
about their problem, and that the diagrams formed an explicit 
background for a continuing ccamnunication between us: both sides 
shared, albeit imperfectly, a common fund of detailed knowledge.
Some notes for readers are given with the diagrams.
2. Primarily, this would deal with major differences in the CORE 
teaching between what the syllabus implied (diagram 2, first 
revise) and what the teachers intended and implemented (diagram 
2, second revise); part of the difficulty lay in adhering
to normally acceptable formats for a course syllabus for the purpose 
of getting the course approved. Secondly, there was no clear 
linking, in the syllabus, between what was in one module and what 
was necessary for leading into other modules; some essential 
elements, in the event, remained untaught. Thirdly, there 
was more in the syllabus than could be taught explicitly with the 
time and staff available. The use of a "gradual learning 
process" also led to different students learning different 
things, depending on their insights. Additional comments are 
made in Bowen, 1983.
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CHAPTER 5
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON SYSTEMS METHODOLOGIES 
Introduction
One of the difficulties of concluding an inquiry of the type 
undertaken here is that new literature appeairs faster than one can 
fully assimilate it. There are conflicting risks as one's own ideas 
become more clearly formulated: one the one hand, there is the problem 
that the development of ideas that one has are incompletely carried 
out because of the influence of the half-digested, possibly mistranslated, 
ideas of others; and on the other hand, there is the danger of rejecting 
new material because it disturbs the stability of an established personal 
view (Huxham and Dando, 1981) .
I decided to study Checkland's book in more depth when the work 
described in the preceding chapters was almost ccmplete. The idea 
was to criticise it and my own work together and to seek reasons for 
any apparent discrepancies, particularly because my discussions with 
those who had studied and used his ideas, implied a need to argue more 
completely my feeling that problem-formulation was not sufficiently 
structured in Checkland's methodology.
I also comment, albeit more briefly, on the potential of System 
Dynamics in the problem-formulation phase.
Checkland's Systems Thinking
Although it is the second part of the book (Checkland, 1981) 
that is more important to my thesis, a few remarks on systems thinking 
as Checkland interprets it are relevant. In ccanmenting on methodological 
and scientific aspects, I concentrate on matters directly or indirectly 
related to the prc±>lem-formulation process, or, as I believe Checkland 
would call it, "understanding the problem situation".
Had we differed in our underlying philosophy of science and in 
our appreciation of how and why thinking about systems (other than 
'hard' or physical systems) must depart from the norms of science, 
there would be little point in any comparison of my practice and his.
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However, there is a great compatibility, all the more interesting 
because our research programmes have been quite independent, bearing 
in mind, of course, that the influence of others, directly and through 
reading, makes true independence of ideas unlikely.
There are six aspects of his teaching that I wish to stress,
1. He sees the need to use his own methodology to study "the 
client-consultant temporary ststem ,.. one which needs to be engineered, 
not left to chance communications" (see my figure 9, and the discussion 
of it, in chapter 3).
2. He examines the problems of testing a methodology and comes 
to conclusions very similar to those of chapter 3.
3. He reinforces my decision to follow Popper's thinking and 
gives reasons why he does not see a conflict between the accounts of 
science given by Popper and by Kuhn. Despite pressures from colleagues, 
who perceived such a conflict, to study Kuhn's philosophy (e.g. Kuhn, 
1962), I had already come to the conclusion that Kuhn was not relevant 
to my purpose. Checkland says: "Kuhn's account stems from an historical 
study of how actual scientists have behaved in the past: Popper's 
account concerns the logic of this activity". It was the logic
that I wanted.
4. He uses, on occasion, set theoretic diagrams and influence 
arrows in a manner similar to mine, although he has not developed 
his ideas and so they lack consistency, discipline and definition.
Indeed, he is quite deliberately not prescriptive of his use of notations 
and is prepared to select as appropriate for his purpose (note 1).
5. He calls for methodology which is flexible enough to incorporate 
or be conç>atible with the ideas and processes of other methodologies.
He is not anxious to claim that his is the definitive methodology 
(I also avoid such a claim).
6. He is willing to use 'hard' systems approaches for parts of 
study if they have logical merit, namely when the problem can, at 
least for the time being, be assumed to be clearly posed. I would 
agree, provided that problem-formulation is seen to be thorough.
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These few comments do not, of course, do justice to the very clear 
and informative account of systems thinking that Checkland provides.
They do, however, underline important areas of agreement.
Checkland's Systems Practice
Despite such agreement on systems thinking, there are marked 
differences in my approach and Checkland's in practice. I believe 
that these stem largely from different views of the role of an analyst 
in relation to his clients.
I wish to avoid, as far as possible, any imposition of my ideas on 
the clients : it is my intention to help them to express the problems 
situation through their Weltanschauung (W) . This W will be changing 
over time, and will be involved with all the value judgements and 
conflicts that they perceive themselves and others to have. Eden 
and his colleagues would go further than I in seeking to preserve 
neutrality, Checkland, correctly perceiving, as we would all agree, 
that absolute neutrality is a myth, moves in the other direction.
He becomes a co-owner of the problem-situation and an active participant 
in its resolution. In his terms he is an Actor in the situation and 
affects it through his own W (note 2).
I do not believe that there is yet enough knowledge available 
to say what is best. One methodology will be handled better than 
another by a particular analyst, and will be received better by a 
particular client. However, there is one constraint which Checkland 
imposes that creates a difficulty, in the sense that I cannot accept 
it absolutely. It concerns the prdblem-situation.
E3g)ressing the Problem-Situation
In considering how to go about expressing the problem-situâtion, 
Checkland refers to;-
"... recording elements of slow-to-change structure within 
the situation and elements of continuously changing structure 
and forming a view on how structure and process relate to 
each other ..."
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He says that this stage of analysis should not be pressed in 
systems terms and that one should not, at the initial stage, inç>ose 
a structure, I do not see how one can define in the model world, 
any relevant system, without some conception of the part it has to 
play in alleviating concern over the current situation: this requires
a framework in which to imbed it. In the end, this framework must 
be a systems one, since a later comparison phase between the 'now' 
and a possible future has to be carried out: the systems language of the 
conceptual new system has to be compatible with that of the description 
of the present situation (note 3). There is also a difficulty 
in setting up root definitions of systems of concern unless there 
is an adequate framework,
I accept, of course, that there will be a gradual process of 
movement towards a more structural and more acceptable framework.
Perhaps 'impose a structure' implies a 'hard' approach: my systems 
would not be seen by me as 'hard' and they are expressed as the client 
sees them. It is certainly possible to deal with "roles, norms and 
values" within my framework: indeed, I am forced to consider these 
and to see them to be as important as Checkland indicates. "Power", 
or, as I prefer to see it, influence of various kinds, is also necessarily 
taken into account.
There is almost certainly some problem of language here.
Checkland is properly insistent on avoiding 'hard' approaches to 
'soft' problems. He speaks of "recording ... structure" and there 
should be no reason to avoid systems language here, whatever constraints 
he may wish to impose on descriptions of process. He may, however, 
already use some looser systems statements in describing the problem- 
situation, and so may be prepared to accept my initial structuring, 
for communication purposes, as a reasonably 'soft' approach. Much 
of the hardness, that seems to be inherent in a technique, vanishes 
if the technique is used in a less ambitious mode - even statistical 
method can be applied without imputing to numbers the rigour that their 
normal usage would imply.
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Reactions to Other Philosophies
Checkland and I have similar reactions to the ideas that underlie 
the philisophies of Vickers (1965) and Churchman (1971) and find them 
broadly acceptable within our own. In the case of Churchman, I would 
perhaps interpret him somewhat differently, for example, his statement 
"I am often inclined to put implementation questions first i.e. 
can anything be changed" (Churchman, 1979) . I take this to be 
equivalent to my insistence that implan en tation and problem-formulation 
are closely related; the problem cannot adequately be e3q>lored unless 
there is an understanding of what can and what cannot be changed, 
at least with the time-scale being considered. Checkland, however, 
sees it relating to the relevance of changes that are actually being 
proposed to a system and would work back to establish a case for the 
existence of such a changed system. Both of us are perhaps reading 
our own philosophies into Churchman's words.
Our attitudes to Ackoff's methodology are fundamentally different 
however, and words may again be getting in the way. Checkland 
reacts against the 'hard' terms used in Ackoff's language, and particularly 
the goal seeking model of human behaviour. I take this model, in 
Ackoff's framework as an 'as i f  concept. In Checkland's conceptual 
models, purpose (goals) is necessarily stated in the root-definition 
of the relevant system. This system is a mental construct and I 
see all of Ackoff's methodology as dealing with such constructs.
Similarly, Ackoff's ideals are even more desirable systems or states, 
known to be impossible to achieve, but nevertheless setting some 
perceived direction of pursuit. It is very important to accept 
that Ackoff is not proposing to resolve people's problems, but to 
offer ideas to help them to take what is, for them, appropriate 
action to assuage their concern with the present.
Towards an Integration
Broadly, I can see a modus vivendi between my approach and 
Checkland's. What I am doing aims to provide what Checkland admits 
many Analysts want, namely, more help with the process of gathering 
a rich impression of the problem-situation. I try to do this with an
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absolute minimum of prescription - despite m^ ’ addiction to Popper 
and to Ackoff. I also wish to display the situation so that potentially 
relevant choices can be revealed - the question that is insistent 
is: "Is what we are doing what we intend it to be, and is it getting
what we want?" My comparison process, conceptually similar to 
Checkland's, is aimed at keeping this question in the forefront of the 
clients' minds: it is the changes that take place in the clients'
actions, values, W's, and so on, that move the process towards their 
realisation of what they must do. Then they might seek help in 
stating alternatives, in how to choose, and how to implement, but 
these are not the parts of the total decision process with which I am 
primarily concerned. However, if they are stated as problems in 
themselves, there is no logical reason why the problem-formulation 
methodology should not form a part of the help given with them: the 
whole of the decision process applies to the choices inherent in the 
part of that process, a fact which too many operational researchers 
have ignored (this applies of course to "implementation" which I 
refer to in the section on Hildebrandt's view of implementation in 
chapter 1).
In general, I find most of Checkland's procedures to be most helpful, 
although I might use them slightly differently. CATWOE, the specification 
of:
Customers of the system
Actors responsible for the
Transformations provided by the system;
Weltanschauungen (world pictures) which control the way the system 
is perceived.
Ownership of the system; and
Environmental constraints,
is relevant for ensuring that all these are explicit, or suitably 
implicit, in the system structure that states the problem. The 
Workbook is a sort of check list, invaluable as an aid for setting 
any study into motion : it is an excellent example of the sort of thing 
that might be a means for aiding decision for use by clients as 
opposed to analysts.
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Finally, there is the concept of the root-definitions of systems 
of concern. This is an attractive idea as a complement to a diagrammatic 
structure. As it is put forward by Checkland, I have two reservations: 
it is not clear what guides and stimulates their formulation, nor whether 
they have to be acceptable in principle to the owners or potential 
owners of the systems, or whether they can be simply models used by 
the analyst for his purpose, at least initially. My equivalent process 
is implicit in the focussing of attention on separate parts of the 
problem structure as it develops: in both cases, there is an iterative
process which includes the comparison process which I have referred 
to already, although the purposes of the two iterative processes 
relate to different stages of the total decision-process. (See note 4.)
System Dynami cs
It has recently been claimed (Wolstenholme, 1982; Wolstenholme 
and Coyle, 1983) that the notations and procedures of System Dynamics 
offer a generic problem-formulation process. The later paper may 
be said to be much less forceful in its claims than the former. The 
full technique description of this systems methodology is given 
in Coyle (1979).
There are two main reasons why I cannot see System Dynamics 
as a basic methodology for the purposes, and with the required scope, 
that I have discussed. Firstly, it was not designed for such a 
process. While there will undoubtedly be problems for which system 
dynamics modelling is appropriate, these are more likely to be 
'hard' systems problems in Checkland's terms. Some of Checkland's 
arguments also imply that the use of a technique, developed for 
a class of 'defined' problems, is inadequate for the messes that 
require understanding of what problem situation is being addressed.
Secondly, it seems to me that the technical language and diagrammatic 
notation of System Dynamics may well hinder rather than aid communication. 
In general, both reasons will tend to mould the problem to the technique, 
or the principles of the technique. In Checkland's methodology and 
in mine, the arguments start from the nature of the prdblens to be 
tackled.
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Nevertheless there are attractions in system dynamics procedures. 
Eden, Jones and Sims (1979), for example, state;-
"We constructed a computer simulation model which could be 
used to demonstrate ... how [a] qualitative and subjective model 
could form the basis for the construction of a qualitative model ... 
hot dissimilar from a Systems (sic) Dynamics model (for example, 
Coyle 1977) except that, since it was based upon a model of the 
world as the client groi;^ ) saw it, then it could be seen by them 
as a simplified representation of their reality".
Again, they say (Eden, Jones and Sims, 1982) in a discussion 
on "coping with quantity"
"It is important ... to distinguish between influence diagrams 
in Systems (sic) Dynamics modelling as they are typically used, 
to model the underlying structure of some 'objective* reality 
and cognitive maps which are intended to represent, using his 
own language and theories, the 'problem-reality' defined by the 
client."
They do not imply, in using a system dynamics model, that it is 
"the only appropriate form of quantitative model", but do stress 
that "it enables the important dynamic consequences of perceived 
feedback loops" to be dealt with.
Wolstenholme and Coyle (1983) return the compliment by their use 
of directed graph techniques, similar to those of Eden. I am left 
with the feeling that because there is all too little available to 
choose from to help formulate messy problems, it would be wise to 
watch what developments take place in System Dynamics. However, I 
have not found anything so far which makes me wish to change or add 
to the methodology that I have presented.
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Notes on Chapter 5
1. Checkland encourages people "to use any map-making methods
they want in providing a 'rich picture' of the prdblem-situation 
(never of the problem) and to be more coherent for systemic 
diagrams later on in the study". His paper "Techniques in 
'Soft' Systems Practice, Part 1; Systems Diagrams - some tentative 
guidelines". Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 6, 1979, 
University of Lancaster, addresses this point.
2. He does, however, expect those in the prdblem-situation to do the 
study with the help of systems analysts.
3. Checkland states that, since he deals with "models relevant to ..." 
rather than "models of ...", it is not inevitable that systems 
discussed are part of a potential future reality. He also notes 
that a conceptual model can be compared with the real world without 
any assumption that the latter is a system. I think I would find 
these subtle distinctions hard to make, and to maintain, in 
continuous interaction with clients.
4. It would seem that root-definitions can arise at any stage 
once the problem-situation has been adequately studied and a 
rich picture obtained. They might therefore appear either as
a consequence of or as a precursor to my diagrams. It is probably 
wrong, in principle, to refer to "stages" of the decision-process, 
since it will always be necessary to judge whether the problem- 
situation has beccane well enough understood for a root-definition 
to be formulated; difficulties with definition might well lead 
to a need to modify any diagrams that had so far been produced.
(These comments follow ccamnunication with Peter Checkland. They 
have been added at the last moment, without there having been time 
for me to do more than offer an initial reaction. His statements 
quoted, or implicit, above were made on an early draft of chapter 5.)
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CHAPTER 6 
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Where to Go from Here
It is necessary to be clear about what is still to be done since 
'the end* does not arrive in this sort of research. As work progressed, 
there were changes of direction and emphasis, although the original 
research programme, appendix D, has been followed more or less.
The first stage of formalisation of the diagrammatic notation, 
and its extrapolation from earlier conflict studies to the task of 
problem-formulation has been thoroughly covered. There have been 
extensions of notation and development of rules, both of which have 
been discussed, both in principle and through examples, A brief 
account has been published (Bowen, 1981c).
The second stage of looking at documented problems (of conflict) 
through the use of the notation has only been done in part. Firstly, 
it was found that there was insufficient detail to be worth going 
too far along this road; and, secondly, it seemed more important to 
study broad methodology to see what else was available that related 
to problem-formulation, and to establish a logical basis for the 
research as a whole. This has been done in chapter 1 as a preamble 
to the development of the notation (chapter 2).
Future tasks that may be considered as possible extensions of this 
second stage are:-
o the use of the methodology to enhance the initial statements
of the problem for both hyper game and metagame studies (see
Bowen, 1981a);
o a more detailed examination of the compatibility of the methodology 
with that of Eden (Eden et al, 1979 and 1982) ; and
o further study, on practical problems, of its relevance and
possible integration with Checkland's methodology (Checkland 1981).
These will be referred to again in looking at future developments 
of the third stage.
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This third stage consisted of the consideration of an experimental 
framework (chapter 3) and the carrying out of an experimental consultancy 
(chapter 4), In these chapters, a satisfactory testing of the 
robustness of the notation and its use for communication is described.
However, this alone is not enough, except to encourage me to take 
practice further in actual consultancy. There are two current research 
studies in which such advances can be made.
A Hospital Study
For a local hospital Accident and Emergency (A & E) Department, 
others at Royal Holloway College have developed and are putting into 
service a ccxoputerised data-base with extensive detail on the 
reception, diagnosis, treatment and follow up of each patient. This 
has been done not only as a convenient filing and reference system 
for the Consultant Surgeon, but as a basis for research into his 
problems and his interests in various associations between treatments 
and consequences, information and diagnosis, and, for example, 
between prescriptive drug use and driving accidents. (It was an 
interest in this, as a result of other College research on road traffic 
behaviour, that initiated this co-operative study.)
It would be foolhardy to use such a data base for random statistical 
analyses to find out what correlations might be determined. What 
are required are hypotheses, stemming from beliefs born of experience.
In simple terms, we require to know what ideas and problems are of 
concern to the Consultant Surgeon and we want to know the context 
in which these problems arise.
The intention is to formulate (or reformulate) these problems 
in the full context of the A & E subsystan of the hospital system.
We require, among many things, a picture of the communications, the 
medical staff and equipment, and the flow of patients through the 
hospital system. We hope to be able to examine financial and organisational 
problems as well as medical problems as our understanding and 
experience develop.
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Figure 14 Diagram based on data in a lecture given by the
Consultant Surgeon entn.tled 
"The New Specialty of Accident and Emergency"
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Two aspects only will be referred to here since the work has 
hardly begun. Figure 14 represents the essence of the Hospital 
system as described by the Consultant Surgeon (in papers and in 
discussion with us). It uses an idea, previously suggested by me to 
a colleague who was developing a game for Ward Management (Hicks, 1975) 
namely to regard the patient as an essential body of information flowing 
through the system. Also, this provides some impression of the time 
dimension. Only one change, asked for by the Consultant Surgeon, 
has not yet been added to this diagram: namely, that he would wish 
himself to be part of the Diagnosis System, although his superordinate 
role in the Medical Staff and overall A & E systems implies his 
availability. His perception indicated a concern that his presence 
was very important, at least for the more serious cases. My own 
perception is that it may indicate an unwillingness to leave sole 
responsibility to his Registrars with the danger of some inefficiency 
in his absence.
The second aspect relates to other diagrams produced by a 
colleague who finds a need to express time delays for which he is
using a sign, --  on the arrow line. It is too early yet to
say whether identification of reasons for this, plus some indications 
of something like a "patient queueing system" might make such an 
addition unnecessary. However, it was implied in Bowen and Smith,
1976, that "errors" of omission, commission and delay might occur 
in any interaction: the first two in effect are dealt with by the 
round based arrows, and it could be that the third needs its symbol 
also.
A Data-Information-Decision Study
Another research study to which the College is committed is that of 
examining decision-making in high military commands. Again, we are 
only at the beginning of the inquiry, but it seems likely that my 
methodology, Checkland's and Eden's will all have a part to play. This 
should provide an excellent opportunity to examine the last two of the 
three "future" tasks referred to in the opening section of this chapter. 
The other one may also arise, particularly since the analysis of 
options (metagame) technique, extended through the hypergame perspective
101
could become an important part of a method of studying the effectiveness 
of staff co-ordination within a Command and Control System.
Other early impressions are that control of such a difficult 
research area, largely unexplored, may itself need the same methodologies 
The subject is a sensitive one (and I mean in a personal and organisa­
tional not in a security sense). Not only do senior officers not 
take kindly to suggestions that their expertise may be questioned, 
but those who sponsor the study, because it has important bearings 
on their equipment development, for action and for training, are 
aware that any infelicities in the handling of such research could 
have repercussions on their freedcm to undertake it. It may well 
be that appendix E will become relevant in this context.
As I have indicated before, problems, wherever they occur, 
have the same generic form, including potential conflicts, and 
should be amenable to the same methodological attack. It is expected 
that my methodology and others will play a useful part in controlling 
the program of analysis and communication with the immediate clients 
and others who are actors in Checkland's sense.
Tentative Conclusions
For reasons already mentioned, it could be rash to draw definitive 
conclusions. Some of the lessons learnt from the experimental 
consultancy have already been stated in chapter 4, and in a paper 
presented originally to the Fourth European Congress on Operational 
Research (Lausanne, July 1982) and later in final form (Bowen, 1983) 
to a 3-day International Discussion Conference (IFORS & ORS) at the 
Management College, Henley, May 1983. I will not repeat those lessons 
here.
What seems appropriate is to state what I believe I have achieved:-
o I have devised a "language" which is simple and understandablej 
a diagrammatic form of communication which can be used in 
discussion about the problem and, ultimately, for its 
formulation.
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o I have provided rules which impose a discipline on the
preparation of diagrams and which force attention to certain 
aspects of systems (acquisition of data for decision, 
implementation of desired actions, multiple roles, communication 
and so on).
o ■ I have made the elements of the notation (and the rules) 
few in number, so as to avoid dealing with aspects of a 
problem in an idiosyncratic, specific problem, oriented, 
manner (Popper's principle of simplicity - see chapter 3).
o I have developed the methodology for the specific purpose of 
problem-formulation: it is not a technique taken off the shelf 
and used for a purpose for which it was not designed - its 
genesis in conflict resolution studies is hardly surprising 
since problems and conflict are inextricably interrelated.
o I have examined it against various ideas (not necessarily 
problem-formulation methodologies as such) without finding 
it in more than minor disagreement with these; and I have 
observed that it can be used as complementary to many of the 
wider ranging methodologies.
o I have tested the methodology on my own problems in a very 
general way; I have used it to describe what I am trying 
to do and to help me to do it; and I have carried out 
experiments over a period of about 18 months, as a consultant 
to a teaching group.
o I have not yet encountered any serious difficulties in expressing 
what I wished to express, despite the simplicity of the 
diagrammatic facilities. Although I have not yet had others 
(except in the current work described briefly above) using 
the notation to state their ideas, I have had useful reactions 
on the basis of diagrams which I offered as representative 
of those ideas.
With regard to this last statement, it is important to appreciate 
that the notation is not the methodology, but merely my choice of a 
means for developing the methodology and using it. There must be 
many other notations which others might prefer. However, I would
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regard it as essential that any other notation be simple, communicable 
to a wide range of people (i.e. not be restricted to specialists 
as a set-theoretic or graph-theoretic mathematics would be), and 
generally capable of expressing the same ideas and concepts which 
are the methodology.
Finally, I do not claim that I have provided a proven methodology, 
since this would be a contradiction in terms. I do, however, claim 
that what is offered here shows great promise for practice and that 
it is a useful stepping-stone for advance. The river is wide and 
deep. Those who attempt to follow are advised to make sure that they 
can swim.
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Appendix A
What Ackoff is proposing for the practice of OR 
and why I think he is right
K.C, Bowen, Department of Mathematics, 
Royal Holloway College, University of London
A paper presented to the OR Society Meeting on 
"The Ackoff Proposals - Is the Debate Over?"
held at the Royal Society 
loth December 1979
The purpose of this paper was to set the background of the debate 
by a s umma r y  of and comment on two papers by Ackoff presented at the 
ORS Annual Conference, York, 1978, and published in 1979 in the 
Journal of OR. It is printed here as it was delivered except that 
quotations and listings were presented visually.
References have been added - see reference list at the end of the 
main text.
114
Mr. Chairman:
This house, in which we hold our conference, belongs to a 
Society which had its genesis in Oxford, through the multidisciplinary 
interests of such men as Christopher Wren and Robert Boyle. It is 
not inappropriate that I, once an Oxford pure mathematician, now 
working in very different subject areas, should be speaking here in 
support of the ideals of Russell Ackoff - a man trained as an 
architect and whose philosophy seems to encourage combustion.
Despite the title of my address, I am not the opener of a debate. 
My aim is to help to close the existing debate, so that we can all, 
in our own very different environments, push on with improving and 
extending the practice of O.R. My personal belief is that what 
Ackoff says makes good sense; it coheres with the way in which I 
have done O.R,, researched in and advised on O.R. and, from time to 
time, taught O.R. It has not made good sense to all, and it has 
angered some.
I shall try to clear away some of the misperceptions about 
Ackoff and his work. I do not expect this to lead you all to follow, 
precisely, the Ackoff trail. I do want you to see that his framework, 
and his use of it is flexible and capable of integration with many 
others, to the advantage of all.
There are many dimensions of the problem of O.R. which is a 
mess, a set of interrelated problems, as Ackoff defines the word 
(Ackoff, 1974). You will see that Ackoff's philosophy helps to decide 
hew to do O.R. and how to teach O.R. It does not tell you what to do 
but it will help you to think about what you want to do.
Let me go on to some important words that Ackoff uses and defines, 
starting with an Ideal.
In 'On Purposeful Systems' (Ackoff and Emery, 1972), he defines 
it first in the technical framework being developed, and then restates 
his meaning as follows :
"(It) is an outcome that can never be obtained but can be
approached without limit. In this sense we can say ... of
some scientists that their ideal is to obtain errorless
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observations. Even though ... an ideal can never be obtained, 
we can speak meaningfully of (its) pursuit."
There are two important observations that I want to make.
Firstly, because of the pejorative implication, especially in debate, 
of the word ’idealist' (one who seeks to attain an ideal state) 
we should avoid that word today. Ackoff's purpose is 'ideal-seeking', 
in the sense of setting a course towards, and continually striving 
to get nearer to, a state which he desires but can never fully 
attain.
Secondly, therefore, he fully accepts that, because of the near­
infinite complexity of the world he seeks to change, his philosphy is 
itself expressing an ideal. He does not expect that either he or 
others can fully effect the principles that he expounds. Because 
of this, the goals and objectives that may be set for O.R. practice, 
in any given environment, at any given time, may be far short of any 
ideal that Ackoff states. However, his judgement of some O.R. practice 
would be that it is not ambitious enough and, more importantly, that 
it is counter-productive to the acceptance, and the future, of O.R. 
as a valuable contribution to the decision-process.
I shall return to ideals in discussing idealised design of systems. 
So, a few words on 'systems'. I don't see Ackoff as being tied to 
any hard systems theory but to systems thinking in the sense of synthesis,
"... a thing to be understood is conceptualised as a part of one 
or more larger wholes, not as a whole to be taken apart.
Then understanding of the larger containing system is sought.
Finally the system to be understood is explained in terms of 
its role or function in the containing system," (Ackoff, 1979a)
He goes on to make an important distinction between knowledge and 
understanding (see also Ackoff and Emery, 1972, pp 46 to 53). In 
a simple sense, knowledge speaks of how something works; understanding 
speaks of why it works that way. If we intend to change a system 
it is understanding, not knowledge, that is essential information 
for our decision.
It seems to me that, while systems thinking, in a restricted 
sense, could shut off whole areas of the total relevant picture, there
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is no logical reason why it should be so restricted. Indeed Ackoff 
says (and I also stressed this at an earlier meeting on methodology - 
Bowen, 1977b)
"There are no physical^ chemical, biological, psychological, 
sociological or even Operational Research problems. These are 
names of different points-of-view, different aspects of the 
same reality, not different kinds of reality. Any problematic 
situation can be looked at from the point-of-view of any 
discipline, but not necessarily with equal fruitfulness."
(Ackoff, 1979a)
Bryer has attacked the Systems Approach as he sees it (Bryer, 1979) 
but in my view he wrongly interprets the work of Ackoff and Emery 
(1972). He seems to see it as a procedure for gaining knowledge, 
whereas I see it as an attempt (and offered as no more) to provide 
a framework within which knowledge can be ordered and co-ordinated 
in the search for understanding. No doubt, we shall be able to develop 
arguments on this issue, later in this meeting.
And now I come to objectivity.
Insofar as scientists, or any others, wish to take into account 
as much information as they can, honestly, truthfully and without 
bias, no one should be opposed to their intent. If, however, they 
claim to be unbiased, or to understand and correct the biases of others, 
they are claiming a god-like status, an ideal. Certainly, in the 
study of messes, as Ackoff defines them, the biases that exist in 
individuals’ perceptions are real factors that influence events : 
they cannot be wished away because they are illogical or irrational 
in the personal value framework of an analyst.
Some will wish to help others to change their ideas (if the latter 
so wish): much of operational research as I have known it, involves
activity to this end. But such help cannot be given if analysts offer 
their wares as objective in contrast to the more subjective approaches 
of their clients, even when this is true. There is no doubt 
in my mind, from my personal experience in defence O.R., and from 
my observation of. what has happened elsewhere, that the "we, they"
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attitude, where it exists, has seriously degraded the potential of
O.R, and has made it both unacceptable and static.
Ackoff does not deny the ideal of objectivity, he merely argues 
that, unless it is understood, it will be misinterpreted and misused.
"Objectivity is not the absence of value judgements in purposeful 
behaviour. It is the social product of an open interaction of 
a wide variety of subjective value judgements. Objectivity is 
a systemic property of science taken as a whole, not a property 
of individual researchers or research. ... it is an ideal that 
science can continually approach but never attain. ... It is 
value-full, not value-free." (Ackoff, 1979a).
Ackoff's discussion of this is central to his thesis on the 
demise or near-demise of O.R. in many places. It is coupled with 
three other aspects: his emphasis on the differences between optimisation
of the solutions of models and the search for acceptable real-world 
choices; his emphasis on the importance of all those who are not involved 
in the decision process but who are affected by it; and his concept 
of O.R. as not only dealing interactively with a wide range of 
discipline but also providing a framework by which this interaction 
can be made fruitful.
It is this last need that drives me to want this discussion to 
be integrative and not divisive.
I now come to a concept which is very important to Ackoff's 
philosophy. When he speaks of producer-product, he is emphasising 
that there are things that are necessary for the production of some 
object or property of an object. In open systems, these are infinite.
Only in closed mechanical systems can we attribute a clear cause-effect 
relationship. Particularly in interactive systems at successive moments 
in time, the producer-product concept is important: ^  may produce b
and b in turn may be a producer of a later form of a^.
Ackoff is not, as was suggested at an earlier meeting at Bath, 
preferring Singer's concept of producer-product to the concept of 
cause-effect in order 'to stand everything on its head'. Such a 
mischievous procedure could enlighten, it could amuse and it certainly
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could be a valuable debating trick. But as Ackoff argues, producer- 
product is a wider, containing concept, generally applicable and not 
restricted to mechanistic systems. Whereas cause is necessary and 
sufficient for its effect, producer is only necessary, not sufficient, 
for its product. Producer-product is an essential concept for the 
wide-ranging employment of the systems thinking that enables what he 
calls the humanisation, self-control and environmentalisation problems 
to be seen as embedded each within the next.
Problems
Environmentalisation
Self-Control
Humanisation
Purposeful Systems
Larger Systems
Organisation
Parts
Figure Al. Problems and Systems relevant to the Concept of
Producer-product
These deal, respectively, witdi the problems of the purposeful parts ; 
the purposeful organisation of primary concern; and the purposes of 
the larger systems of which tbe organisation is part. It is essential 
to appreciate that Ackoff*s philosophy is thereby insisting on attention
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to the many unquantifiable and difficult-to-understand aspects of 
individual and group behaviour.
So far, I have discussed primarily and all too sketchily some of 
the important principles of Ackoff's thesis as outlined in his first 
York paper (Ackoff, 1979a). If he exhibits anger there, it is anger 
with what he sees as an almost total refusal by the United States 
O.R. Establishment to develop O.R. to meet the bigger challenges 
of the day. He in no way decries the importance of the many O.R. 
techniques which help with problems of a mechanistic nature. He 
does inveigh against a refusal to get involved with more complex social 
problems, and against the stupidity, if such involvement is accepted, 
of using classical O.R. techniques to tackle issues for which they 
are largely unsuited. Insofar as he includes the U.K. in his general 
attack, he recognises that in many areas people are pushing forward 
in ways that are not his style (and he has stressed that there is
an obligation in any study to take style into account). Nevertheless,
there is U.K. O.R. work which he sees as consistent with progress 
towards his ideal. He perhaps under-emphasises his disclaimer.
In examining his second paper (Ackoff, 1979b), we must accept 
any detailed extension of his philosophy as a personal approach 
(both possible and acted upon in the environment in which he works).
It is an approach to the mess that is O.R. practice. It is neither the
solution, nor can it ever ^  a solution. It can only be an attenç>t
to move forward, and it can only be tested by results. Ackoff would 
claim that the results are not discouraging, although he admits that 
so far he has only managed to make small impacts on very messy messes.
He is both a realist and a humanist; to regard him as being distant
from sociological and psychological problems as they affect individuals, 
and to be concerned only with a cold theoretical structuring of such 
problems is quite absurd.
So - on to the ideas of resurrection of the future of O.R.
With regard to interactive planning Ackoff offers three principles.
1. The principal benefit of planning comes from engaging in it.
2. Planning should be continuous.
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3. Every part of a system and every level of it should be planned 
for simultaneously.
The first of these is the participative principle. It was thoroughly 
debated at our Oxford conference, and I gained the impression that, 
despite the undoubted difficulties, it commanded wide support in 
principle. The second is, in effect, asking for deep involvement right 
through to in^lementation and control of the new system, something 
which many O.R. workers have sought, but few have attained. The third 
stems from the interactive nature of the systems we deal with; we 
all know the frustrations of providing analysis which proves to be 
irrelevant to those we serve because of changes in systems other than 
the one on which we, often without choice, have concentrated.
I suggest that, while it might be interesting to discuss how 
to overcome obstacles to the application of Ackoff's principles, we 
have no reason to deny their relevance and desirability.
His concept of an idealised design for the system planned for 
seems to me to be equally desirable, but very much misunderstood.
It is the constraints placed on this design that are all-important. 
Firstly, the design should be technologically feasible and I do not 
intend to discuss this further. It should also be operationally viable. 
It is this latter constraint that makes a conceivable reality of what 
would otherwise be a pipe-dream; it would encompass the incrementalist 
approach and draw attention to what increments were possible.
One particularly important feature of idealised design, indeed 
of the conceiving of ideals in general, is this. Initially, one 
is not bounded by constraints other than those that, for some personal 
reason, confine one's thinking. For example, it may be that a decision­
maker is likely to have strong antipathy to certain options : if
neglect of such options is likely to constrain the idealised design, 
there is a new sub-problem - to get him to understand how and why such 
options miÿit be better included.
The idealised design will not be achieved in any easily definable 
sense, because the test of its viability in the various stages of 
planning will subject it to continuous change. It will take into
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account the many value judgements of those concerned (those who plan 
and those affected by the plan who should also be involved in the 
planning) . It will take into account the many conflicts that will 
occur and, by its process, assist in resolving these. It will 
facilitate participation and motivate those involved to work for the 
future they desire. It will encourage creativity and direct its 
purpose, and it will widen the horizons of what is deemed possible.
How far one can go in practice is a matter of conjecture: all
depends on the vision and persuasiveness of those brave enough to 
follow the logic of the principles. The hardest nut to crack is the 
further concept of a system designed to be ideal-seeking, having an 
ability to monitor its environment and adapt to changes. It is not 
that we do not all accept the importance of flexibility in this context: 
it is that conceiving the sort of flexibility that should be designed 
into the system is very difficult.
On the practice of O.R. Ackoff makes three points. I will do 
little more than state them, because I hold them to be self-evident.
We should unde fine O.R. For a long time, O.R. has been, for me, 
what I do to help those who seek my involvement with their decisions.
I hope that eventually we can usefully define it, but the definition 
must be adaptable under the pressures of the changing tasks to which 
it might be applied.
We must take interdisciplinarity seriously. I believe that it 
is not important to regard all the members of an O.R. team as doing
O.R. The essential O.R. people are those who can shape those of many 
disciplines or expertises into a team capable of addressing the task 
in hand.
Finally, those who are concerned in any way with the decision, 
should be members of the team in some sense. We are back to the principle 
of participation. I would only add that the constitution of the team, 
in ability and in spread of skills, must be a factor in deciding 
what sort of idealised design is worth aiming for: it will not be
operationally viable if it is not efficiently planned for.
In Ackoff*s comments on the role of the Society, I don't see 
anything controversial. What he calls for, I believe our open society
1 2 2
has striven for, although our success to date has been limited.
We also now have, although not initiated by the Society, a U.K. 
journal (the Journal of Enterprise Management) , the aims of vdiich are 
in sympathy with Ackoff*s call for improved communication between
O.R. people and managers. I shall watch its future development with 
interest. It is certainly not enough to talk to ourselves. I have 
often quoted an article, which I thought excellent, which bemoaned the 
lack of interest by operational researchers in occupatioftal psychology.
It was printed in the Journal of Occupational Psychology (Gregson, 1962), 
as if to advance its own argument by minimising the probability that 
operational researchers would be motivated by it - since they would 
be unlikely to see it.
I also believe that we discourage contributions to journals 
by too strict a refereeing standard of what is O.R. I know many, 
who see themselves, or are willing to see themselves, as doing O.R., 
who feel shut out. I am with Ackoff in urging our publications to 
be ever more adventurous; if controversy results, I believe this to 
be beneficial, provided it can be controlled - I suppose that such 
publications would be ideal-seeking and designed accordingly.
In his section on O.R. education Ackoff does two things. He 
puts forward, as an exan^le of an O.R. education programme, designed 
to follow the principles outlined earlier, his own (S^ ) programme 
at Pennsylvania. He also comments on the 1978 Presidential address 
(Simpson, 1978).
Regarding the Pennsylvania education programme, he does not offer 
it "so much as an example to be followed, but to show how completely 
the educational paradigm that O.R, uses can be redesigned." He also 
states that "the product is far from ideal but it is systematically 
ideal-seeking and subject to continuous experimental modification."
Since any educational programme must have many features which are personal 
to those designing it, whether an idealised design or not, I can see 
no purpose in describing again here what is clearly and factually 
described by Ackoff.
His so-called criticism of Professor Sin^son, is important if 
only for the fact that Ackoff has been accused of rudeness, of comment
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inappropriate to an occasion when the President was presiding. I 
find it difficult to find support for these accusations; Ackoff 
started by saying that he was not taking issue with the President, 
but with a concept of teaching that he shared responsibility for in 
the 1950s and 1960s. He then proceeded to say why he thought that 
this model for teaching, which was still being used, was no longer 
what was needed. I believe that the 'offence' taken on the President's 
behalf was a rationalisation of a refusal to listen to a view that might 
shake confidence in present methods of teaching. I hope Mike was 
not himself offended, however surprised he may have been. (I learnt 
after this paper was given that S knew beforehand of A's intentions, 
and raised no objection.)
When 2, heard the Presidential Address, I would, had it not been 
a privileged occasion, have taken issue, in principle, with some of the 
arguments that Ackoff finds unacceptable. I worried particularly 
about some of the statements on formal courses in mathematical techniques, 
because I believe that the relevance of these to the essence of large- 
scale problems is marginal. I would accept that they have a major 
role in dealing with the more technical or mechanical systems; I 
do not agree that we can attribute some general conceptual content, 
relevant also to complex purposeful systems, to standard mathematical 
models.
Let me now wind-up. I am not, as I said, intending to make debating 
points. Over the years that I have listened to, argued with, and 
read the ideas that Ackoff puts forward, and which he changes in 
accordance with his principle of idealised design, I have accepted 
much of his philosophy as my own. I have done this, not because it 
looked good, or because it was the best available, but because he 
formulated what, in some way, I had thought but had never made explicit 
in a way that satisfied me. So anything I have said today is my 
belief, and m^ interpretation of what Ackoff says. If you disagree 
with me you may or may not be disagreeing with Ackoff.
I have, for many years, wanted a new direction for O.R. I 
did not find the continued reflections on what is wrong with O.R, 
voiced at the Stirling conference, disturbing. . I would perhaps 
have been disturbed if nothing had been said, although I would have
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preferred to have heard more of what people were doing to advance the 
state-of-the-art towards their ideal.
I hope that any meeting that follows up today's discussions will 
put before us accounts of what individuals and groups are doing to 
improve the process and the image of O.R. At present, there are many 
doing good O.R. in Ackoff's sense, but their principles are incompletely 
expressed and not available in a form that gives a blue-print for others. 
I would also like the Society to provide a Peking Poster facility, 
for those who want to offer unconventional ideas, not yet accepted 
as O.R., but relevant to the challenge that Ackoff sees in major social 
and organisational problems.
For our present purposes, I hope we can stay close to the arguments 
put by Ackoff at York. We cannot easily recall the context of state­
ments made long ago: those who argue for a sociological base for O.R. 
will perhaps agree that we would have to know the sociological background 
that produced the statements, before we could interpret them in the 
context of today.
Finally, I ask you to accept that the problem of doing O.R. is 
a mess: it may even be called a meta-mess. It is not a problem amenable 
to classical O.R. and it is not enough to say, what we prefer managers
to say, "I know what to do: it is my expertise.". If we do 
not follow Ackoff, we must find an equally coherent and well-argued 
philosophy to guide our footsteps.
Here are my requests in a nut-shell.
From Individuals
1. Explicit formulations of his or her philosophy and principles 
of 'good' O.R.
2. Acceptance of or alternatives to the principle of idealised 
design.
From the Society
1. A Peking Poster facility for unconventional (even inccxnplete) ideas,
2. Less strict definition, by referees, of what is O.R.
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For this Conference
1, Stay close to the arguments of the York papers (as far as Ackoff's 
views are concerned).
2. Accept that the problem of doing O.R. is a 'mess'.
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Appendix B
Operational Research's Contribution 
to the Problem of Defence
K.C. Bowen, Department of Mathematics, 
Royal Holloway College, University of London
A paper prepared for the Third International Discussion 
Conference on Operational Research, organised by the 
Universities of Sussex, Lancaster and Pennsylvania, 
at the Dudley Hotel, Hove, 12-16 May, 1980.
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Introduction
The 1939-45 war gave great impetus to the involvement of scientists 
in the study of military operations and created a new subject, operational 
research. Many believe that the early methodology has been lost; 
that OR then was "good" and that, scanehow, it has become "less good",
I would argue against this. Systems were then so underdeveloped and 
so little understood that great improvements could be made with the 
help of quite sinple models. Problems were so many that it was possible 
to do a great deal by concentrating on the easier, generally tactical, 
ones. The close co-ordination of scientists and decision-makers was 
natural and readily accepted in the circumstances prevailing. Perhaps 
most importantly, e3q>erimentation and testing of ideas was possible 
in actual operations. In all, the environment was very favourable 
towards the success of OR, as it was, for similar reasons, in industry 
in the 1950s,
The intention at this conference, however, is to look at the 
present day and to the future. So we are concerned with current and 
future spending on defence, and how OR can assist in its econcmic 
application to systems whose improvement or development will have 
the greatest pay-off for the security of our various countries. There 
are several reasons why our task of assessing the value of defence 
OR is difficult.
Security, Details of successful OR studies of recent date are
not openly available. We can, however, try to identify areas 
in which we believe that OR has been of value for decisions on 
resource allocation or operational efficiency.
Identifying the influence of OR, Relating the findings of analysis 
to policy decisions is far from easy, Scanetimes the two seem 
to be incompatible, and when they are not, proof that the decision 
was greatly affected by the analysis is rarely possible. Also, 
because of the time-scale of equipment introduction into service, 
many changes of policy take place, without further analysis, and 
the relevance of the earlier work is often far from clear. We 
can perhaps judge OR's value indirectly:
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o has it affected the mode of thinking and judgement of 
those who are, or will be, responsible for decisions?
o is it still being required in major defence studies?
o has it provided any tools for management use and at 
what level?
Peacetime and Wartime. We do not have a fully operating systen 
and cannot measure directly even today's effectiveness, if we 
regard success in war as the main criterion of the defence 
system. We may, however, see deterrence and political impact 
as a main criterion. If so, are studies done which give measures 
of such a criterion? Can we identify peace-time operational 
facilities or processes which are important for deterrence, and 
say how OR has helped to introduce or improve these?
Prediction, Future operational environments are very uncertain.
Has OR found ways of identifying facilities needed which are 
reasonably independent of environment. If models are based 
on "likely future wars", can they deal reasonably with the initial 
conditions (the states of the systems when war starts), and, 
in reaching these conditions, can the effects of interference 
from systems over which Defence has no control (e,g, potential 
enemies and international organisations ) be taken account of?
I have stated these aspects of defence OR and its assessment as 
if they were peculiar to defence. This is not entirely true. Commercial 
and political security hides from open publication many of the things 
we would like to know when judging the success or failure of OR in 
other areas. The time-scale of industrial and social system projects can 
also be as long as 10 years, a figure broadly applicable to major 
defence equipment developments. Again, planning studies in the civil 
field often deal with new systems which will introduce operational 
problems of which there is no prior experience. Finally, prediction 
problems abound in economic studies, and they are just as complex 
as those faced in defence OR,
If I am right in saying that defence has the characteristics of 
the general class of socio-economic problems, there is an importance
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for our discussions. There are many such problems being studied and 
OR, although not necessarily by that name, in involved in most of them.
Discussants, whether or not they have worked in Defence OR, should 
have experience of value to help asses whether OR in defence is doing 
the right things in the right way.
National and Alliance Contexts
I hope that our discussions will not be limited to the defence 
OR of nations whose defence budgets are large in absolute terms.
There is a strong tendency in discussion meetings of this type 
for the US or British environments, or both, to predominate, I would 
like to get a wider picutre, across nations and alliances of nations, 
of what defence OR is done (or not done) that is (or would be) 
appropriate and valued in its particular context. It will be of 
interest to know, for each nation;
o at what level in the hierarchy are OR departments or 
units situated
o to what level of decision do its studies relate
o what organisational factors operate for or against the 
implementation of OR-derived ideas
0 what are the aspects of defence problems that are most 
difficult to deal with (either because OR does not have the 
tools it needs or because OR has inadequate access to data - 
including in the latter case barriers which say "that is 
none of your business"!),
1 know, for instance, that Sweden has a very different defence 
OR set-up to that of the UK and that its priorities for study are
also different (Jennergren et al, 1977), I know that the small nations 
of NATO have very different national criteria for defence effectiveness 
to those they adhere to as part of the NATO alliance. From time to 
time, nations have priorities for internal security, which demands 
OR support more akin to the wartime OR of 40 years ago.
With those complications, added to those of security, and the 
limited time at our disposal, our discussions will probably be more 
useful if they are conceptual and general, rather than technical
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and detailed. We shoiild certainly try to establish whether there 
is "good OR" being done by one country the nature of which can be 
generalised for the benefit of others. I do not imply that specific 
cases cannot be described, but I do suggest that description be limited 
to what is essential to establish where Defence OR stands and where 
it might be going.
I will end this introductory discussion paper with my own views 
on UK Defence OR, You may take these as necessarily biased.
However, I have been for the last ten years a methodology researcher, 
outside the main-stream activity of advising the MOD; I have had to 
take a critical look at what we (including myself) had done in the 
past, as well as what changes were taking place. I have tried to 
reflect carefully on my judgements; they will still be only one man's 
view of a very complex area, and fallible. Perhaps, however from the 
accidental sample we acquire, some consensus and some useful ideas 
for the future will emerge.
Defence OR in the UK - A Personal View
My own involvement in operational activities has spanned 40 years, 
although I can only formally label my work as operational research 
over the period from 1954. I have worked in a Research and Development 
(R & D) Establishment as an analyst of the potential operational 
performance of naval equipment under development. I have worked as a 
scientific member of Naval operational groups, including a period serving 
afloat, on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. I spent 
five years with the Department of Naval Operational Studies, within the 
MOD, examining the immediate problems of the Naval Staff. Finally,
I was at the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment as a manager of 
project teams working on maritime problems and more recently as a 
researcher and in-house consultant; in both these roles, I have been 
involved with a wide range of problems including major resource-allocation 
and operational planning studies, where the customer is at high level 
up to and including the Secretary of State for Defence.
131
From this background, I will comment both on the organisation 
of OR and on its performance, and state what I believe to be its 
weaknesses as we move into the 1180s. I start by listing some areas 
where there has undoubtedly been success, albeit varying in degree.
Logistics. Defence OR has taken over methods developed in
industry for improving stores handling, repairs, ship building, 
aircraft and vehicle maintenance, and so on. Inventory and 
stock control, reliability theory, queuing theory, critical path 
analysis and many statistical techniques have been put to good 
use. By improving control systems, lower costs and increased 
efficiency have resulted.
Tactics. Using similar methods to those of wartime, tactical 
studies have been a continuing OR commitment, seeking better ways 
to use, in wartime, what we have. This has been carried out, 
in general by small groups working with operational units sometimes 
at operational headquarters, sometimes less directly from R S D 
Establishments. Service officers are closely associated with these, 
as with most other OR studies, and are often integral members 
of the OR team.
Equipment R & D . Operational studies, of limited scope, are 
carried out alongside research and development. They help in 
making choices between alternative developments and in enhancing 
equipment performance in operation. There are elements of sub- 
optimisation in such work, but links with studies which examine 
the same and other equipment in wider contexts exist. I believe 
these links to be far from satisfactory due to the organisational 
structure and to the different criteria of "goodness" that are 
inevitable in different parts of a large organisation. Nevertheless, 
there is excellent work done in this field.
Communications Networks. Many important studies have been carried 
out to help in the design of communications systems, particularly 
to ensure that networks have appropriate capacity and are robust 
against interference and breakdown. The larger question as to 
whether data provided by communications systems is properly matched 
to the information extracted for decisions is of continuing concern, 
but as yet little progress has been made.
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Movement and Redeployment. Military strength measured in terms 
of ships, tanks, aircraft and weapon systems is of little relevance 
unless things can be in the right place at the right time.
Strategic movement studies can be carried out, to a large extent, 
without the complications of battle interactions which reduces 
performance in ways difficult to assess. Many valuable studies 
of this type have been carried out and well received; linear 
programming and other programming techniques have been admirably 
suited to the purpose. One such study has been reported in the 
open literature (C.N. Beard and C.T. Mclndoe, The Determination 
of the Least Cost Mix of Transport Aircraft Ships and Stockpiled 
Material to Provide British Forces with Adequate Strategic 
Mobility in the Future, 1968 Operational Research Society Conference 
Edinburgh) . Studies such as this are among the few that have 
offered planning aids as well as the advice needed for major 
decisions on strategic concepts and equipment procurement.
This is not a complete list, but by omission it serves to draw 
attention to an important area of defence OR that consumes a large 
part of the resources available, large-scale battle and campaign 
modelling. This complex task must be attempted if help is to be given 
to the tasks of planning for major weapon systems through an understand­
ing of their interactions and their separate and joint capabilities.
One cannot but admire the technical skill and professional understanding 
that has been deployed. Often both analysts and senior military staffs 
have been pleased with what has been done, on other occasions there 
have been serious reservations. I am wary of the early enthusiasm 
of the cusomter because I do not see the follow-up actions as being 
clearly related to the analysis received; I am worried by the frustrations 
that result from non-acceptance of analysis, and even more worried 
when analysis is accepted but the reservations made by the analysts 
are ignored.
One success that can be attributed to large-scale modelling, 
although I could not prove it, is that everyone involved is learning 
a great deal about the systems studied and about the environment.
They are understanding better the relationships of the many variables, 
controlled abd uncontrolled, that are used in the models. But relating
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the findings of analysts, to the decisions that are to be taken is very 
difficult. Because they should be part of our concern in debate,
I will list some of the reasons why I think OR needs to assess success 
with large-scale modelling with great care.
o Many factors, whose importance is not questioned, are omitted 
from these models. Morale is one such factor; "command 
and control" is another. The latter has recently been the 
subject of study in a land-battle context (D.W. Daniel,
"What Influences a. Decision? Some Results from a Highly 
Controlled Defence Game",) Information-décision games have 
produced results which do not give confidence that actions will 
be as smooth and satisfactory in their response to situations 
as most modelling would suggest.
o Monte Carlo simulation models are difficult to control,
in the sense of understanding the reasons for consequences, 
given the input data and the rules. The need for parallel 
analytical models and the use of variance reduction techniques 
is increasingly realised, but the mode1-worlds are still 
as bewildering as the real one.
o The models do not seem to represent the world as the customer 
sees it, judging by his responses. Why this is so is not 
easy to determine, and it seems to depend on the level of 
decision involved. Sometimes, the issues that decide military 
resource allocation are far from the "natural" military 
context. Economic, political, and even industrial, pressures 
which the decision-maker sees as realities are not in the 
models, nor do the outputs relate easily to these. There 
are associated unrealities and lack of explanation of results 
as discussed in the two preceding statements.
o Increasingly, defence analysts engaged on work for the 
Central Staffs of MOD have become more distant from the 
realities of warfare (as have their military advisers) and 
from the operational systems with which they deal. The 
first is due to a long period of relative peace. The second 
is due to a combination of two factors; the pressures of many
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demands on a small number of anaylsts; and the less frequent 
opportunities to work with the Services, particularly in 
major exercises. The net result is that the development of 
models increasingly emphasises the technical at the e]q)ense 
of the operational.
o If there is ^ need for analytical mathematical models, the
available expertise must be better balanced, away from computer 
programming skills and towards logical-mathematical skills.
It is important also to realise that good mathematical modelling, 
because it has to simplify descriptions of systems, has to be 
backed by good operational insights.
o Whatever types of model are deployed, statistical skills
in data handling are increasingly required, both in handling 
"dirty data" that determines inputs and model generated data. 
Defence OR is not alone in lacking such skills - where do 
statisticians go?
The Future of Defence OR
If my concern about defence OR in support of major decisions 
is justified and it is desired to continue and improve this area 
of work, we should discuss what is needed in the future. It is clear 
that, in less taxing areas, the successful use of OR is a logical 
development of the type of OR that created our subject in World War II 
and in the industrial post-war era. In the more difficult, high-level, 
decision areas, a further extension of this OR approach is an uncertain 
way forward.
We could make changes in various ways, for example:
o we might offer large-scale models in a form suitable for 
learning by those who have to take decisons, rather than 
attempt to use such models to obtain results on which we^  
believe decisions should be based;
o we might use them solely for our own learning to help us 
construct simpler models as aids to decison;
o we might try, more consciously to set our models in the
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wider framework of the de ci son-making process, perhaps 
using non-quantitative approaches;
o we might pay a great deal more attention to an analysis of
our own decisions concerning the selection and use of our models.
In what I have said, I neither decry what has been done in the past, 
nor do I despair for the future. Even in the areas of greatest difficulty 
I am impressed by what has been achieved; but I am not satisfied that 
those who have responsibility for decisions are getting the value that 
they expect or that the immense efforts of analysis would imply.
There is one final difficulty that I think should be discussed.
OR has the reputation of being restricted to highly numerate problems, 
and clients tend to avoid non-numerate aspects. On the other hand, 
most OR workers are reluctant to adopt qualitative methods that might 
be more appropriate (Bowen, 1979) . Even if the door is partly open,
OR is not pushing very hard in order to get through.
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Appendix C
The Process of OR - A Systems Approach
K.C. Bowen, Defence Operational Analysis 
Establishment, Ministry of Defence
A paper presented to the OR Society meeting on 
"The King is Dead: Long Live the King"?
held at the University of Aston 
December, 1977
This was one of six papers discussing the future direction in which 
OR methodology might develop. It is given here unchanged except for' 
the style of referencing.
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Introduction
When a systems approach to the study of a large scale socio­
economic problems is put forward, there can be a misunderstanding 
of what is involved. In the language of the physical sciences, from 
which operational research has drawn its main strength, systems are 
considered in a mechanistic way, with fairly rigid rules for interactions 
and for the effect of variation of system parameters. Seen in this 
way, a systems approach can be said to be inadequate for dealing 
with sociological, psychological and other behavioural factors, which 
are clearly important for the types of problem with which OR is 
increasingly concerned.
It is, of course, all too easy to be critical of OR as it is.
All is not well with OR, but, sometimes, this criticism can be unfair. 
Many writers have damned OR on the basis of work done on the Third 
London Airport study, which used a cost-benefit approach to bring 
complicated value-systems and social attitudes into line with money 
measures. But this study was not carried out as an OR study; indeed, 
the analysts had little or nothing to do with problem-formulation 
and the identification of options. On the other hand, examples 
can be found which cam be used to praise OR, again with limited justifica­
tion. The Docklands Redevelopment Team (led by a former Defence OR 
man) did what is, to many, a fine piece of OR work. Yet it was not 
carried out by an OR team, but by a top-level planning group, which 
did not use generally accepted OR techniques.
It is not part of ray argument that particular techniques are 
good or bad. They can only be judged by their use. I am concerned 
with the lack of a framework for problem-formulation, within which 
appropriate analysis methods can be chosen for the particular problem 
of concern, so that the process of OR can proceed sensibly. Such 
a framework may be provided by a systems approach.
Systems and Subsystems
My concept of systems generally follows that of Ackoff and Emery 
(1972) , apart from defining the environment of a system as including 
that system, and treating it in turn as a system (a containing set).
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Necessarily, in a short presentation, precision of definition is 
impossible, but will I hope, be sought from the various references 
by those who wish to go further than reaching a broad understanding 
of the direction in which my arguments lead.
A system is a set of two or more interacting elements, existing 
in an environment which influences the system and is influenced by it.
In general, it is difficult and unprofitable to examine what a system 
is doing in isolation from its environment. We are interested first 
in a purposeful system which can operate on its subsystems and, 
via a common environment, on systems which it does not control. We 
need to define and place all the essential subsystems of the systems 
we discuss, and then deal similarly with the subsystems until the total 
problem is exposed.
Some of the subsystems will be in the minds of people - their 
ideals, goals, objectives, aims, value systems, world pictures, prejudices, 
beliefs and so on. Indeed, once purposeful systems are introduced 
as essential parts of a problem, the roles of people (singly and in 
groups) must be of concern. Ackoff and Emery offer a starting point 
for the introduction of behavioural factors into a systems framework.
My own work on conflict and OR methodology has been influenced by 
theirs.
The notation that I use is based on Bowen and Smith (1976) , 
but is simpler. In essence, a system is drawn as a rectangular box 
and will contain others which are its subsystemis. Containing boxes 
will indicate, for example, environments. Interactions take place 
between any system and a system directly containing or contained 
by it - lines indicating interactions need not be included except 
when emphasis is required. Conflict potentially occurs between distinct 
systems in a common environment, provided that these systems are 
purposeful. Human systems, regarded for simplicity as individual 
people, are shown as circles. They may be in control of the system 
that contains them, i.e. they represent its purposeful nature.
I shall not in this paper deal specifically with the sy stems- 
structuring of what is in people's minds. The paper already referred 
to gives an indication of what can be done, if the diagrams representing
139
the adaptive and decision processes are interpreted as representing 
individual behaviour. Another use of the notation is also given in 
Bowen, (1978b) : it is applied to the roles and activities of people
in games played for research purposes and is primarily the work of 
Janet I. Harris.
What follows is a treatment of the OR process itself. It was 
first presented in Mexico to underline some of the points made in 
a written paper (Bowen, 1975b) and was then included in a paper 
presented in India (Bowen, 1975c). In these two countries, major 
social problems are being faced, and I thought it important to emphasise 
the difficulties of the OR process and the overriding inportance of 
good problem-formulation and of a clear understanding of the decision­
making system. Indeed it seemed to me then, and still does, that 
more help is likely to be given in this way than by large-scale 
modelling of those parts of the problem that are able to be described 
by numbers and by mathematical relationships.
The advantage, if I can use such a term for a perceived limitation 
of analysis as at present developed, is that, since relationships 
are described in logical but not numerical terms, all factors, whether 
sociological, psychological, or physical, can be included. But one 
warning must be sounded. The systems description is as perceived 
by those who create it, or at best it is how they perceive someone 
else's perception. A number of such diagrams, ostensibly of the same 
systems, are needed to describe "reality" effectively. In the 
discrepancies between such diagrams lie the major difficulties that 
face those who have the task of making decisions, including the analyst 
who must face clearly the problem of what approach to analysis should 
be made.
The OR Process
Fig. Cl, then, describes, in a simplified form, the OR process 
as perceived by me, for the purposes of the discussion which follows. 
Insofar as different perceptions are held by those reading this paper, 
they will be alerted to possible reasons for different attitudes 
to OR and to the likelihood of difficulties of communication resulting. 
Certainly, if such a diagram is used to help in deciding what analysis,
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P(X)
Model Implementation
System
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DM
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to be modified
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Process
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Output
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of X /Y
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Model 
of P(X)
I SA \
TOTAL SYSTEM
Figure Cl. The OR Process : System Relationships
organisation and procedures are necessary, it must be a description 
eventually held in common by analyst and decision-maker. Briefly, 
what has been included is as follows.
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X is the system centrally involved in a particular problem,
X* is the policy-making system for X.
P(X) is the defined problem area which contains X and also
Y , the external systems which are the most important identified
systems which conflict with X*’s present intentions 
for X.
DM has nominal control over X* (which identifies and chooses
policies relating to X) and, in a second role over
I(X), the system that implements choices to change X - in
particular to change
X'* which is a specific subsystem of X.
D(X) the overall decision system for X, contains X*, I(X)
and DM. Note that DM, in charge of D(X), is assumed 
here also to play the role of DM in X* and in I(X) - 
but he can only play one role at any one moment in 
time.
A* is the analysis system. It is (ideally) external to
P(X) and it studies P(X) for DM of X*. It has two 
main subsystems',
k' , the main analysis system, and
, the explicit analysis output which is modelled in X*.
SA the systems analyst (or senior analyst) in charge of
A* overall, plays other roles when in charge of A" or 
A^ separately. He plays an importantly different role 
when communicating with DM within X*.
The separate models in k' will be discussed later. Firstly, some of 
the more general inferences that can be drawn from the model of 
figure Cl will be discussed.
The Policy-Making System
Ideally, DM and SA will work in harmony in X*. Potentially, by 
the definition of the structure, they may be in conflict beyond the 
conflict level essential to their interaction, assumed here to be 
fundamentally co-operative. The explicit model of the problem area
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P(X) is there to help them resolve any damaging conflict in the 
problem-formulation stage. Similarly, the explicit model of 
which they can relate to the model of P (X) will help them to remain 
co-operative at the model solution and policy decision stage.
The models therefore have an importance that extends beyond their 
value as outputs from A*, it may also be noted that DM in X* is 
nominally the resolver of conflicts that take place between purposeful 
subsystems under his control: but he cannot resolve conflicts 
between himself and other subsystems without acceptance of scane 
independent "authority" or agreed procedure (he could get rid of SA, 
of course, although SA is, in this conception, partly independent).
DM of D(X) could nominally help to resolve conflicts, but here 
we are assuming him to be the same person playing a different role.
This puts him in an unenviable situation if he is also DM of I (X) .
Since the purposes of policy and implementation may well conflict, 
considerable difficulties can arise for the two-hatted DM (difficulties 
not unknown to individuals whose social and professional duties and 
intentions conflict). There are even greater problems, since policy­
making and implementation are separated in time, and analysis may 
become irrelevant to implementation. But those are difficulties which 
will not be discussed in this paper.
The Systems Analyst
As conceived here, the systems analyst, responsible for A*, A' 
and A^, has similar multi-role difficulties. Again, if these are 
different people, SA in A* could resolve disagreements between SA 
in a ' who wants to report his analysis (which he perceives as 
entirely relevant to X*) in full, and SA in A^ whose job it is to see that 
analysis output is matched to policy-making needs. But one overriding 
difficulty occurs.
SA in A* and SA in X* are necessarily one and the same person.
A* is nominally outside P(X) but SA in A* spends at least part of his 
life as an integral part of X* (assuming that direct communication 
with DM is essential) . A* cannot therefore remain as detached as it 
should be if, in theory, we maintain the "disinterested" scientific
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approach. The desired balance must be achieved through the models, 
communication and the freedom of SA to disassociate himself from analysis 
for D(X), if he so wishes (a despairing act, since he is only partly 
independent!),
The Modelling Process
What is shown in A" is what is desired; it is not a description 
of what is usually modelled. The model of the X/y interaction is 
normally limited to the X'*/Y interaction at some future time. This 
model inquires whether X can handle interactions with the future Y 
if there is a new or modified X"'. There are a number of questions 
that may not be examined in such a model, for example, how Y reacts 
to the changes made in X^ over time. This is part of the wider 
question of the steadily changing situation of X and Y; it poses further 
problems for D(X), in particular problems for I(X), as referred to 
above.
But the modelling of X/y , however inadequate, may be overshadowed 
by the inadequate modelling of P(X). Problem-formulation has as 
yet no clear methodology, and, indeed, is often so sketchily done as 
to amount to little more than a vague verbal description, although, 
for SA, much more is implicit in his modelling of X/Y. But how does 
that enhance the communication, and reduce the conflict, with DM? 
Experience shows that there is trouble, even at intervening levels of 
the hierarchy, if there is not an explicit model of P(X). This, as 
time goes on, helps, in X*, to get acceptance of the analysis (the 
model of A^) as relevant to the problem as perceived by DM; it also 
helps DM to foresee possible policies, which again can be fed back 
by SA to control the development of the model of X/Y and the form of A^.
What is envisaged for the modelling of P(X) is a structured 
diagram or diagrams of the type used here. It is apparent that even 
the limited structure provided in figure 1 is more than a trivial 
model of the problem of the analyst/decision maker interaction. But 
the most important issue of modelling is still to be discussed.
Models of the decision process are rarely provided: one reason 
may be that decision-makers do not like analysts treading on sacred
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ground. Yet it is of great importance that SA should understand D(X) 
thoroughly: how otherwise can he provide outputs that match D(X) 
inputs for whatever decision process takes place?
One other way of demonstrating the importance of such a model 
is to go back to the requirement for a model of P (X) . P(X) contains 
the x/y interaction, but it also contains D (X) as a subset of X. 
Modelling the problem includes modelling the decision-making system.
If decision were a straightforward matter there would be no problem.
Much more could be said about the implications of the diagram, 
not only in relation to modelling but also (assuming more detailed 
structuring of aims, values, and other aspects of DM and SA) in relation 
to the importance of variables of a psychological nature. Further, 
if the diagram were to include those within Y, and those neither in 
X or Y, who might act in ways which constrain the decision-making 
system, a new dimension of P(X) becomes explicit.
However, all I wish to emphasise here is that, if a systems- 
structuring can cast light on the nature of, and the difficulties in, 
the OR process itself, which is in part a psychological and socio­
logical problem, it should also be usable for what I now consider the 
most important challenges. These are firstly, to develop a methodology 
for problem-formulation and for explicit description of the decision 
process: and, secondly, to find out how far this goes towards aiding 
the making of policy.
The capabilities of a systems approach, that are of overriding 
importance, are, firstly, the provision of the structure of the problem 
(mess) being studied, and, secondly, the provision of a coherent and 
simple "language" to aid analysis. This analysis may often be limited 
to relationships, to classification, and even to less formulised 
description. The essence is that all important elements, subsystems 
and systems be described and interrelated, even if this means that 
measurement, in the classical (absolute) sense, becomes an unlikely 
primary tool for anlysis.
Systems should not necessarily be regarded as having a defined 
reality. It is how things are perceived that is important, for we 
may never know how things are. The purposeful systems must be seen
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to contain concepts of history, culture eind social organisation 
and these will play a considerable part in influencing behaviour.
It is essential, in particular, that decision-making systems (that 
formulate policy and/or implement changes) are described as they are 
perceived to be, not as they are conventionally, hierarchically, 
defined (even the President of the US is powerless unless he can 
influence people, in the system which he nominally controls, to make 
the changes he desires).
The "language" which a systems approach demands can provide a 
means of treating conceptually similar systems (however different 
they may appear when described in natural language) in similar ways.
It also offers a means of merging different disciplinary outlooks 
rather than choosing between them. There are sociological aspects 
of problems : there are also psychological aspects, economic aspects
and so on. The problems include all these aspects and what is needed 
is something which helps to tackle the problem as a whole. I do 
not believe that the views* which Bryer expresses are necessarily 
incompatible with mine. If this conference helps to bring these and
any other apparently conflicting views closer together, it will have
served a valuable purpose.
Concluding Remarks
It is not possible in a short paper, intended as a basis for 
discussion, to develop arguments fully. Elsewhere (Bowen and Harris, 
1978) , I have outlined the direction of my personal research programme, 
and made clear my view that a wide range of expertises and techniques 
have to be integrated if OR is to have a major impact on important 
and ccxnplex social problems. Further, I would urge people to pay 
attention to Ackoff's views on how to approach these "messes" (Ackoff, 
1974) and to appreciate those aspects of OR which are not and cannot 
be scientific - inspiration and insights cannot be formally extracted 
from the bewildering variety of the real world, but perhaps they can 
be helped to emerge.
* These are best referred to in Bryer, 1979.
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I am encouraged by others who have made statements which I see 
as congruent with my own outlook. Recently, Rolfe Tomlinson sent me 
a short paper outlining his broad intentions for research with IIASA. 
On the management/systems analysis interface, he says
"...the systems analyst is unavoidably part of the overall 
system. Certainly, if his results are to be effective, there 
must be continual interaction between him and the system 
that he is trying to improve or affect. The study of this 
interaction is itself a systems problem, and constitutes an 
essential area for study if systems analysis is to be more 
effective."
On the question of whether OR is or can become a science, Dando et al 
(1977) refer to OR, as it is today, as a technology that will remain 
a hit-and-miss affair unless an underlying science can be developed. 
Such a science would have, as the phenomena of concern, the decision­
making processes in organisations. The language of the science would 
be drawn from systems theories, and theory-testing would be associated 
with developments of decision methodology and controlled forms of 
gaming.
A systems approach is not a panacea. It will still be difficult 
to tackle difficult problems and provide a marked improvement in the 
means available to resolve them. But is has the right sort of 
characteristics to become the basis for a process of OR which is 
not biased. It may even make OR a coherent subject.
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Appendix D
A Proposal for Research into a 
Methodology for Problem-Formulation
K.C, Bowen
This document, dated 31 May, 1979, was submitted to the 
Department of Mathematics, Royal Holloway College for 
acceptance as a PhD study to commence November 1979.
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A PROPOSAL FOR RESEARCH INTO A METHODOLOGY
FOR PROBLEM-FORMULATION
As tasks for decision-makers become more complex, clarity 
about what the problems are necessarily decreases. Those who offer 
help by providing aids for decision then need to be particularly 
careful in their specification, jointly with those who own the problem, 
of what it is they are attempting to do. In what Ackoff (1974) 
calls 'messes', there are generally many interlocking problems; 
and, among the people directly or indirectly involved in the decision­
making process, there are many differing perceptions of how the existing 
systems work, and similarly, many views of the feasibility and 'goodness' 
of providing new or improved systems.
In a technical sense, there are, in such circumstances, many 
individuals and groups in conflict, real or perceived. There are those 
with nominal responsibility for decision; those others within the 
decision-making system, including analysts, who share some of that 
responsibility; and those who have no organisational responsibility 
but whose actions and reactions might constrain the options for decision 
or reduce the efficiency of implementation of decision.
The basis for the research proposed rests on the method of conflict 
modelling devised by Bowen and Smith (1976) . This has not yet been 
developed very far, although its potential has been indicated through 
its use by Harris in examining the structure of games (Bowen, 1978b); 
by an application to a broad examination of the OR process itself 
fBowen, 1977b); and by various descriptive uses in examining the nature 
of problems arising from conflict situations (e.g., Bowen, 1975b - 
no operational examples have appeared in the open literature) . It 
is important to note that the method itself can and should be used 
to monitor its own application.
The idea is essentially simple. Systems and subsystems are 
defined as sets ; some of these sets, representing concepts, may be 
theoretically fuzzy. Any set may be contained by and contain other 
sets, and there will be sets from which it is totally separated - 
overlapping sets are generally redefined. Producing the appropriate
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set labels and the set relationships imposes a powerful discipline 
on the formulation of the total system structure, which in turn 
facilitates the search for implications not explicitly stated in the 
earlier process. In particular, attention is drawn to different 
possible or actual interpretations of the situation studied, as time 
passes or through the eyes of different people; also, the conflicts 
that may ensue, and the nature of these conflicts, are identified.
Research would have three stages (interactive rather than 
sequential).
1. Further formalisation and extrapolation of the diagrammatic 
notation. (The value of trying to put this into a strict 
mathematical, set-theoretic, form is uncertain; it would, in 
particular, make communication with non-mathematicians difficult).
2. Translation of conflict problems, documented or broadly 
described in the literature, into this notation.
(In particular, it seems important to examine the relevance of 
the notation to game-theoretic methods, e.g., Bennett's hypergame 
theory (Bennett and Dando, 1979) and Radford's analysis of options
(Radford, 1977) , and also to sociologically oriented methods 
such as those of Eden, 1978.)
3. Attenpts to structure current problem studies and to evaluate 
the usefulness of the approach:
a. in communicating with decision-makers,
b. in formulating their problems, and
c. in considering likely limitations on the implementing
of various perceived options.
It is believed that, initially, this research should be the 
responsibility of a single individual. The nature of the research 
would require communication with and the convincing of others, and some 
useful support should arise from such interactions. Other support 
could come from second-degree students, since research of this nature
invariably throws up a lot of interesting and important side issues
which would provide a basis for project and thesis work.
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Although some useful research findings would be expected throughout 
such a study, 3 years work is the order of effort required to reach 
a definitive understanding of the value and limitations in application 
of the proposed methodology.
151
Appendix E
Notes on the Analyst and the Decision-Maker 
Interactions and Perceptions
K.C. Bowen
This is a version of research work carried out in 1974-75 
at the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment, by 
Miss Janet I. Harris, under my supervision. It was 
never formally recorded or published.
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NOTES ON THE ANALYST AND THE DECISION-MAKER 
INTERACTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS
In troduc ti on
These notes are abbreviated and amended versions of earlier 
attempts to make statements about the main features of the 
interaction between an analyst and his clients, who are faced 
with decisions on a perceived problem. Diagrams are presented 
representing the perceptions of 'problem' and pattern of 'solution' 
as seen by the various parties. A brief comment is made about 
the mismatch of perceptions that might lead to misunderstanding 
and conflict.
The main purpose is to put on record otherwise unavailable 
ideas which seem to be relevant to the central theme of problem-
formulation, and which may offer some contribution as the work
proceeds. I treat the ideas as my own because I have not entirely
followed the direction of Janet Harris' inquiry which was
carried out in collaboration with me in 1974-75. I take respons­
ibility for any errors or misunderstandings that she may perceive, 
but, nevertheless, I acknowledge her original contribution.
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The Decision-making and Advisory Situation
Figure El is a conceptual diagram of a problem under study 
(it is my, not necessarily the analyst’s, conception). It shows 
a sub-system decision-maker, D(subX) under direction from D(X), 
considering purposeful action to effect whatever it is, external 
to the system X, that creates a perceived discrepancy between 
existing and desired states.
D(X)
DecisiOij System
D(SubX Token 
sub-system 
of X
Analysis
System Sub X
Token
allied system.S
P(X)
Figure El, Conceptual Diagram of the Problem (meta-view)
The problem, P(X), is shown as an environment of X, and this environment 
includes the analyst, A. Also shown are other potentially co-operating 
systems, similar to X and to sub X. Although it is not shown, it 
would be desirable (yet often not achievable in practice) for a direct 
link to exist between A and D(X). Only arrows which indicate purpose, 
communication arid interactions of primary importance to the progress 
of resolution of the problem are shown. The statement made is a very 
broad and general one.
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Figure E2 is a diagram of the problem as the analyst is assumed 
to see it, at least initially. He concentrates on D(X)'s needs, 
although D(sub X) is the person to whom he responds. He is aware also 
that another of D(X)'s subsystems is working on some aspects of the 
problem, but does not concern himself in any detail about the particular 
part of the environment on which it operates. However, he pays close 
attention to the sub-system of the environment with which D(subX) 
is concerned; this may be outside X but under some control by X, 
either by entitlement or through influence, persuasion or agreement.
The analyst is also aware that, as understanding of the problem grows, 
a different sub-system of the environment may become more relevant.
b(x)
Token
sub­
system
CKSubX)
Sub X
Token
environment
subsystemSub E
P(X)
Figure E2. Conceptual Diagram of the Analyst's Perception of the
Problem.
It may be that the analyst will, later, see the need to study what 
is going on in the alliance depicted in figure El. Importantly, he 
may or may not come to realise that, as soon as his interaction with 
his client begins, he is automatically a part of the problem.
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The next diagram, figure E3, is a comment on the analyst's 
advisory process. There may be immediate action, within the authority 
of D(subX), that he can suggest or that is being taken. Although 
this will affect later possibilities, it is not likely to be adequate, 
although it has the merit of getting something done quickly. The 
analyst sees it as wiser to spend time in looking for potential inter­
mediate action, based on more detailed analysis which would include a 
closer look at what D(X) intends and how other sub-systems under control 
of D(X) may be behaving. At the same time, the analyst should be, 
ab initio, seeking to determine how far he can take the analysis in 
the long term. During this more ambitious phase, he should regard
b(x)
Token 
Sub X
CXSubX)
Sub X
Sub E
]_ r^ ^ ia te  ,P(X)
Long-term
Short-term
Figure E3. Conceptual Diagram of the Analyst's Advice (meta-view;
the 'sets' shown by hatched lines* provide a time-dimension)
♦While this conflicts with the use of hatched lines when systems have 
dual or alternative positions, it is unlikely that it will lead 
to any misunderstanding.
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himself as part of the problem. He will consider how much of the 
total environment his analysis can encompass, and he will suggest 
interests and options which may not have been part of D(subX)'s 
conception of the problem, and which will need negotiation. Although 
this is not shown, such negotiation may have to be directly with D(X).
The hatched-line and outer boxes provide a time-dimension 
(moving outwards) of the analysis provess. Figure E4 indicates 
broadly the relationship of the times involved. Only the immediate 
action is shown as actually occurring (with a time-lag). The rest 
is potential action under consideration but not liable to implementation 
for some undefined time.
^  Potential long-term analysis to meet changing____________________^
circumstances and to allow for detailed study
<■
Potential short-term action in cooperation 
with other parts of the system
Immediate action under 
own authority
Now * - ^  Time"
Figure E4. The Time-Sequence of Advice and Action
My conceptual structures, one of which (figure E2) is, by proxy, 
the perceptions of another, contain various degrees of detail. Such 
detail is always the choice of whoever owns the diagram. D.G. Smith 
has suggested four kinds of justification for inclusion and exclusion: 
expediency, authority, pragmatism and 'demonstrated consistency'.
The last implies internal consistency and consistency with relevant 
parts of the real world that could be supported by argument about
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the issue that the diagram is highlingting. The first three relate, 
respectively, to statements such as:
"It makes things easier"
"It is diagram of world"
"It seems reasonable to me for the present purpose".
The distinctions between these are obviously blurred.
The Decision-maker
Figure E5 shows how a problem may be perceived by a decision­
maker who is autonomous, thus omitting any constraints 'from above'. 
It is a rather artificial situation, but it might well be the desired 
picture for a sub-system's decision-maker or even the perception he 
has of the authority delegated to him.
Discrepant Subsystem 
of the environment
Environment\/
Figure E5. Problem-perception by an Autonomous Decision-maker
His problem arises frcm a perceived discrepant sub-system of the environ­
ment: he has sub-systems that operate directly or indirectly on the 
environment and which are his resources for change. The decision-maker 
himself comes into his picture as soon as he considers possible
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'solutions' (figure E6).
D (X)
Environment
Figure E6. Pattern of 'Solution' for an Autonomous Decision-maker.
He will be able to act purposefully on sub-systems under his 
control so as to effect changes to chosen sub-systems of the environment. 
These parts of the environment may be under his direct control, i.e. 
part of X, or will be affected by what his sub-systems do: it is not 
always necessary to act directly on the discrepant sub-system, and not 
always possible unless it is part of X itself.
Figures E5 and E6 are not easy to define separately: problem and 
pattern-of-solution perceptions are normally so interwoven that the 
decision-maker's picture is better described by a combined diagram, 
figure E7. Although it is not shown, there may be cases in which X 
can affect the discrepant sub-system directly.
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Discrepant Subsystem 
of the environment
PCX)
Environment ^
Figure E7. The Overall Picture of an Autonomous Decision-maker
(problem and pattern of solution combined)
However, the other diagrams have their interest. Figure E6, for 
example, which excludes the observed discrepant sub-system of the 
environment, may be the picture that the decision-maker communicates 
to an analyst: this is not a recommended action, but it does happen, 
which is in part why, in figures El to E3, the discrepancy observed 
by the decision-maker is not a prominent aspect of problem and 
analysis. It will also be noted in figure E5, that because patterns 
of solutions have not yet been considered, there is no constraint on 
what part of the environment may be chosen as the important area 
for change. There could also be more drastic effects by the time 
that figure E6 has been reached, since D(X) may already sense crisis 
and be glad to discard his autonomy and appeal to a higher level 
of authority for help.
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Figures E8 and E9 extend the ideas already discussed to two 
separately autonomous decision-makers acting in alliance; they 
parallel figures E5 and E6. Note that in figure E8, the alliance 
set is shown as it could have been in figure El, although it plays 
no part as an entity in the discussion provided here.
Allied
System
Discrepant Subsystem 
of the Environment
Alliance
Environment \y
Figure E8 Alliance Version of Figure E5
Allied
System
Alliance
Environment
Figure E9 Alliance Version of Figure E6
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The problem is as perceived by one of the alliance, namely X 
or, specifically, D(X). Clearly, if the two parts of the alliance 
have different perceptions of a ’common’ problem, a prior problem 
arises in resolving this conflict of purpose. Figure E9 shows only 
communication for enhancing co-operation and in an alliance this is, 
in theory if not in practice, sufficient. Again the figures might 
well be combined, but I have not shown this.
The diagrams provided are parsimonious, yet a number of points 
for discussion and better understanding can be made both explicitly 
and economically. Additional detail, systems and sub-systems can be 
added as needed: with an actual problem, such detail would increase
rapidly. It would be advisable, however, not to allow it to grow until 
basic perceptions have been communicated, say between analyst and 
decision-maker.
The Subsystem Decision-Maker’s Problem
I now examine the broad structure of the problem as it may be 
perceived by the individual responsible for a subsystem of X; my intention 
is to provide a diagram which can be compared to figure E2, so that 
the sort of differences between D(subX) ’s and the analyst's perceptions 
can be compared.
Figure ElO shows the overall picture of D(subX)’s perception* 
of problem and pattern of solution combined.
*He is shown as not at present including the analyst in his perception 
of the problem-solution process.
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Discrepant Subsystem 
of the Environment
f Sensorsl4
D(SubX)
fEffectorsI
Sub X
Environment
Figure ElO, Overall Picture of a Sub-system Decision-Maker
There is an observed need for communication with other subsystem 
decision-makers under the control of D(X), for whose purpose they too 
will be making interventions in the environment. The inclusion of 
sensors and effectors in this picture imply that, in general, there will 
be constraints imposed on D(subX) by D(X) which will make some 
aspects of the operation of sub X independent of D(sub X)? the latter 
cannot be considered free to impose totally independent purposeful 
action on the environment (including sub X), In other words, once 
D(X) has * spoken", the machinery of organisation will go into action. 
Here, therefore, D(sub X) is fully aware that he is not autonomous; 
his view of his fellow decision-maker is not more optimistic but simply 
more vague!
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A Comparison of Perceptions
As drawn here, the perceptions of the analyst (figure E2) and 
of the sub-system decision-maker (figure ElO) are very similar. This is 
not surprising since I am proxy for both. Nevertheless, there are 
differences which may be important (I add, and the reader must take 
my word for this, that these differences were observed after the diagrams 
were drawn and were not deliberately introduced),
a. The analyst conceives of the environment as D(X)*s problem,
P(X), whereas D(sub X) sees it as 'the environment*. The 
latter has something clear-cut to do, and, unless and until 
he finds himself in difficulty, he perceives no problem - at 
least no problem with which he needs to call for help. This 
is important to the analyst, if he feels that he should be 
intervening, but is not asked,
b. The analyst has concentrated on what the system is likely
to do and has not included explicitly why the system is thinking 
of doing it (the discrepant subsystem of the environment 
is not in figure E2) , He may, for example, know that the 
system wishes to plan and develop a new transport facility: 
while this may identify the subsystem of the environment on 
which to operate, it may be far from clear why the former 
facility was inadequate. This may lead the analyst to 
"optimise" on criteria which are irrelevant from D(X)"s point 
of view,
c. The analyst is not clear, as D(sub X) is, of the constraints 
under which the latter operates. The analyst's picture implies 
a much greater freedom of purposeful action by D (sub X),
in response to D(X)"s requirements, than will in practice 
be the case, (See note 1.)
d. Moreover, the analyst does not focus on the need for co-operation 
between the subsystems of D(X), As seen in figure E3, this 
becomes of importance to his dealing with D(sub X) when
advice in the intermediate and long-term is considered, and 
he may well take it into account at a later stage. However, he 
should be conscious of it before then, because (vide a. above) 
he may have to make a persuasive case for his involvement in 
the problem.
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Necessarily, the above might be exaggerated because the perceptions 
although far from unreal, are artificially created. At worst, however, 
it illustrates something of the nature of what effect different 
perceptions might have on the interactions between analyst and decision­
maker ,
There are also differences between figures E9 and ElO that are 
potentially important, D(sub X) concentrates on what system X 
might do on its own and is relatively unconcerned with such external 
relationships that D(X) perceives as important. The analyst too 
(except in the meta-view of figure Al) is analysing entirely within 
the confines of X and its potential influence outside through 
sub X, It should be noted that often, in practice, he is constrained 
in this way by the perceptions that D(sub X), or D(X), may have
of his, the analyst’s, role - see appendix B,
In the earlier work, on which this appendix is based, an attenpt 
was made to examine the process of communication between analyst and 
client, and how this might be viewed by them individually. However, 
figure E3, as interpreted here, is a meta-view and not the analyst's 
view, while a diagram which tried to give the decision-maker's view 
(not included here) was found not to go deeply enough, nor with sufficient 
conviction, to be useful for my present purpose.
Finally, it is worth noting that the representation of the OR 
process given in the diagram of appendix C was produced at about the
same time as those discussed above, albeit for a different purpose.
That diagram does not aim to examine perceptions and the problems that 
will arise from differences in these. It is a simple meta-statement of 
the process and the part that the analyst plays in a satisfactory 
analyst-client relationship, although it did in practice (through 
discussion based on it) provide some insights into difficult situations 
that might be encountered and that could perhaps be avoided, I regard 
it as representing a situation, or leading to an understanding of 
a situation, much closer to the ideal than that implied by figure El,
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Note 1
Professor McDowell has pointed out that ccxmnents on the different 
perceptions of constraints under which a sub-system decision-maker 
works do not follow logically from figures E2 amd ElO. This is a
valid point; it is the interpretation in the text that leads to the
conclusions stated and the intent when drawing the diagrams is not 
explicitly represented. All depends on how sensor and effector subsystems 
are defined. I see them as acting independently of the decision-maker: 
ideally they do his work and his bidding, yet they are not part of him
and how they operate creates a constraint on what he can achieve -
see, for exanple, Halperin, (1974). What might be needed, for the 
notation, is some rule about the inclusion or non-inclusion of sensors 
and effectors, or some way of indicating the perceptions, by a decision­
maker, of organisational constraints.
Jannet Harris states, in relation to these very general diagrams, 
that, without verbal expansion, they can induce as much misunderstanding 
as any other communication. Normally, of course, such diagrams will 
be used for communication on a problem that is already, in part, shared 
knowledge.
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Appendix F
Language - a Military Exanple
K.C. Bowen
This, like appendix E, records, for the first time, work 
carried out by Janet Harris, slightly altered for the 
purposes of this thesis.
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LANGUAGE - A MILITARY EXAMPLE
Military conflict between two countries X and Y can be conceived 
in terms of their intentions to reduce the "value systems" of their 
opponents. "Value" is being used in a very broad sense here, as 
opposed to the more specialised use in, for example, Bowen, 1979.
The expression connotes a combination of belief and resource systems. 
Here two particular military components of the value systems will 
be stressed, their firepowers (F^,F^)and their logistic (movement) 
capability (M^,M^). The latter have no inherent firepower in the 
concept at present being followed. The value systems contain many 
other components (capital assets, human resources, beliefs, ways 
of life and so on), but this example will not be concerned with them 
explicitly. So far, the statements made give figure Fl.
Fx
Mx
Vx
Fy
My
Vy
Figure Fl. The Value Systems of Warring Opponents
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X's purpose in having will be taken to be its potential for 
the destruction of V^: it enables X to act counter to the value 
system of Y. This can be written
and, similarly.
= CVy , C being an operator;
Assuming symmetry between and V^, it seems reasonable to put 
V^, with the preceding operator C, in place of the box (figure F2)
Figure F2. Use of the Operator C (counter)
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Two systems. X and Y, have value systems (sets) and V^. In
general, if K is any set defined for X(Y), K^(K^) will denote 
this set.
Definitions
1. is the set of elements of which have first order
interaction with Y (i.e. F^ acts directly on Y) .
2. is the set of elements of which have second order
interaction with Y (i.e. acts on Y only through F^ .).
Now take the following as axiomatic.
Axiom 1. The structure of Y mirrors the structure of X.
Axiom 2. F n  M = ^  .
From definitions 1 and 2,
Axiom 3. V 2) F and
Axiom 4. V 25 M
are sufficient, with axioms 1 and 2, to produce figure Bl.
In order to deal with operator C, a further definition is required.
Definition
3. For any subset of V^, CK^ is that subset of which 
is specifically directed to first order interaction with K^.
Using definition 1, it follows that CK^ O  F^ and also that, 
if Ky Z> Ly then CK^ ID CL^ (L is a further subset of V) .
In particular, CK^ C  F^ implies CV^crCF^.
But, from definition 1, F^ (% CV^.
Hence, FX = CV^. Similarly, from axiom 1, F^ = CV^. We will treat 
these as axiomatic, viz.
Axiom 5. F^ = CV^, F^ = CV^.
From axioms 3 and 4 and definition 3, it also follows that, since F 
and M are subsets of 
this as axiomatic, viz.
V^, CF^ ci F^ and CM^ ci. F^ and we treat
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Axiom 6. CFy C2 F^, CM^ (2 F^.
Axioms 1 to 6 are still inadequate to produce figure B2. An additional 
axiom is needed, viz.
Axiom 7. CF n  CM = ^
As the production of diagrams towards figure B3 continues f reuse 
of definitions 1 and 3 are needed to deal with the sub-sub-sets and 
so on; new axioms arise, but further ones need introducing ab initio 
before figure B3 is reached.
Axiom 8. CCF D  COM = 0  
Axiom 9. CCCF D  CCCM = 0
Minimally we need definitions 1, 2 and 3 with axioms 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 
and so on.
It will be observed that definitions 1 and 2 and axiom 1 are 
immediately inapplicable to figure F4. As soon as the roles of 
different physical entities in F and M are taken into account 
in the language developed, the simple axiomatic structure above beccmes 
useless. It may be inferred that the language used for conceptual 
models, which represent the meaning of that language, may be quite 
inappropriate for discussing many of the complexities of physical 
systems; in the latter, allocation to role, spatial and temporal 
relationships, and many other factors are introduced. What language 
to use can be decided from the diagrammatic structures that seem to 
contain what it is desired to sayl It may be found, as for figure F4, 
that finding suitable language, other than the diagram itself, may 
be far from easy.
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Appendix G
Third-Party Consultant 
A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict
K.C. Bowen
This, and the related text in chapter 3, was first prepared 
in 1973 as part of a ccmmunication to A.S. de Reuck 
of the University of Surrey in the context of his work
with J.W. Burton.
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THIRD-PARTY CONSULTATION 
A METHOD FOR THE STUDY AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
The title of this appendix is that of a paper by Ronald J. Fisher 
(1972) which surveys the subject of conflict resolution and integrates 
ideas. It adopts the view that rival "theories" are based mainly on 
observations about different aspects or dimensions of the overall 
conflict problem. It suggests that all conflicts can be described 
in common generic terms. It regards conflict as an essential element 
of any relationship between systems, and it looks at resolution of 
conflict as requiring the control of the dysfunctional nature of 
conflict. Without processes of "third-party consultation", whether 
these be external to, or accepted within, the environment of the main 
interaction, he sees conflict to be more naturally escalatory than 
self-correcting. Fisher's outlook is seen to be similar to that of 
David Smith and myself : our studies (Bowen and Smith, 1976) were carried 
out at about the same time as Fisher's but the two inquiries were 
completely independent.
The tabular summary given by Fisher (his figure 1) is interpreted 
more briefly in table 1 overleaf. He refers to it as a model, although 
I regard it, in conjunction with his accompanying text, as only 
suggesting what such a model might be. My diagrams (figures 10 to 
13, chapter 3) develop the essence of Fisher's finding into model 
form: its essential elements (representing the task of the third- 
party consultant, Z) are paralleled, in table 1, with the statements 
that Fisher extracts as generalities ccanmon to the majority of conflict 
resolution techniques that he analyses.
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Refers to 
Figures 10 to 13 of Chapter 3
Refers to 
Figure 1 of Fisher's paper
a. To change X, Y representations 
by :-
(i) making them aware of each 
other's representations;
Improving communications 
(improved relationship and 
attitudes - see also b(ii)).
(ii) offering structures through 
which they can modify their 
concepts of X*, Y* aims and 
policies ;
Professional expertise and 
knowledge of conflict (diagnostic 
and regulatory functions).
(iii) helping them seek 
superordinal aims and 
policies (mutual, 
co-operative, 
non-conflicting, etc.);
Positive motivation. Movement 
towards conflict resolution.
(iv) retaining neutrality as a 
member of Z, who would 
(figure 10) seek to modify 
X*Y* interaction, in ways 
similar to Z behaviour in 
the XYZ interaction.
Low power.
Moderate knowledge.
b. To retain his neutrality by:- Impartiality
(i) developing X and Y 
representations of Z to 
match his perceived role;
Control over situation.
(ii) improving communication by 
controlling the neutrality 
of the XYZ environment 
(and by actions related to 
a. above).
Improving communications 
(link back to a. (i) above).
Table 1. The Roles of Third-Party Consultancy
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As discussed in chapter 3, interactions are face-to-face communica­
tion or communication through the third-party. No other environmental 
feed-back occurs in the neutral environment which is so important: 
there is a need for the understanding and interactions of X and Y 
to belong to them entirely and not to be a function of an environment 
which is uncontrolled and difficult to understand.
It is noteworthy that the two roles of Z (a. and b. of table 1) 
are integrated through the overriding need to improve communication.
This and other aspects of the resolution process that Fisher observes 
seem to be adequately covered by the diagrams of chapter 3. Finally, 
there is an implicit plea in Fisher's paper for a meta-language for the 
expression of Z's viewpoint and this too seems to be provided by the 
notation.
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F ig u r e  1 0 .  Two P e r c e p t io n s  o f  a N e g o t i a t i n g  System
The d i f f i c u l t y  stemmed from what was meant and u n d e r s to o d  by "we" and "you". 
If th e  board s a id  "we", th e  u n io n s  heard "we , t h e  g overn m en t" .  I f  a t r a d e  
u n i o n i s t  s a i d  "we", he r e f e r r e d  to  h i s  u n io n ,  but t h e  board heard "we, th e  
j o i n t  n e g o t i a t i n g  team". "You" had r e v e r s e  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  each  s i d e .  
T his i s  a more com plex v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  problem o f  g e t t i n g  a p rom otion  c a n d i d a t e  t c  
d i s t i n g u i s h  betw een  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  team work and t h e  j o i n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n :  he
t e n d s  t o  u se  "we" i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y ,  an d ,  b ec a u se  o f  t h e  way he p e r c e iv e d  h i s  
t a s k ,  f i n d s  d i f f i c u l t y  in  a t t r i b u t i n g  any g l o r y  t o  "I" .
Language and p e r c e p t i o n s  a r e  so i n t e r t w i n e d  t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  them 
as s e p a r a t e  i s s u e s .  Perhaps t h i s  i s  why e x p e r t s  o f t e n  p e r s e v e r e  w i th  t h e i r  
t e c h n i c a l  la n g u a g e  w i t h o u t  o b s e r v i n g  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  com m unicat ing  l i t t l e  t o  t h o s e  
whom t h e y  a r e  a d v i s i n g .
I t  i s  one  o f  t h e  p u rp o ses  o f  t h e  n o t a t i o n  p r e s e n te d  h ere  t o  o f f e r  a s i m p l e ,  
neutral la n g u a g e  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  and d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  p ro b lem s .  I m p o r t a n t ly ,  th e  
s ta te m e n ts  w i l l  be i n  e x p l i c i t  permanent form.
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THE PROBLEM OF USING THE NOTATION
The n o t a t i o n  has l i t t l e  f u t u r e  i f  I c an n ot  make good u s e  o f  i t  m y s e l f .  I 
c l a i m ,  a l th o u g h  t h i s  has l i t t l e  w e ig h t  as e v i d e n c e ,  t h a t  I have been a b le  through  
i t s  u se  t o  s e e  problems more c l e a r l y ,  and I have e x t r a c t e d  from diagram s i d e a s  
w hich were not  in  my mind when t h e  d iagram s were drawn. In sm all  w a y s ,  i t  has  
been u s e f u l  to  c o l l e a g u e s  in  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e i r  p rob lem s.  There a r e  two o b v io u s  
n ext  s t e p s .
F i r s t l y ,  I sh ou ld  be a b le  t o  draw my problem , t o  e n c a p s u l a t e  th e  e s s e n c e  o f  
c o n d u c t in g  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  p r o b le m -fo r m u la t io n  w i th  a c l i e n t  g r o u p .  F ig u r e  11 i s  
a s im p le  v e r s i o n  o f  such a d iagram .
Expl'Ci f c:1 |%
ncTcsittr
F ig u r e  11 .  The Problem o f  P ro b le m -F o rm u la t io n
P* i s  my problem . P' i s  th e  d e v e lo p in g  f o r m u la t io n  o f  t h e  prob lem , many 
i n t e r t w i n e d  problems o f  my c l i e n t  g r o u p .  I am th e  c o n s u l t a n t ,  C, and t o  ea ch  and 
e v e r y  one o f  t h e  g r o u p ,  o f  whom A i s  o n e ,  I p r o v id e  e x p l i c i t  r u l e s  f o r  th e  
n o t a t i o n ,  e . g .  t h i s  p a p e r ,  and my i n i t i a l  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  their problem . I a c t  
p u r p o s e f u l l y  in  p r o v id in g  t h e s e ,  but t h e r e  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  be d i s t o r t i o n  in  th e  
com m unicat ion  t o  A. A w i l l  r e s p o n d ,  perhaps not  a t  f i r s t  in  th e  la n g u a g e  o f  th e  
n o t a t i o n .  The p r o c e s s  i s  i t e r a t i v e :  e v e n t u a l l y  a shared  s e n s e  o f  o w n ers h ip  and 
purpose  i s  e x p e c t e d ,  and any i n i t i a l  c o n f l i c t s  between  A and C or  w i t h i n  t h e  
c l i e n t  group (n o t  shown h e r e )  s h o u ld  be r e d u c e d .  The aim i s  t h a t  any r e s i d u a l  
c o n f l i c t  sh o u ld  be b e n e v o l e n t ,  p a r t  o f  a common p r o c e s s  f o r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  t h e  f u l l  
v a r i e t y  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  problem .
The second  s t a g e  o f  t e s t i n g  i s  t o  a p p ly  t h e  method i n  an environm ent  i n  which:
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(a )  th e  i n i t i a l  s e n s e  o f  c o n f l i c t  i s  s m a l l ;
(b)  th e  la n g u a g e  i s  b r o a d ly  a c c e p t a b l e  ab i n i t i o ;
(c )  th e  c l i e n t s  w i l l  be c o o p e r a t i v e  f o r  t h e  e x p e r im e n ta l  p u r p o se ;  and
(d) t h e  c l i e n t s  w i l l  adopt a c r i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  and to
t h e  n o t a t i o n .
The p u rp ose  o f  t h i s  i n i t i a l  ex p er im en t  i s  t o  se e k  l i m i t a t i o n s  o r  d e f e c t s  in  
t h e  method p r o p o se d ,  and t o  s e e  w hether  s im p le  ch a n g es  can overcom e t h e s e  or  
w h eth er  a more d r a s t i c  r e a p p r a i s a l  w i l l  be n eed ed .
In my u n p u b l ish e d  p a p e r s ,  m entioned  a t  t h e  end o f  s e c t i o n  1 o f  t h i s  p a p er ,  I 
d i s c u s s  r e a s o n s  f o r  n o t  e x t e n d in g  th e  n o t a t i o n  i n  an i d i o s y n c r a t i c  way based  on 
what em erges from t h e  s tu d y  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  problem . I b ase  my o u t l o o k  on my 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  P o p p e r 's  v ie w s  [ 6 ]  on th e  p r o c e s s  of< d e v e l o p i n g  and t e s t i n g  
t h e o r y ,  a l th o u g h  I have a p p l i e d  t h e s e  t o  a m e th o d o lo g y ,  t o  som eth ing  l e s s  than  a 
t h e o r y .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  I am co n cern ed  w i t h  simplicity and falsfiability as  
im po r ta n t  r e l a t e d  c o n c e p t s .  In b r i e f ,  I c an n ot  hope to  f a l s i f y  my t h e o r y  t h a t  
t h e  n o t a t i o n  a s  such  i s  g e n e r a l l y  h e l p f u l ,  i f  i t  becomes s p e c i f i c  in  some a s p e c t s  
f o r  each  problem s e p a r a t e l y :  t h e  n o t a t i o n  must remain g e n e r a l .
T h is  d o es  not  im ply t h a t  o t h e r  n o t a t i o n ,  o t h e r  l a n g u a g e s ,  c a n n o t  be u s e d .
I t  m e r e ly  means t h a t  t h e s e  w i l l  n o t  be r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  judgm ent o f  what my 
n o t a t i o n  can a c h i e v e  i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  o r  amended form.
7 .  THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT APPLICATION
I have j u s t  begun t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  becoming a c o n s u l t a n t  (un p a id )  t o  an 
u n i v e r s i t y  group r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t e a c h i n g  OR and s y s t e m s  t h i n k i n g  a t  se c o n d -  
d e g r e e  l e v e l .  The t a s k  t h e y  f a c e ,  as  I s e e  i t  a t  p r e s e n t ,  i s  t h e  d eve lopm ent  
and m a in te n a n c e  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  and academ ic a c c e p t a b i l i t y  and s ta n d a r d s  o f  
t h e i r  c o u r s e s .
I t  i s  a w i d e - r a n g in g  problem a r e a ,  r i c h  in  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  p e o p le  and th e  
p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t s  i n v o l v e d .  I t s  e l e m e n ts  i n c l u d e  t h e  t e a c h e r s ;  t h e  s t u d e n t s ;  
t h e  l a r g e r  d ep artm en t  o f  which t h e s e  a r e  p a r t ;  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  and o u t s i d e  b o d i e s ,  
co n cern ed  w i t h  academic s t a n d a r d s ;  p o t e n t i a l  e m p lo y e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  who pro­
v i d e  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  work; and many o t h e r s .
Those who a r e  prepared  t o  a s s i s t  me i n  e x p e r im e n ta l  c o n s u l t a n c y ,  by b e in g  
my c l i e n t s ,  p r o v id e  th e  e n v iro n m en t  summarised i n  t h e  p r e c e d in g  s e c t i o n .  They 
a l s o  have a v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t  which sh o u ld  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  and r e l e v a n c e  
o f  a s u i t a b l y  c r i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e .  I f  t h e  method i s  so u n d ,  t h e y  would be a b l e  to  
u se  i t  as  t e a c h i n g  m a t e r i a l :  t h i s  would h e lp  in  t h e  d eve lop m en t  o f  t h e i r  c o u r s e s
in  a manner q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  from i t s  u se  i n  p la n n in g  such  d e v e lo p m e n t .
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8 .  CONCLUDING REMARKS
F u r th er  r e s e a r c h  i s  p lanned t o  s e e  w h eth er  t h i s  method o f  p r o b le m -fo r m u la t io n  
can p r o v id e  a u s e f u l  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  l a t e r  employment o f  methods o f  a n a l y s i s  such  
as hypergam es,  B e n n e t t  e t  a l .  [ 7 ] ,  and t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  o p t i o n s ,  Radford [ 8 3 .
As f a r  as u se  o f  t h e  n o t a t i o n  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  s i x  months w i l l  have been sp e n t  
in  a t te m p ts  to  a p p ly  i t  b e f o r e  t h i s  paper i s  p r e s e n t e d .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  I cannot  
p r e d i c t  th e  ou tc om e .  I b e l i e v e  however t h a t  any a t te m p t  t o  o f f e r  so m eth ing  in  
one o f  t h e  m ost  n e g l e c t e d  a r e a s  o f  th e  t o t a l  OR p r o c e s s  i s  im p o r ta n t ,  ev en  i f  i t
d o es  no more than  en co u ra g e  o t h e r s  t o  d e v e l o p  o t h e r  and b e t t e r  m eth od s .
I t  i s  worth b e a r in g  in  mind t h a t ,  so m e t im e s ,  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f
th e  prob lem , in  t h e  f u l l e s t  s e n s e ,  may be a l l  t h a t  d e c i s io n - m a k e r s  r e q u i r e .
9 .  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I w ish  t o  thank t h e  P r i n c ip a l  and t h e  Head o f  t h e  Department o f  M athematics  
a t  Royal H olloway C o l l e g e ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  London, f o r  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  p ro v id e d  f o r  
my c o n t in u e d  r e s e a r c h ;  t h e  Leverhulme T r u s t  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  su p p o r t ;  t h e  M in i s t r y  
o f  D e fe n c e ,  under whose a e g i s  e a r l i e r  r e s e a r c h  freedom  was g r a n t e d ;  and many 
c o l l e a g u e s  o v e r  th e  many y e a r s  th e  i d e a s  r e p o r t e d  h e r e  h a v e ,  w i t h  t h e i r  h e l p ,  
d e v e lo p e d .
10.  REFERENCES
[ 1 ]  Bowen, K.C. and S m ith ,  D .G . ,  D evelopm ent o f  m odels  f o r  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
c o n f l i c t  p ro b lem s,  in :  C o l l i n s ,  L. ( e d . )  The u s e  o f  M odels in  th e  S o c i a l  
S c i e n c e s  ( T a v i s t o c k ,  London, 1 9 7 6 ) .
[ 2 ]  Bowen, K .C . ,  R esearch  Games (T a y lo r  and F r a n c i s ,  London, 1 9 7 8 ) .
[ 3 ]  A c k o f f ,  R.L. and Emery, F . E . ,  On P u r p o s e fu l  S ystem s:  an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y
a n a l y s i s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s o c i a l  b e h a v io u r  as  a sy s tem  o f  p u r p o se fu l  e v e n t s  
( T a v i s t o c k ,  London, 1 9 7 2 ) .
[ 4 ]  Eden, C . , J o n e s ,  S . and S im s ,  D . , T h in k in g  i n  O r g a n iz a t io n s  (M acm il lan ,  
London, 1 9 7 9 ) .
[ 5 ]  L a in g ,  6 . J . ,  Communication and i t s  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  o r g a n i s ­
a t i o n s ,  OMEGA The I n t .  J1 o f  Mgmt S c i .  8 ( 1 9 8 0 )  2 8 7 - 3 0 1 .
[ 6 ]  P opper ,  K .R . ,  The L o g ic  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  D i s c o v e r y  ( H u tc h in s o n ,  London, 1 9 7 7 ) .
[ 7 ]  B e n n e t t ,  P .G . ,  Dando, M.R. and S harp ,  R .G . ,  U s in g  hypergames t o  model
d i f f i c u l t  s o c i a l  i s s u e s :  an approach  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  s o c c e r  h o o l i g a n i s m ,
J .  Opl R es .  S o c .  31 (1 9 8 0 )  6 2 1 - 6 3 5 .
[ 8 ]  R ad ford ,  K . J . ,  Complex D e c i s i o n  Problems: an i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a t e g y  f o r
r e s o l u t i o n  ( R e s t o n ,  V i r g i n i a ,  1 9 7 7 ) .
O PERATION AL R E S E A R C H  gf 
J.P tirans (editor)
North-Holland Publishing Company 
k ) IFORS. 1981
A CONFLICT APPROACH TO THE 
MODELLING OF PROBLEMS OF AND IN ORGANISATIONS
Une m éthode de form ulation des problèm es 
des organisations au m oyen du concept de conflit
KEN BOWEN 
Royal Holloway College, University of London
A bstract: A fundam ental aspect of decision-making is the  initial and continuing
exploration of w hat problem  is being addressed. An approach to  the explicit form u­
lation of problem s is offered through a diagram m atic no ta tion  first developed for 
the study of conflict. It is a systems approach with a tten tion  to  concepts such as 
language, roles, perceptions and prejudice. It aims to  help decision-making groups 
to  com m unicate and understand better their separate and joint purposes.
Résumé: Un aspect fondam ental de la prise oe décision est la définition e t la
continuelle remise en question de la problém atique à considérer. Cet article propose 
une form ulation explicite des problèm es, au m oyen d 'une no ta tion  par diagramme, 
développée il y a quelques années au cours d 'une étude de conflit. Il s'agit d 'une 
approche systém atique où on utilise les notions de langages, rôles, perceptions et 
préjugés des acteurs du problèm e. Son b u t est d 'aider à la prise de décision de 
groupes en form alisant la com m unication afin de faciliter la com préhension des buts 
individuels e t collectifs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s ,  w i t h  a c o l l e a g u e ,  David G. S m ith ,  I became i n t e r e s t e d  in  
the  n a tu r e  o f  c o n f l i c t .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  s i n c e  I was th e n  w ork ing  f o r  th e  M in i s t r y  
o f  D e f e n c e ,  I was t r y i n g  to  und erstan d  b e t t e r  the  p r o c e s s  by which s i t u a t i o n s  
d e v e lo p e d  towards and i n t o  a s t a t e  o f  war. Not o n ly  i s  i t  im p o r ta n t  in  m o d e l l in g  
w a r fa r e  to  know so m eth in g  about  l i k e l y  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  b u t  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  in  
p e a c e t im e  t o  c o n s i d e r  a l l o c a t i o n s  o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  e q u ip m en t ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  and s o  o n ,  t h a t  c o u ld  l e a d  t o  w id e r  o p t i o n s  f o r  s t e e r i n g  c o n f l i c t  
towards p e a c e f u l  r e s o l u t i o n .
During the  s t u d y ,  two g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  became a p p a r e n t .  F i r s t l y ,  th e  
c o n c e p tu a l  m o d e l l in g  t h a t  was d e v e l o p e d ,  and th e  d iagram m atic  n o t a t i o n  t h a t  
d e s c r ib e d  th e  m o d e ls ,  r e l a t e d  to  c o n f l i c t  o f  a l l  k i n d s ,  betw een  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
between g r o u p s .  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  m ethodology  f o l lo w e d  seemed t o  have r e l e v a n c e  to  
the  a n a l y s t - c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  in  th e  OR p r o c e s s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  th e  e a r l y  s t a g e  
o f  d i s c u s s i n g  and making e x p l i c i t  th e  problem t h a t  w a s ,  j o i n t l y ,  t o  be r e s o l v e d .  
Although v a r io u s  minor a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  i d e a s  were made in  i n t e r n a l  p a p e r s ,  
o n ly  two p u b l i s h e d  r e f e r e n c e s  are  a v a i l a b l e .  In 1 9 7 2 ,  Bowen and Smith [ i ]  
p r e s e n te d  a paper t o  a s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  se m in a r  a t  Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y ,  and a 
l a t e r  e x t e n s i o n  o f  the  n o t a t i o n  by J a n e t  I .  H a r r is  was in c lu d e d  by Bowen [ 2 ]  in  a 
book on r e s e a r c h  games.
The use  o f  the  n o t a t i o n  f o r  th e  fo r m u la t io n  o f  problems i s  now th e  s u b j e c t  o f  
a t h r e e - y e a r  r e s e a r c h  programme: t h i s  paper  summarises th e  p o s i t i o n  a t  th e  end o f
the f i r s t  y e a r .  The n o t a t i o n  and r u l e s  f o r  i t s  u se  d i f f e r  in  s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s  
from what i s  d e s c r ib e d  in  th e  e a r l i e r  p a p e r s .  Although f u l l  d o cu m e nta t io n  on a l l  
a s p e c t s  o f  the  r e s e a r c h  i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  i s  in  d r a f t  form o n l y .
2. SYSTEMS, INTERACTION AND CONFLICT
In r e f e r r i n g  to  system ^ I f o l l o w  the  p r a c t i c e  o f  A c k o f f  and Emery [ 3 ] .  In 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  e le m e n ts  t h a t  make up a sy s t e m  o r  a s u b - s y s t e m  w i l l  be t h o s e  and 
o n ly  th o s e  which are  r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  i n q u i r y ,  and s i m i l a r l y  f o r  t h e  d i r e c t  or  
i n d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s  between  them. The environm ent o f  a s y s t e m  w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  a l l  
r e l e v a n t  e le m e n ts  t h a t  can a f f e c t  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  s t a t e :  how ever ,  in  c o n t r a s t  w i th
A ck o f f  and Emery's d e f i n i t i o n ,  th e  env ironm ent  w i l l  be d e f i n e d  as i n c l u d i n g  the  
sy s te m  i t s e l f .  This  a l lo w s  l a b e l s ,  as in  f i g u r e  1 ,  t o  a p p ly  t o  e v e r y t h i n g  in  th e  
boxes ( s y s t e m s )  so  named.
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F ig u re  1. I n t e r a c t i o n  o f  Systems
H ere ,  two s y s t e m s ,  X and Y, interact i n  a common e n v ir o n m e n t .  They a f f e c t  
t h e i r  en v iro n m en t  and i t ,  in  t u r n ,  a f f e c t s  them, as shown by t h e  d i r e c t e d  l i n e s  
(arroaa). I t  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be assumed t h a t  direct i n t e r a c t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  
through t h i s  p r o c e s s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  w id e r  e n v ir o n m e n t ,  h ere  c a l l e d  th e  t o t a l  
e n v ir o n m e n t ,  i n f l u e n c e s  th e  more im mediate  en v iro n m en t  o f  th e  i n t e r a c t i o n .
I t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n c l u d e  a l l  a r r o w s ,  i f ,  by c o n v e n t i o n ,  i n t e r a c t i o n  
t a k e s  p l a c e  as shown betw een  c o n t a in e d  and c o n t a i n i n g  sy s t e m s  ( s e t s ,  b o x e s ) .  In 
any s e t  o f  b o x e s - w i t h i n - b o x e s , t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  v i a  th e  n e x t  sy s te m  
boundary. However, two c a s e s  in  which arrows w i l l  be u s e d ,  f o r  e m p h a s i s ,  a re :
( a )  t o  s t r e s s  th e  im portance  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  as i s  done in  
f i g u r e  1 f o r  th e  p u rp oses  o f  t h i s  p a p er ;  and
(b)  to  s t r e s s  an i n t e r a c t i o n ,  a c r o s s  s y s t e m  b o u n d a r ie s  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  when
t h i s  i s  s e e n  in  some s e n s e  as d i r e c t .
The c h o i c e  o f  em phasis  i s  l e f t  t o  w hoever  draws th e  d iagram , s i n c e  i t  i s  h i s
s t a t e m e n t  t o  be used  in  a p r o c e s s  o f  com m unicat ion .  F ig u r e  2 g i v e s  an example o f
( b ) ,  th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  X and Y b e in g  p r i m a r i ly  through X's i n f l u e n c e  on a 
su b s y s t e m  ( s u b s e t )  o f  Y.
F ig u re  2 .  D i r e c t  I n t e r a c t i o n
P o t e n t i a l l y ,  c o n f l i c t  can e x i s t  betw een  d i s j o i n t  s e t s  or  s y s te m s  w i t h i n  an 
e n c l o s i n g  s y s t e m ,  e . g .  w i t h i n  the  im mediate  environm ent  o f  X and Y in  f i g u r e  1 .  
This may be em p has ised  by a d o u b le  l i n e  j o i n i n g  X and Y as in  f i g u r e  3.
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F ig u r e  3 .  C o n f l i c t
I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  t h a t  th e  word conflict sh o u ld  n o t  be m isu n d e r s to o d .  I t  
im p l i e s  [ i ]  t h a t  th e r e  are  some d i f f e r e n c e s  ( i n  a im , p o l i c y ,  u n d e r s t a n d in g ,  e t c . )  
b etw een  two s y s t e m s  t h a t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  one o r  th e  o t h e r ,  o r  b o t h ,  in  t h e i r  
a t t a i n i n g  f u t u r e  sy s t e m  s t a t e s  p r e f e r r e d  by them. R e s o l u t i o n  o f  c o n f l i c t  can ta ke  
many fo r m s ,  f o r  example a change in  own a t t i t u d e  and a c t i o n s ,  s i m i l a r  change by an 
o p p o s in g  s y s t e m ,  o r  change in  e n v ir o n m e n t .  C o n f l i c t  may be b e n e v o l e n t  in  th e  
s e n s e  t h a t ,  w i t h o u t  d i f f e r e n c e s  t o  s t i m u l a t e  a b ro a d er  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  
f a c e d ,  t h e r e  would be no p r o g r e s s .  The d o u b l e - l i n e  n o t a t i o n  i s  in t e n d e d  to  be  
u sed  when su ch  d i f f e r e n c e s  appear  t o  o p e r a t e  m a l e v o l e n t l y ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  hoped f o r  
c o o p e r a t io n  o r  a m e l i o r a t i o n  o f  h o s t i l e  o r  c o n f l i c t i n g  a t t i t u d e s .  I t  i s  a l s o  u s a b le  
t o  i n d i c a t e  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  o f  an u n d e s i r a b l e  k in d .
I t  w i l l  o f t e n  be n e c e s s a r y ,  w h e th e r  a sy s t e m  be an o r g a n i s a t i o n  o r  an 
i n d i v i d u a l ,  t o  d e s c r i b e  some o f  i t s  s u b s y s t e m s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  d a t a - s t o r e  (memory, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n )  and t h e  d e c i s io n - m a k in g  c a p a b i l i t y .  Such 
su b s y s te m s  are  c l e a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  f o r m u la t io n  and r e s o l u t i o n  o f  prob lem s:  but  
th e y  can a l s o  c r e a t e ,  as w e l l  as r e s o l v e ,  bo th  problem s and c o n f l i c t .  Problems  
and c o n f l i c t  go hand in  hand. There are  some c o n c e p t s  which ap p ear  t o  be  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t :  préjudice, rolee, perception and language.
3. DECISION-MAKING
The o r i g i n a l  paper [ i ]  d e a l t  w i th  th e  s u b - s y s t e m s  t h a t  r e c e i v e  d a ta  and th o s e  
t h a t  put  d e c i s i o n s  i n t o  e f f e c t .  Here I s h a l l  assume t h a t ,  in  many c a s e s ,  t h e s e  
s u b - s y s t e m s ,  which  are  p r e s e n t  in  a l l  p u r p o se fu l  s y s t e m s ,  can be subsumed i n t o  th e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and d e c i s io n - m a k in g  s u b - s y s t e m s  w i th  t h e  s y s te m  
i t s e l f  ( f i g u r e  4 ) .
Modelling o f  problems o f end in organUetions 83
X-B.
F ig u re  4 .  The Brain  o f  th e  System
The two s u b - s y s t e m s  shown in  t h i s  f i g u r e  are  j o i n t l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  th e  fc rc rtn  
o f  th e  sy s t e m .  I t  i s  h ere  t h a t  im p o r ta n t  p r o c e s s e s  go on when a d e c i s i o n  by X i s  
t o  be made to  r e s o l v e  th e  u n d e s i r e d  i n f l u e n c e  o f  Y. F ig u r e  5 w i l l  o n ly  be 
d i s c u s s e d  h ere  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  one im p o r ta n t  c o n c e p t .  O ther a s p e c t s  are  t r e a t e d  
e l s e w h e r e  [ i ]  .
X " Xmi>,
c + ' y 
C pwgjLi^ice)
X  ' B e p r c s c n t o i  i c i i
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F ig u r e  5 .  The D e c i s i o n - P r o c e s s
X i s  t r y i n g  to  ch o o se  a p o l i c y  t o  match h i s  aim. I t  must a l s o  t a k e  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  Y, which i s  n o t  a c o o p e r a t in g  o n e .  X may n o t  be a b l e  to  
g u e s s  Y's a im , and he can o n ly  g e t  an a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  Y's p o l i c y  through a 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  Y 's  b e h a v io u r .  This r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  w i l l  be b ased  on h i s  p r i o r  
p i c t u r e  o r  judgm ent o f  Y: in s h o r t  i t  i s  b a sed  on prejudice. (As an a s i d e ,  I am
aware t h a t  n\y use  o f  t h i s  word , and th e  word c o n f l i c t ,  may in d uce  c o n f l i c t
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between  a n a l y s t  and c l i e n t s ,  and w i l l  have t o  be used w i th  c a r e .  For p r e s e n t  
e x p o s i t o r y  p u r p o s e s ,  I h o p e ' t o  e s c a p e  c e n s u r e . )
When X's b e l i e f s  about  Y are  f a l s e ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  X's chosen  p o l i c y  w i l l  
n o t  produce the  r e s u l t s  he e x p e c t e d ;  a p la n n e r  who b e l i e v e s  t h a t  p e o p le  w i l l  
n e c e s s a r i l y  f o l l o w  h i s  c r i t e r i a  o f  what  i s  good ( f o r  them !)  i s  in  f o r  some rude 
s h o c k s .  S o ,  X has t o  t r y  t o  i n t e r p r e t  Y 's  b e h a v io u r  t a k in g  i n t o  acco u n t  Y's  
c u l t u r e  and h i s t o r y .  He need n o t  a g ree  w i t h ' Y ,  but  he does  need t o  a p p r e c i a t e
how Y m ight  ( i n  h i s  own r a t i o n a l  c o n t e x t )  r e a c t  t o  X's a c t i o n s .
These a s p e c t s  are  im p o r ta n t  to  most p ro b lem s ,  w i t h i n  th e  d e c i s io n -m a k in g  
group and o u t s i d e .  I t  may be t h a t  d e t a i l e d  p r o c e d u r e s ,  such as t h o s e  d e v e lo p e d  
by Eden e t  a l .  [ 4 ] ,  a r e  needed  t o  examine the  b e l i e f s ,  v a l u e s  and c o n s t r u c t s  t h a t  
make up th e  r e l e v a n t  w o r l d - p i c t u r e s  o f  t h o s e  i n v o l v e d  in  a problem. However 
a t t e n t i o n  can be drawn to  such  f a c t o r s  by i n c l u d in g  them in  diagrams such  as t h a t  
o f  f i g u r e  5 .  The s u b - s y s t e m s  which are  c o n c e p t s  in  the  mind o f  an i n d i v id u a l  may 
be ak in  t o  f u z z y  s u b s e t s ,  but  the  n o t a t i o n  s t i l l  seems a p p r o p r ia te  and the  c h o ic e  
o f  what and what n o t  to  in c l u d e  i s  f o r  whoever ouna th e  diagram t o  d e c i d e .  
Ownership h ere  i s  an a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a c o n c e p t  o r  a s t a t e m e n t  as o n e ' s  own: th e
t h in g  owned may have been  borrow ed , as has t h i s  c o n c e p t  o f  o w n e r sh ip .
4 .  ROLES
P e o p le  a r e  complex sy s t e m s  and e q u a l l y  complex i n  t h e i r  rolea as s u b - s y s t e m s .  
Because  o f  t h e i r  un ique im p o r ta n c e ,  a symbol to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  them from o t h e r  
s y s te m s  i s  d e s i r a b l e .  A circle i s  th e  chosen  sym bol .  A group o f  p e o p le  w i l l  be  
shown as a box c o n t a i n i n g  c i r c l e s ,  s i n c e  a group r e q u ir e s  t h i n g s  o t h e r  than p e o p le :  
i t  i s .  a p u r p o s e f u l  s y s t e m ,  but  does n o t  i t s e l f  a c t  l i k e  a p e r s o n .
In a s y s t e m ,  th e r e  i s  o f t e n  someone n o m in a l ly  o r  a c t u a l l y  in  c o n t r o l .  The 
c i r c l e  i s  then  p la c e d  in  th e  upper l e f t  hand c o r n e r  o f  th e  box .  F ig u r e  6 shows a 
h i e r a r c h y  in  s im p le  te r m s .
F ig u r e  6 .  Control in  a H iera rch y
B and C in  ch arge  o f  sy s t e m s  Y and Z are  s u b o r d in a t e  to  A who i s  i n  c h a rg e  o f  
X o f  w hich  Y and Z a r e  s u b - s y s t e m s .  Assuming t h a t  i t  works p r o p e r l y ,  c o n f l i c t  
between Y and Z does  n o t  need  to  be i n d i c a t e d  s i n c e  A's  r o l e  i s  t o  r e s o l v e
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c o n f l i c t  through h i s  c o n t r o l  o f  B and C.
In f i g u r e  7 ,  h ow ever ,  A i s  shown a s  h a v in g  a dual r o l e ,  b e in g  s u p e r o r d in a t e  
to B, but  a l s o  d i r e c t l y  in  c o n t r o l  o f  s u b s y s te m  Z in  which r o l e  he i s  a t  th e  same 
h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l  as B.
F ig u r e  7 .  R ole  C on fus ion  in  a H ierarchy
The n o t a t i o n  shows A in  two p l a c e s  as h a t c h e d - l i n e  c i r c l e s .  At any one  
moment in t i m e ,  A i s  t h i n k i n g  and a c t i n g  in  one o f  h i s  two r o l e s ,  b u t ,  h a v in g  o n ly  
one b r a i n ,  he c a n n o t  f u l l y  d i s s o c i a t e  h i m s e l f  from e i t h e r .  He i s  in  no s t a t e  f o r  
r e s o l v i n g  c o n f l i c t  betw een  th e  s u b s y s t e m s :  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  i s  shown a c c o r d ­
i n g l y .
S i m i l a r l y ,  a person  a s  an e n t i t y  i n ,  s a y ,  a b u s i n e s s  o r g a n i s a t i o n  may be 
i n f l u e n c e d  in  h i s  b e h a v io u r  by h i s  r o l e s  in  o t h e r  s y s t e m s :  in  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l ,
r e l i g i o u s ,  p a r e n ta l  and o t h e r  r o l e s ,  he may a c t  in  ways a p p a r e n t ly  i l l o g i c a l  t o  
t h o s e  who s e e  him as  a su b s y s te m  o f  th e  b u s i n e s s  s y s t e m .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  problem s in  
à f irm  may have t o  be examined o u t s i d e  th e  n a tu r a l  b ou n dar y ,  th e  b u s i n e s s  e n v i r o n ­
ment. At the  s i m p l e s t  l e v e l ,  any good manager knows t h a t  what i s  h appen ing  in  an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p r i v a t e  l i f e  i s  f a r  from i r r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  o f f i c e  o r  w orkshop.
b. LANGUAGE AND PERCEPTIONS
Because  i n d i v i d u a l s  may p e r c e i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  and th e  p r o b l e m s , t h a t  o r g a n ­
i s a t i o n s  f a c e ,  v ery  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  i t  w i l l  be n e c e s s a r y  t o  produce more than one  
diagram f o r  some p u r p o s e s .  I t  i s  in  making su ch  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x p l i c i t  t h a t  a f i r s t  
s t e p  in c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  i s  t a k e n .  R e a l i t y ,  a t  any moment, seems t o  be a 
c o m p o s i te  o f  a l l  r e l e v a n t  perceptions. C o n f l i c t  can a r i s e  from m is u n d e r s ta n d in g  
o f  which i s  used to  d e s c r i b e  so m eth ing  a c c o r d in g  t o  one s e t  o f
p e r c e p t i o n s  ( w o r l d - p i c t u r e )  b u t  which i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  through  a d i f f e r e n t  s e t .
A s im p le  example i s  g iv e n  in  f i g u r e  8 .  Policy a t  one l e v e l  o f  a h i e r a r c h y  
becomes aim a t  th e  n e x t  l e v e l .  I t  i s  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  p o l i c y  a t  t h i s  lo w er  l e v e l  
and aga in  handed down. P e o p le  in  such  a h i e r a r c h y  t a l k i n g  about  p o l i c y  a re  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  t a l k i n g  about  th e  same t h i n g ,  a l th o u g h  i t  may o f t e n  be s i m i l a r  enough  
For them n ot  t o  n o t i c e  and d i f f e r e n t  enough t o  c a u se  c o n f u s i o n .  A l s o ,  in  th e  
p ro ces s  o f  com munication down the  h i e r a r c h y  t h e r e  w i l l  be d i s t o r t i o n  o f  what was
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F ig u r e  8 .  Aims and P o l i c i e s
in te n d e d .  One re a s o n  f o r  t h i s ,  d i s c u s s e d  by Laing [ 5 ] ,  o c c u r s  due to  th e  u se  o f  
o r a l  com m unicat ion:  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  in c l u d e  th e  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  p e o p le  p e r c e i v e
as l i m i t i n g  t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  and o b v io u s  t h i n g s  l i k e  s im p le  m i s a p p r e c i a t i o n .
B ecause  o f  th e  im portance  o f  what happens c o n t r a r y  to  what was i n t e n d e d ,  
s p e c i a l  ar r o w s ,  d e a l i n g  w i t h  p u r p o se fu l  a c t i o n ,  com municat ion  a n d ,  i n  both c a s e s ,  
d i s t o r t i o n  are  in tr o d u c e d  ( f i g u r e  9 ) .
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F ig u r e  9 .  P u r p o s e ,  Communication and D i s t o r t i o n
The r u l e s  a r e  t h a t  p u r p o se fu l  a c t i o n  b e g in s  from a c i r c l e  and com m unicat ion  
ends a t  a c i r c l e .  Boxes can p r o v id e  com municat ion  but t h e y  a r e  n o t  communicated  
w i t h ,  nor do t h e y  have p urpose  e x c e p t  through th e  p e o p le  t h e y  c o n t a i n .  In t h i s  
p a p e r ,  I s h a l l  u s e  t h e s e  arrows o n ly  i n  th e  f i g u r e  in  th e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  which  
d e s c r i b e s  my problem o f  p u t t i n g  th e  n o t a t i o n  to  e f f e c t  w i th  a c l i e n t .
But b e f o r e  d i s c u s s i n g  t h a t  I want to  add a l i t t l e  more about  la n g u a g e  and 
p e r c e p t i o n ,  f i r s t l y  through  a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  com municat ion  and c o n f l i c t  i n  a 
t r a d e - u n i o n  and management n e g o t i a t i o n .
There were t h r e e  u n io n s  co n cern ed  and t o g e t h e r  t h e y  formed a j o i n t  n e g o t i a t ­
in g  team . S u b je c t  t o  c e r t a i n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  govern m en t,  th e  management 
board was f r e e  t o  n e g o t i a t e .  Reading t r a n s c r i p t s  o f  some o f  t h e  i n t e r c h a n g e s ,  I 
v a^s s t r u c k  by th e  ap p aren t  i r r e l e v a n c e  o f  r e s p o n s e s  and t h e  a w a ren ess  o f  th e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h a t  t h e r e  was some h idden  b a r r i e r  to  u n d e r s t a n d in g .  F ig u r e  10 g i v e s  
nty g u e s s  o f  th e  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  two s i d e s :  i t  was s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e i n t e r p r e t
and make s e n s e  o f  many o f  t h e  c o n f u s i n g  r e s p o n s e s ,  and i t s  c o r r e c t n e s s  o r  o t h e r ­
w i s e  i s  not  im portan t  h e r e .
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A n  Experiment in Problem Formulation
KEN BOWEN
Royal H ollow ay College, U niversity  o f  L ondon
In a recent pap er (in Operational Research '81, N o rth -H o llan d , 1981), the a u th o r  p u t fo rw ard  a 
m ethodology  fo r p rob lem -form ulation . In o rder to test it, a  g roup  o f  teachers concerned with the 
in troduc tion  o f  a new, in tegrated  opera tional research and  system s analysis M .Sc. course agreed to 
accept the a u th o r  as a consu ltan t. T he aim  was to  clarify and define their problem  o f  developing and 
m ain tain ing  their new course. T his pap er describes the n a tu re  and  course o f  the experim ent. It 
com m ents on  the difficulties th a t were encountered , and  on the perceived benefits to the client-group 
and  to the researcher.
K ey words: m ethodology , research, experim ent
INTRODUCTION
O n e  o f  t h e  most important tasks for any operational researcher is to ensure that the 
problem that he studies for his clients is one that they perceive. If it is not, then either 
they will not use his results, or, worse, they will misuse them. Further, it is important that 
the problem be seen and analysed in its total context, however restricted the eventual 
boundaries may have to be for pragmatic reasons: without such an approach, a proper 
choice of analysis methods is very difficult and an adequate adaption to new demands and 
to a changing world is impossible.
The need for satisfactory methodology for this purpose drove the author to develop 
ideas from earlier work on conflict resolution, and a basis for problem formulation in 
diagrammatic form was proposed in a paper published recently.' The purpose of this 
explicit, largely non-verbal technique was to act both as a discipline for the analyst and 
as a medium for communication with his clients. It is essentially a systems approach.
It is not pretended that there is nothing else available. Over the period that this work 
has been in progress, other developments have taken place. Nevertheless, for different 
situations, different clients and different analysts, the same approach may not be 
satisfactory. The aim has been to find something more structured than the methodology 
of Checkland-  ^ and less detailed in its treatment than that o f Eden et al? It is suggested 
that the former leaves too much to the idiosyncratic nature of the analyst, while the latter 
demands a type of client and analyst participation which, from personal experience, is not 
seen to be easy to achieve in bureaucratic organisations such as Ministries. However, there 
is nothing that is intended to be at variance with these two approaches, nor with other 
methodologies that have been studied, such as the use of systems dynamics by Coyle and 
Wolstenholme.4
This paper looks at what happens when the proposed methodology is put into practice.
THE CHOICE OF EXPERIMENTAL CLIENTS
Normally, experiment is undertaken to test a theory. Following Popper,^ one criterion for 
satisfactory experimentation would be that the theory initially postulated had the highest 
degree of universality and precision that seemed sufficient: in other words, one starts with 
the hope o f being able to make simple statements and only introduces conditions and 
qualifications when this is inevitable. The notation proposed' has a simplicity which 
accords with this principle, and one purpose of the experiment was to test the sufficiency 
of the notation for describing problems.
A first d ra ft o f  th is pap er w as p resented  a t the Fifth European Congress on Operational Research, L ausanne, 
Sw itzerland, July 1982.
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Just before the ‘communications problem’ took people’s attention, I had suggested 
extending the study into areas relevant to these, particularly the tasks o f the Course 
Organiser and the resources, of time and people, required to handle these and other 
difficulties. How effort is to be made available is necessarily part of the policy issue.
I believe that, had this not been an experimental consultation, we might have got 
through these additional inquiries and, as expressed forcibly by one o f my clients, have 
started on the “real problem”—“our inability to get ourselves into action over all things 
that concerns us”.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By itself this experiment is not enough: it is also, inevitably, incomplete. There are now 
in progress at Royal Holloway College two formal studies for outside organisations that 
will use the methodology. Only when satisfactory results stem from such operational tasks 
can any ‘proof’ of the usefulness o f the methodology be claimed, although I shall hope 
that the University of Aston group will wish me to take the work done there to a further 
stage.
Even at the present stage, however, I am satisfied that, during the experiment, the 
methodology enabled me, in much more detail than I could otherwise have done, to 
interpret the clients’ pictures of their problem. In turn, this helped them to formulate ideas 
and concerns which might otherwise have had little, or less satisfactory, debate. I would 
also stress that communicable diagrams, rich in information, have been created using very 
simple and explicit rules.
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A second criterion is that the theory must be potentially falsifiable. However, in dealing 
with a methodology, any statement in the form of a general theory is difficult. What is 
to be established is that people in general will be aided by the methodology and will wish 
to use it or have it used on their problems: not all people, but some people, and this ‘some’ 
must be an appreciable number. Any failure with a client or client-group must point to 
directions for reappraisal of the methodology: there may be a need for changes in notation 
or uses of notation, in the way in which the methodology is applied, or in the class of clients 
for whom the methodology is seen to be suited. Thus, the methodology must include the 
consultancy procedure for its application. It was with this in mind that the previous paper 
included a diagram in the notation to express the problem of applying the methodology: 
this diagram is repeated as Figure 1 in the next section.
To carry out a first experiment, it was necessary to find a real problem in process of 
study by those who had perceived it as a problem, but it had preferably to be one for which 
the relationship between analyst (consultant) and clients was already reasonably estab­
lished and such that true consultancy and experiment could go hand-in-hand. It was 
essential that the clients be critical; and, if possible, that they should have a vested interest 
in there being such a methodology and in its having a general (rather than a specific, 
own-problem oriented) application.
After considering various possible clients of a general kind, who were aware of their 
difficulties in the past of having concentrated on the wrong problem, and more specific 
clients such as operational researchers, who were aware of their lack of a suitable 
problem-formulation methodology, it became apparent that teachers of operational 
research formed the most suitable group for seeking ‘experimental clients’. Preferably, the 
client group would be one which was seeking to increase the generality and methodology 
content o f their teaching of O.R.
An obvious choice was the University of Aston Management Centre’s Operational 
Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA) group. They were, at the time that the experiment 
started, nine months away from the introduction of a new, integrated, M.Sc. teaching 
course and were well aware of the very considerable difficulties that faced then in this 
innovation. My personal relation with them (and it is essential that I now use the first 
person) was well-established and I knew what they intended, in general terms, through my 
position as External Examiner of the Systems Analysis M.Sc. course. At that time, this 
was a separate course from the Operational Research M.Sc. Towards the end of 1980, I 
proposed that they accepted me as a consultant on their problem, defined provisionally 
by me as
“developing and maintaining an integrated M.Sc. ORSA course in the Management
Centre o f the University o f Aston”.
They accepted this and, in December 1980, I commenced the experiment to apply my 
methodology to assist a client group of ten people, conscious that I had to beware of my 
own preconceptions due to my other role in the Department.
THE FIRST STAGE 
In January 1981, I sent to each member of the client group the following material.
(a) The rules governing the notation used.'
(b) A suggestion that each individual might wish to discuss with me personal problems 
within the overall course development programme and how these might arise.
(c) A set o f six diagrams, describing, on the basis of written documents and earlier 
discussions of a general nature,
(i) the management system;
(ii) the proposed structure o f the ORSA M.Sc. course;
(iii) communication and purpose, with primary potential conflicts (relating to 
systems external to the group);
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Explicit rules for notation
Consultant 
C
Client
system
Explicit 
formulation 
of problem 
by the 
consultant
Explicit 
formulations 
of problem  
by
individuals
Those
notation
F ig . 1. The problem  ofprob lem  form ulation . A  is any individual client. P *  is m y problem . P ' is the developing picture
o f  th e ir  problem.
(iv) resource allocation;
(v) personal aims, policies and values;
(vi) the course programme monitoring and coordination system.
This was all I was able to abstract from what had so far been given to me.
(d) A request for differences of opinion on, or lack of understanding of, my treatment 
of the as yet incompletely defined problem.
The process of interaction was described in the paper forwarded (a). Figure 1 repeats 
the appropriate diagram and gives implicitly some notion of the diagrammatic language. 
The main elements of that notation are shown in Figure 2.
It was intended that each person should respond to me in his or her own time. Dealing 
with busy people, already under pressure from current teaching and future planning, this 
was a mistake! In due course, I arranged a series o f interviews at the University, spending 
an hour or more with each individual.
In a short paper, I cannot provide full details of the diagrams, nor of the way in which 
they changed as the consultations developed (these are still in progress). I have tried to 
provide enough to indicate how the methodology helped the exploration of the problem 
and communication of individually perceived issues.
The management system
The most important discussions stemmed from the perception of the roles of the Acting 
Head of the Group and his nominated Course Organiser. My original impression of the 
hierarchy was as in Figure 3, which is part of a much more detailed picture o f the 
management system. Discussion led to a new picture (Figure 4), introducing the Course
 I System
Individuel (also a system) 
I I System and subsystem
=  Potential conflict 
- o  Communication 
Purposeful action 
General interoction or influence 
■ o  Distorted communication 
Distorted purposeful action
Arrows ore used to em phasise interactions.
F ig . 2. N otation {other rules are m ade specific in Bowen  ' ).
687
Journal o f  the Operational Research Society, Vol. 34, No. 8
0 (A';
0  0  0  
Group Monogement
Other lecturers
ORSA Teoching Group
Monogement Centre
F ig . 3. M y  initial perception o f  the hierarchy. .4 = A cting  H ead o f  D epartm ent. B ,C  = other Senior Lecturers.
X  =  H ead o f  M anagem ent Centre.
Organiser as superordinate to his Head of Department for the purpose of developing the 
new course and reporting to the Director, Post-Graduate Studies. It also eliminated the 
concept of a ‘group management’, since the client group saw themselves as operating in 
a looser framework in which all major decisions were negotiated through a joint discussion 
process. The leading roles of the three more senior people, including the Acting Head of 
Department, operated by example and by persuasion.
Monitoring and coordination
Consequential changes occurred in three other diagrams—see c(iii), c(v) and c(vi) above. 
However, in the last of these, the system for the monitoring and coordination of the M.Sc. 
course programme, other major changes occurred, introducing the Admissions Tutor and 
the role of the Course Organiser in his later role of administering the new course under 
the general supervision of the Acting Head of Departments (the natural hierarchy now 
operated). Figure 5 shows the process as it finally appeared. It should be noted that this 
is not capable of integration with the diagram of Figure 4, since the roles of two people 
have changed (I believe that the discussions clarified their picture of their dual re­
lationship).
Reporting back
A great deal of information on personal difficulties was obtained. The lack of a clear 
process for the later understanding of and control o f what was going on was also identified. 
A detailed report (generalised to preserve certain confidentialities) was made to the Acting 
Head of Department with several modified diagrams. Following an interview with him, 
and his agreement to pass the information on to individuals, further discussions were held 
to decide how best to proceed.
©
i'j)
(A ! @  ®  (c)
Senior Lecturers
Other lecturers 
 (Including J )
ORSA Teaching Group
ORSA M.Sc. Course
Post-G raduate Studies
Management Centre
F ig . 4. A m ended  picture o f  the hierarchy. A  =  A cting H ead o f  D epartm ent. B ,C  = other Senior Lecturers. 
J  = Course Organiser. X  =  H ead  o f  M anagem ent Centre. Y  =  Dean o f  Studies. Z  - D irector o f  Post-G raduate
Studies.
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Available
Desired
projectCourse
organiser DesiredDesired
programme StudentExplicit
espoused
values
(SUPV!
PI
Actual
programme
Admissions
tutor
Course
expectation
Student
ORSA M.Sc. course coordination
( Personal > 
tutor/odviser
Student
ORSA M.Sc. Course
Potential
(students
F ig . 5. M onitoring and coordination o f  M .Sc . course programme. P \ , . . . ,  C \  . . . ,  C \  . . . .  are projects and courses.
One evident shortcoming was that (Figure 5) the monitoring and coordination process 
depended on there being “explicit espoused values” (their phrase) and on there being 
adequate data fed back to indicate the satisfaction of both students and staff with what 
happened once the new course started. It was also evident that the initial picture of the 
proposed structure of the course—see c(ii) above—would have to be developed in 
considerably more detail.
The Course Organiser provided his version of what the course was intended to put into 
the minds of students: he called it the Learning Objectives. There were 25 o f these; for 
example:
“At the end of the course students will:
1. understand and value the view that perceiving the world as a variety of nested and 
overlapping systems provides a useful way of generalizing the process of problem 
solving, decision making and the provision of information for managers;
6. be able to use statistical concepts to describe and estimate uncertainty in the 
behaviour of systems;
16. be able to identify, develop and modify a variety of models describing the 
relationships of system behaviour with action plans, strategies and objectives;
25. be able to use computer hardware to run systems programs and to develop their own 
programs.”
These objectives were generally idealised (in the Ackoff sense), but were nevertheless 
useful as broad guides to what was being aimed at. I was told that a questionnaire would 
be put to students, at various stages during the course, to get their reactions to whether 
these learning objectives were realised. I was asked to take the now more developed 
syllabus and provide a detailed diagram of the course structure linked with the learning 
objectives.
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Opfionol subjects
CORE
1 8 -1 9
Optional subjects
1___
1^
SMI SM2
M2
8 - 9  
P. S.
16
21-23
Inter-
ventlon
Info.
tech.
Comp.
prog.
Accounting
20
Commn.
skills
13 -15
Statistics
11-12
Computers
2 4 - 2 5
Methodology
Interaction
Modelling
ORSA projects
F ig . 6. Part o f  the initial conceptual diagram o f  the proposed M .S c . course related to learning objectives. N um bers 
refer to learning objectives. H a tched  lines with arrows are po ten tia l influences.
Optional subjects
(20)
Accauntancy
2 , (3),(4), 
5,(18) 
'SM 1’
(1),3?  
4 2
 I . SM 2
Methodology ^
6 ,7 , (2 0 )
13,14,15,
(22)
I__
Commn.
skills (16),17(7),11,12,
(14)
'Ml'Statistics M2
Modelling
8 ,9 ,2 0
'PS'
Problem
struct.
21, ( 2 2 )
Inter­
vention
2 5
Comp.
prog
Interaction
First term 
teaching Second term teaching
24
Info.
tech.
ORSA dissertation  
projects
CORE
  L
^  Optional subjects
F ig .  7. R evised  diagram o f  the developing M .Sc . course. (20) implies that there is som e teaching relevant to learning  
objective 20, etc. A ccountancy m ay be ill-m atched to C O R E  and to S ta tistics as im plied by 'con flic t' double lines.
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THE SECOND STAGE
The process of defining and discussing the nature of the course, how it was meeting the 
objectives stated, and whether these objectives were properly stated, took place during the 
first year that the new course was taught. It is, of course, a continuing process. As an 
indication of results, my initial diagram of the M.Sc. Course and Learning Objectives 
(Figure 6) showed the nature of the course as then documented. A knowledge of the 
syllabus and the Learning Objectives is, of course, needed to interpret it fully. It was 
provided to all members of the teaching staff, and interviews were conducted to obtain 
reactions to it. These were instructive and showed some inconsistencies. The final diagram 
offered is shown in Figure 7, and some interesting points can be made.
Firstly, certain subjects specified separately in the syllabus have not been taught 
separately, but as part o f an integrated package. The concept has been one o f a gradual 
learning process where methodology, modelling and the process of interaction with clients 
becomes increasingly clear through case studies (term 1), minor projects (term 2) and the 
major dissertation projects (after term 3). Consequently, there was a need to understand 
and monitor the time sequence o f the teaching process: the diagram uses the systems 
defining the main term-by-term teaching to indicate this time sequence. This change 
between syllabus and teaching practice, although consciously intended, had not been 
entirely satisfactory and had caused some confusion, both to students and to some of the 
teaching staff. In particular, communication skills taught within the integrated package 
seemed to have been duplicating the separate module and perhaps conflicting with it.
Secondly, the links between separate parts o f the syllabus and the Learning Objectives 
were far from one-to-one, and some of the objectives were not, or only sparingly, covered. 
It is quite clear that much study of these links is needed so that teaching can become 
appropriately integrated. The teaching had not been carried out with any explicit attention 
to the Learning Objectives, and the Acting Head of Department, for example, appreciated 
that he could in future greatly improve his own presentation of Information Technology, 
using links with other teaching.
Thirdly, the Learning Objectives will have to be rewritten and agreed (by and large) by 
all concerned. Some of them are woolly, and some are differently interpreted by different 
individuals. The fact that individuals perceive that there will be certain contributions from 
others to Learning Objectives central to their own teaching does not of course mean that 
these contributions will be made.
THE THIRD STAGE
This was planned to deal with syllabus and Learning Objectives, potential course changes 
for the second year and the so far neglected area o f resources o f time and people. Other 
important areas, which had only been superficially covered, were those of communication, 
values and beliefs.
In the event, all of these things were examined in a special context owing to the incidence 
of important differences of opinion about the direction in which the course was developing. 
There was also concern about the way in which other university pressures and duties had 
seriously affected the intended open communications on which the efficiency o f the 
informal management procedures depended.
The details of the interactions involved are necessarily confidential to the clients. 
However, some general statements can be made. Firstly, it was possible to identify a 
number o f the difficulties within the framework of the diagrams already produced. 
Secondly, it was possible also to obtain a useful picture of the primary communication 
channels used by individuals in the context o f the main problem, that o f developing and 
maintaining the course.
Thirdly and most importantly, I had assumed, in structuring many of the earlier 
diagrams, that because my clients so described their operations, free and undistorted 
communication was taking place within the group. I had not considered pressures which
691
Journal o f  the Operational Research Society, Vol. 34, No. 8
might affect these communications, although it should have been obvious to me that if the 
basis o f their management system was disturbed in any major way, conflicts would 
inevitably arise and these would be difficult to manage and resolve.
It is probably a sound general principle that communications necessary to a style of 
management should be described as part o f any problem, since maintaining such 
communications is essential to the handling of any resolution of that problem. It is 
particularly necessary to stress communications, possibly new, that will be needed to 
manage change.
FINDINGS FROM THE EXPERIMENT
It is not easy to draw firm conclusions from an experiment o f this sort. Any intervention 
by a consultant who is interested in and willing to involve himself in another’s problem, 
with the consent of the problem owner, is almost bound to be helpful, whether his 
methodology is explicit or not. This perhaps explains continued support for O R., even 
when little regard seems to be paid to the outcome of analysis! However, there are lessons 
that I have learnt and conclusions that I believe to be fair statements.
Use o f the notation
Although the diagrams were generally easy for clients to interpret and were invaluable 
as a means o f communication during discussions, they did not use the notation to express 
their own ideas. This is perhaps, on reflection, not surprising: it is important to everyone 
to be able to use their own language, and it is best that they should do this provided that 
it does not encourage major misinterpretations.
Nevertheless, it was an important discipline for myself to ensure that everything I 
received was incorporated in the structures, and an important means by which I tested 
whether my understanding was correct. What could not be incorporated was reported back 
in writing: this generally involved aspects of the problem not yet sufficiently explored for 
inclusion in the diagrams. At no time did I find it impossible or potentially difficult to 
include essential features in the diagrams within the constraints of the rules o f notation.
The communication study raised an interesting technical issue, as well as the more 
fundamental one discussed in the preceding section. At first, it seemed that I needed to 
indicate, for the communication arrows, some measurement of the degree of commu­
nication that occurred. However, it transpired that, for the sort of fuzzy measurement I 
could make, the available notation sufficed:
—(>: good communication;
—O: incomplete communication, with inevitable distortion of information about the 
problem;
no link: no communication or virtually none;
(----- >^: could have been used to imply interaction with no particular stress on
communication, but this seemed to introduce unnecessary special meaning to 
this interaction arrow); and 
=  : unconstructive communication in a conflict situation.
Every aspect of the notation came into play. Only one proved potentially contentious; 
it was drawn to my attention by a student (during an M.Sc. course which I was teaching 
elsewhere). It concerned the use o f the double line to imply potential conflict, as used in 
Figure 5, between “explicit espoused values” and “actual programme”. Since these two 
‘systems’ are not themselves purposeful, this is perhaps not strictly logical. However, as 
a shorthand for a conflict between A, assumed responsible for the values, and J, assumed 
responsible for the course in being, it is meaningful. Indeed, in practice, J has produced 
the explicit statement of the values as well! However, it is ultimately A’s responsibility to 
have J produce something which meets the values A is prepared to accept: in practice, 
again, the whole teaching team will adopt a consensus view.
The time taken to produce and draw the more complicated diagrams by hand is an
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unsatisfactory feature. It may be possible to set up a graphics display to play about with 
layouts, and to use the rules to check the validity of diagrams and make changes as 
required.
Finally, the inability to represent well the time varying state of a system is a matter for 
further study. The ways this has been attempted so far are limited: a series of diagrams 
at different points in time; the definition of systems which occur successively in time, as 
in Figure 7; using environment boundaries to indicate the time sequence in which 
additional sub-systems, shown within those boundaries, become important; and, for people 
passing through a system such as a hospital, to include those people in a number of 
sub-systems with arrows linking them to the next sub-system that they go to. The choice, 
or invention of new procedures, seems likely to be problem-dependent.
Problems o f time for consultancy
Since the clients were always busy with their everyday tasks, and the consultant was 120 
miles away (and also had other work to fit in), there was an inevitable slowness in the rate 
of interaction. Because new knowledge about the problem came slowly and because the 
clients had too little time for planning the future, this was less of a disadvantage than it 
might have been. However, it would have enhanced the service to the clients had there been 
more interaction: not only could richer pictures have been produced, but some of the 
difficulties o f the first year o f the new course might have been avoided. For the purpose 
of the experiment, the slow time-scale for interaction was not a serious drawback, other 
than having to wait to get results.
In practice, I have always seen the process as operating for an in-house consultancy, with 
the consultant able to intervene regularly as the problem changes. For most problems, I 
believe that such closeness of contact is very necessary: the analyst must ideally be part 
of the decision-making team. Nothing experienced in this experiment leads me to doubt 
this.
Communication with clients
Apart from the issues just raised, no problems arose. All the clients gave their views 
clearly and uninhibitedly. Doubts and difficulties were freely stated: only occasionally did 
they put any confidentiality on what they said to me, and this usually only after I had 
suggested that they might so wish.
Although the group operates well in the sense that, normally, they hold regular 
discussions as a group and on an individual basis, there is no doubt that it is very difficult 
for them to find time enough to really know what each other is doing and thinking. Even 
in the relatively short time I spent with each of them, I found myself identifying issues that 
needed debate and attention, through acting as a communication channel for them. In the 
words of the Acting Head of Department, I “provided a stimulus to their thinking”, 
although this is no more than any methodology which pays attention to problem- 
formulation should do.
In general, I reported back only what was given to me. Additionally, in trying to produce 
the pictures of their problem, I found that I was short of data and had to probe for it: 
they had most of the data, but the formulation process made it available as relevant 
information. Importantly, it enabled this information to be shared and held in common.
The penultimate draft of this paper was sent to my clients to ensure that what I had 
said breached no confidences and was a fair picture o f what had taken place. This has led 
to some useful clarifications , but more importantly it has raised a number of perceptions 
of ‘the problem’ as it is now.
One of these would involve expanding the full version of Figure 4 in order to explore 
policy problems inherent in the course’s future. Another would require a closer exam­
ination of the Course Organiser’s tasks and the facilities he has to implement what seems 
desirable. Yet others stem from an appreciation that what has been described was, in some 
sense, already ‘known’. None of these perceptions was made explicit to me at any earlier 
stage, although they were undoubtedly beginning to emerge more strongly.
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THE LEARNING OBJECTIVES
The attached document (retyped with minor editorial corrections) 
was produced by the Course Organiser. It is a first draft, not 
produced specifically for my needs, and not agreed formally within the 
teaching group. Nevertheless, it was accepted by my clients as 
representing a useful indication of what the course was aiming to do.
Its use drew attention to some of its shortcomings.
a) Many of the objectives were far-reaching (e.g. in 3, one
might ask whether it was intended to teach people how to 
describe the stated undertakings and activities at all 
levels).
b) There were too many 'jargon' phrases which could (and were) 
interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, in 2c it is 
intended to imply that the effects of information on 
behaviour and vice versa have to be taken into account in 
system design, although other interpretations are possible; 
in 9, 11 and 12, words like "accountable", "faith" and
"fidelity" are not the best that could be used in the
context intended.
c) There was vagueness in many of the statements, partly 
due to their being overgeneralised. The ways in which 
they were understood by the different teachers was clear 
evidence of the consequent ambiguity.
Despite all this, the document proved satisfactory for my purposes; 
indeed, without something like it, it would have been difficult 
for me to bring some aspects of their problem into the open.
It is extraordinarily difficult to make suitably ejqplicit the 
aims of a task which the individuals concerned see as based on personal 
expertise and e^gerience. My encounter with this particular aspect 
of problem-formulation leads me to suggest that any group of teachers 
would find value in trying to identify the purposes of their courses, 
and to link the elements of their written and/or taught syllabus with 
these purposes, in the way I have done in diagrams 3 (first and 
second revise).
In the case of an (M (or similar) teaching group, not only would 
it be a proper professional thing to do, but it would provide 
a useful teaching tool in covering systems thinking, and would help 
the students to understand and use the course better. For other 
teaching groups, it would primarily be the teachers' better under­
standing that would enable them to help the students to see the 
course in proper perspective.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES FOR MSc ORSA COURSE 
At the end of the course students will:
1. understand and value the view that perceiving the world as a variety 
of nested and overlapping systems provides a useful way of 
generalizing the process of problem solving, decision making and 
the provision of informations for managers ;
2. recognise and agree that ORSA is concerned with
a) the design or modification of linked physical and social 
systems aimed at meeting specified system behaviour objectives,
b) the design or modification of information handling systems 
which provide the means of regulating the behaviour of a 
physical/social system, and
c) the identification and design of behaviour/information 
and information/behaviour relationships which enable
a) and b) to be effectively linked;
3. be able to describe governmental, industrial, commercial, social 
and domestic undertakings and activities in terms of the systems 
involved;
4. be able to describe the properties and relationships of systems 
and relate these to the behaviour of individuals, governments and 
organisations of all kinds and to use the knowledge to link the 
topics covered in the course into a coherent whole ;
5. be able to describe the role of information in governing the 
behaviour of systems ;
6. be able to use statistical concepts to describe and estimate 
uncertainty in the behaviour of systems ;
7. be able to design experiments and test hypotheses concerning the 
behaviour of chosen systems ;
8. be able to identify, observe, analyse and question sources of 
information relevant to the task in hand;
a) formulate an appropriate description of the system concerned.
the environmental (supra-) systems, the principal sub-systems 
and the relationships between them
b) identify the objectives of the problem owners or clients and 
interpret them in terms of the systems description
c) identify and describe in terms of the systems description 
the potential range of actions, modifications or system 
composition that may be considered;
9. be able to interpret objectives as accountable entities;
10. be able to plan and execute a project, the design of which is 
appropriate to the structure of the problem and the time and 
resources available, and the results of which extend the problem 
structuring phase through the modelling and analysis stages to the 
production of final plans, proposals and/or recommendations;
11. be able to determine how much faith to put into a set of observations 
or data;
12. be able to improve the fidelity of current or planned data 
gathering;
13. be able to interpret, discuss, diagnose, propose and assess ORSA 
projects using the principal language and concepts that govern 
the regulation of organisations (particularly accounting) ;
14. view communication as the mechanism governing
a) the acquisition of information
b) the testing and evaluation of progress during an ORSA project
c) the gaining of clients' satisfaction through understanding 
and acceptance of the project results;
15. be able to describe the importance of communication in ORSA projects 
and have the skills needed to:
a) acquire infomation by informal discussion,
b) negotiate the establishemnt of a project and collection and/or 
provision of data,
c) to present progress reports, final conclusions and design 
specifications in oral and written form.
d) to prepare for and make effective contribution to formal 
committee meetings,
e) to answer examination questions and write University project 
reports ;
16. be able to identify, develop and modify a variety of models 
describing the relationships of system behaviour with action 
plans, strategies and objectives;
17. be able to develop and/or implement model manipulation procedures
(algorithms) to identify and recommend a course of action or 
system design that provides a good solution to the original 
problem;
18. visualise the process of model development and use as that of 
providing information for the specialized social system (management) 
that is (in part) regulating, directing or controlling a more 
general and extensive social and physical system;
19. be able to describe the nature and role of information in systems 
in general and organisations (management systems) in particular 
and to use this knowledge to:
a) identify and specify information needed to make a chosen 
decision or range of decisions within a particular context,
b) design ways of collecting, storing and presenting the 
required information;
20. be able to make use of records and projections available frcan 
accounting departments and statistical digests;
21. be able to recognise, describe and anticipate the difficulties 
involved in making changes within social systems (organisations) 
and be able to identify the source of these difficulties and 
suggest ways of minimising them;
22. understand the importance of interpreting "theoretical solutions" 
derived from abstract models of the system concerned into less 
abstract, practical terms which can be understood and communicated 
to the people involved and be able to make such interpretations;
23. recognise the importance of monitoring the implementation of a 
project, policy or remedial action and be able to plan and execute 
an effective monitoring programme;
24. know what connuters are, what they can do and how they can be made 
to do it;
25. be able to use conç)uter hardware to run systems programs and 
to develop their own programs.
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DIAGRAM 2 (second revise)
Conceptual Dia,grajQ of the Developing MSc Course 
related to the Learning Objectives
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Forecasting
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Simulation
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DIAGRAM 3 (first revise) 
CoBwunication and purpose 
with Primary Potential Conflicts
PG Studies
Management Centre
University
Students
Senate
Potential
Students
Potential
Employers
SRC
(Maths)
Project System
Students
Project
Clients
ORSA MSc Course
ORSA MSc Teaching Group
Project
Super-
Lvisors.
Notes: 1. Not all communication and purpose links are stressed, e.g. J's
communications with the individual teachers other than A.
2. Interactions internal to the ORSA M.Sc. Teaching Group are extended 
in diagrams 5 and 6.
3. This diagram is concerned with the development of the course. Its 
monitoring and control is considered in diagram 6, where J becomes 
subordinate to A.
PI^^GRAM 5 (^ipst revise) 
personal Alms, policies emd Values 
(Teaching Staff)
Individual 1
Individual 2
ORSA MSc Teaching Group
Aim/Policy for 
own consultancy
Aim/Policy for 
own research
Aim/Policy for 
own teaching
Explicit 
Espoused Values
ORSA MSc Course (Development)
Notes ; 1. Like diagram 2, this is concerned primarily with course development,
although, apart from J's position, it relates also to the monitoring
and co-ordination function (diagram 6),
2. Individual 1 is repeated for 2, ...
3. It would be useful to have explicit aims, etc. for each individual
where these are openly discrepant with the ideal (the explicit 
espoused values).
DIAGRAM 6 
Monitoring of programme
Expected
ProjectProject
Organiser Avail
-able
Explicit
Espousal
Values
Student
Desired
Desired
Programme Project 1
Courses
OrganiserEvaluation
Student
Course 1^Individuals
Student
Programme
\Organiser/
Actual
Programme
ORSA Group 
Management
Desired
modules
Tutor Student
ORSA Group
Notes I 1. The problem of roles becomes increasingly important, I have not
specified individual teachers in this diagram, but it should be so 
extended,
2, By "tutor", I imply a general adviser to any individual student,
3, Students are shown as examples. Satisfactions/dissatisfactions
may be voiced by the student body as a whole (see diagram 3),
4, The desired programme is limited by available teachers and what they 
can, and wish to, teach - also by what students expect, request, 
object to, etc,
5, Diagram 2 must change as the process depicted above proceeds,
6, Diagrams 4 and 5 need to be extended if a full monitoring programme
is to be possible.
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’Students' are typical examples. Conflict is shown with how the 
course is run following communication with personal tutor/adviser.
Pi, Cl, are projects and courses.
Conflict between teaching staff and students as a body is represented
in diagram 3 (first revise),
The actual programme is governed by what teachers are available and 
what they can, and wish to, teach - also by what students expect, 
request, object to, etc.
There is a strong link with diagrams 2 and 4 (when fully developed)
and with diagram 5 (first revise). Development of these diagrams
is part of the monitoring and co-ordination process.
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Legend
A = Acting Head of Department
B, C = Senior Lecturers
D = Visiting Research Fellow
E to K = Lecturers
X = Head of Management Centre
IHD = Interdisciplinary Higher Degrees
MORS = Midland Operational Research Society
Notes
Students and Senate included in 
Diagram 3,
Conflicts (potential) are apparent 
from notational definition, but 
not stressed here.
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Note; As seen in later diagrams, this is subject to change due to conflicts and 
constraints,
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Notes: 1, Not all communication and purpose links are stressed,
2, Conflicts internal to the ORSA Group are extended in a later diagram,
3, SRC = Science Research Council (later Science and Engineering 
Research Council).
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Notes : 1. R R , are desired allocations of available R^|^ (time)11' '' ' Ip' * 
for the teaching programme; etc,
2. Some of the conflicts are seen, from other aspects in the next 
diagram,
3, I am not yet satisfied with the notation, logic and potential 
usefulness (when developed) of this diagram.
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Individuals may be members of ORSA Group Management, in which case 
hatched lines would be used.
Individual 1 is repeated for 2, ...
It would be useful (eventually) to have explicit aims, policies, etc, 
for each individual.
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Legend; As for diagram 1, except 
B not included (on leave)
Y = Dean
Z = Director of Post-Graduate 
(PG) Studies 
J = Main Course Organiser 
G = Admissions Tutor 
E = Course Organiser for 
part-time students
Notes ;
1, J (and G and E, not shown) 
has a direct responsibility 
to Z,
2. Mech. Eng. Dept, no longer 
seen as of any special 
importance, ^
DIAGRAM 2 (first revise)
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Notes on Diagram 2 (first revise)
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1. Hatched boxes represent ORSA and Environmental optional modules. Unhatched 
boxes outside the CORE are additional common subjects.
2. Arrowed lines imply that the influence of the box from which the line originates
will assist in the teaching of the box at which it terminates, particularly
in relation to the learning objective number shown in brackets. Hatched 
lines show potential influences (option may not be taken or project may not 
be relevant).
3. Learning Objectives are listed (1 to 25) in Attachment 4.
4. Only what I perceived (prior to discussion with the teaching staff) as the
more important and more likely interactions are included.
Abbreviations
CP = Computer Programming
IT = Information Technology
PS = Problem Structuring
M = Modelling
SM = Systems Methodology
Inf SD = Information Systems Design
M & PS = Management and Planning Systems
S & P = Systems and People
Notes on Diagram 2 (second revise)
1. ( ) implies that something is taught relevant to the Learning Objective
indicated by the bracketed number.
2. LOs 1 and 22 are probably not met.
3. The LOs do not seem to relate to SM2 as taught.
4. Accountancy teaching is ill-matched to that of the CORE and of Statistics - 
conflict lines show this.
5. The potential value of Information Technology teaching for other LOs was 
discussed, but no definite statements can yet be made.
6. This diagram represents an amalgamation of teaching staff's opinions, based 
on discussions of diagram 2 (first revise).
